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 In the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crisis, the United Kingdom’s Overseas 
Territories came under significant pressure to implement reform policies in their financial 
services industry. Yet the reform pressures in the form of policies prescribed by multiple 
regulatory authorities contained significant elements of overregulation that would 
undermine their international competitive advantage in financial services. The UKOTs 
had to devise a strategy by which to satisfy international regulatory requirements while 
protecting their ability to compete as industry leaders. From 2014 through 2016 they 
adopted eight key pieces of financial services legislation on Beneficial Ownership, 
Exchange of Information, and Common Reporting Standards. Together the policy and 
legislative adoptions constituted a long term reform policy within the financial services 
industries’ of the UKOTs. This study attempts to explain the choice of policy adoptions 
that comprise the reform from among the policies prescribed by regulatory authorities. It 
seeks to develop a minimally sufficient explanation for the reform outcome through use 
of a mixed method Process Tracing-QCA model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Question 
 
What explains the adoption of the 2014-16 financial services reforms by the UK 
Overseas Territories? 
1.2 Introduction 
 
From 2014 through 2016 seven of the UK Overseas Territories 
(UKOTs/territories) adopted eight key pieces of financial services legislation on 
Beneficial Ownership, Exchange of Information, and Common Reporting Standards: UK-
CDOT (2014 ), US-UKOT FATCA IGA (2014), UK-Central Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership (2016), Global Common Reporting Standard(CRS)  for Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information( 2016), FATF-Recommendations and Guidance on 
Transparency and Beneficial Ownership (2016), G20-High Level Principles on 
Beneficial Ownership Transparency (2016), G20-Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2016),  EU –Fourth Money Laundering 
Directive of the European Union (2016).1 
                                                 
1 The British Overseas Territories holding significant Financial Services sectors – (7) in total (Anguilla, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Gibraltar, Bermuda, Turks and Caicos). In regard to 
Financial Services the British Overseas territories generally lobby as a bloc of 14, but only the bloc of 7 
adopts and implements legislation. Peter Clegg & Peter Gold, “The UK Overseas Territories: a decade 
of progress and prosperity?,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 49:1 (2013): 115-135. DOI: 
10.1080/14662043.2011.541117.  
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Together the policy and legislative adoptions constitute a long term reform policy 
within the financial services industries of the UKOTs.2  The last major reforms instituted 
by the territories occurred over a decade earlier between 2000 & 2002, and again in 2005 
as part of greater global level financial center reforms initiated by the OECD.3 Thereafter 
the territories have largely been deemed compliant with international regulatory standards 
in the pre-reform period.4  
In the aftermath of the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis, the UKOTs faced 
increasing pressures to institute financial services reforms from the unilateral (US, UK), 
bilateral (UK), regional (EU), and multilateral  (FATF, OECD, G20) levels of regulatory 
authority. The reform pressures were comprised of a series of prescribed policies for the 
territories to adopt, most at the threat of penalty for noncompliance or non-adoption. The 
final reform package included a combination of the prescribed policies, of which some 
were adopted in a form different than its original presentation by regulatory authorities.  
Given the territories’ status as UK Overseas Territories sharing sovereignty with 
the United Kingdom, the literature largely attributes their financial services reforms either 
                                                 
2 The Exchange of Notes between the Government of the UK and UKOTs on sharing beneficial ownership 
information describes the adoption as a major reform. “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories 
and Crown Dependencies,” Gov.UK., Last modified April 21, 2016, accessed June 2, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/518300/Exchange_of_inf
ormation_between_UK_government_and_the_government_of_the_British_Virgin_Islands.pdf. 
3 The 2000-2002 & 2005 reforms adopted by the territories included the Model Agreement on Exchange of 
Information on Tax Matters, Controlled Bilateral on-request Arrangements for assisting OECD member 
states in tax as well as the Tax Information Exchange Agreement for automatic reporting of interest 
payments under the EU Savings Directive. “Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field 2007 
ASSESSMENT BY THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION,” OECD PUBLICATIONS, No. 
44430286 2006, 6-8. 
4 “Exchange of Information on Request Ratings,” OECD: Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, accessed April 15, 2017, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/ratings/#d.en.342263. 
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to negotiations, protection, or pressure from the UK.5 The UK and UKOTs constitutional 
relationship at present makes Britain ultimately responsible for ensuring the territories 
comply with international standards of economic and financial regulation.6  The public 
record further substantiates that following the UK’s 2013 hosting of the G8 summit, the 
UK Parliament began pressuring the territories to adopt greater transparency policies on 
beneficial ownership and public registers.7  
However, given the existence of simultaneous competing reform pressures on the 
territories in addition to the UK, it cannot be simply assumed that the UK is primarily 
responsible for the reforms. The US, EU, FATF, OCED, and FATF all were making 
regulatory demands on the territories in the pre-reform period. It is not clear that UKOT 
policy adoptions such as the US FATCA IGA or OECD CRS & AEOI were made at the 
behest of the UK given the direct negotiations of territories with the US Treasury and 
their steering group representation in the OECD Global Forum. These and other 
independent activities of the UKOTs give indications of a competing explanation to the 
UK centered hypothesis proliferating the literature. Yet little further speculation has been 
undertaken within the literature as to the basis for the structure of the UKOTs 2014-2016 
reforms and the details of how they came to be. The question remains as to what was the 
primary basis for the selection of policies from among those prescribed by regulatory 
authorities both prior and during the reform period. The objective of this study is to 
                                                 
5 Houlder, “UK reaches tax agreement with overseas territories.”  Rogers, British Overseas Territories in 
the Caribbean agree to central registries of beneficial ownership information – the first step on the 
slippery slope to full disclosure has been taken.” 
6 “2010 to 2015 government policy: UK Overseas Territories - Policy paper,” GOV.UK, last modified May 
8, 2017, accessed January 10, 2017,  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-
government-policy-uk-overseas-territories/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-overseas-territories. 
 
7 Ibid. 
13 
 
identify the basis for the choice of policy adoptions that ultimately comprise the reform 
package.  
Questions of regulation and regulatory reform in the financial services sectors of 
Small Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) generally, and those of the UK Overseas 
Territories specifically, has in the past been examined primarily within the context  of 
geopolitics, international political economy, international law, tax law, and shared 
sovereignty approaches. Within these approaches regulatory reform is either the product 
of a global power struggle between economic powers, financial services competition 
between large onshore financial centers and small offshore financial centers, struggles for 
extraterritorial application of regulation vs traditional concepts of territorial jurisdiction 
and nationality, or based on examination of the relational precedent for the imposing of 
British direct rule in the territories.  
Yet these conventional approaches are characterizing by an agency deficit in 
which little agency is attributed to the territories in the reform of their financial services 
industries. The international political economy and tax law approaches attribute financial 
services reform in small OFCs to efforts by states with large onshore financial centers, 
including Britain, to regulate transparency gaps and harmful tax competition by small 
offshore financial centers both unilaterally and via multilateral institutions. The 
geopolitics and shared sovereignty approaches attribute regulation and regulatory reform 
of the territories’ financial services to the UK’s efforts to protect the territories from 
regulation harmful to the OT economies, and itself from potential liabilities caused by the 
territories’ financial services industries.  
14 
 
Common to each approach is the regarding of the UKOTs as merely principals in 
regulatory processes in which they are actively involved for their own survival. OFCs 
actively lobby large states bilaterally as well as lobby multilateral institutions to constrain 
regulatory efforts harmful to their financial services industries.8 In multilateral financial 
and economic institutions where large states have sought to delegitimize the financial 
services model of small OFCs, the OFCs have used the same institutions as forums by 
which to levy international law to demand a level playing field with large countries in 
terms of regulatory requirements.9 The most effective OFCs have found the means to 
effectively preserve their financial services industries despite their small size and power 
deficit. As such, the presentation of the UKOTs merely as principals is not wholly 
accurate as the literature does give indications of agency exercised by the small offshore 
financial centers.   
While indeed suffering from an agency deficit, the conventional approaches do 
sufficiently account for the conditions and context within which the reform pressures 
were exerted on the territories.  In the UKOTs financial services case, the policy 
prescriptions contained considerable elements of overregulation in which the territories 
were under pressure to adopt early non-universal policies targeting specific 
jurisdictions.10 Adoption and compliance with those policies stood to significantly 
undermine the territories ability to compete internationally. Geopolitics, international 
                                                 
8 Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of 
Offshore Sovereignty,” Law & Policy January (2007): 51-66. 
9 Ibid. 
10 The deduction is made from Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge’s definition of over-regulation. Baldwin, Robert, 
and Martin Cave, and Lodge, Martin. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 2nd Ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 70.  Vanessa Houlder, “UK reaches tax agreement with 
overseas territories,” Financial Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 2, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/749e219e-99e3-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc. 
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political economy, and international law approaches sufficiently account for process by 
which the elements of overregulation emerge as a part of both geopolitical and economic 
competition.  
However, those approaches do not characterize efforts to excessively regulate 
small OFCs as overregulation. Those efforts are instead framed as minimizing contingent 
liability, ameliorating harmful tax competition, extraterritorial application of national 
regulatory authority, and geopolitical economic rivalry. Likewise, they also do not 
examine the responses to excessive regulation as overregulation responses. They are 
instead defined as efforts to achieve a level playing field, the levying & financializing of 
sovereignty, or leveraging of sovereign ambiguity.11  
An assessment of the structure of the 2014-2016 reforms warrants a theoretical 
approach framing the reform within an overregulation context in which the viability of 
UKOTs financial services industry is threatened by a series of prescribed regulations 
decreasing their comparative advantage.  Framing is necessary that considers the reforms 
a response by smaller actors to attempted overregulation by larger actors given their 
power and size deficit. This study begins with the assumption of agency on the part of the 
territories and that the undermining of their ability to compete in financial services is an 
existential threat they actively seek to avert. 
1.3 Significance of the Study: 
 
Academically, this study will add to the existing body of knowledge by filling a 
research gap in the study of the regulation of Small Offshore Financial Centers generally, 
                                                 
11 The terms are explained in depth in the review of literature. 
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and financial services regulatory reform in the UK Overseas Territories specifically. The 
case of the UKOTs 2014- 2016 financial services reforms has not been addressed in the 
literature to date. Theoretically, this study stands to give some indication as to whether 
the case meets the predictions of overregulation theory and the theory of comparative 
advantage.  While the findings of the case are not generalizable, they are based on 
systematic causal mechanisms from general theories. The case does having some capacity 
for illustrating the efficiency of explanation of the two theories.  
The study also holds practical importance in identifying how the territories as 
microstates were able to successfully navigate international demands for reform policies 
that stood to ultimately undermine the viability of their financial services industries. The 
power deficit in the global economy suggests that microstates do not wield a significant 
enough degree of economic or political power to resist the demands of larger actors. Yet 
the UKOTs as micro states are successfully meeting their national interests relative to 
larger actors in the center of the international financial architecture of the global 
economy.   
The overregulation approach changes the context of the discussion from 
international regulators seeking to safeguard against the harmful practices of small 
offshore financial centers due to inadequate regulation, to consideration of the possibly 
harmful effects of those regulatory efforts on the territories’ financial services economic 
lifeline. The approach is distinct in this granting of agency to the territories where the 
conventional approaches maintain an agency deficit. The territories are not regarded as 
mere principals, but instead as actors actively involved in the regulatory process seeking 
17 
 
to defend their own national interests.  
1.4 Organization of the Study 
 
Chapter 1 of this study was dedicated to the introduction of the research question 
and topic area, giving justifications for its pursuit and stating the fundamental problem it 
seeks to address.  Chapter 2 of this study includes an extensive literature review of the 
regulation of small Offshore Financial Centers generally, and the UK Overseas 
Territories in particular. Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework employed in this 
study, specifically over-regulation theory and the theory of competitive advantage. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the research design, presenting the hypothesis and details of the 
methodology utilized to answer the stated research question.  The chapter presents and 
justifies the units of analysis, operationalizes all theoretical concepts, and discusses the 
reliability and validity of the measures in both processes. The research parameters and 
basic assumptions and limitations of the study are defined in this chapter. Chapter 5 is 
dedicated to process tracing, outlining the steps leading to the reform. Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis is undertaken in the chapter as a tool for tracing the key decision 
making stage in which the reform is populated by policy adoptions.  Chapter 6 presents a 
summary of the research findings and goes on to discuss how they complement existing 
research on the question. The chapter closes with a discussion of the limitations of the 
analysis and identifies future research possibilities emerging from the findings. 
18 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of literature is dedicated to both regulatory reform in the UKOTs and 
the competitive advantages they enjoy in financial services. Regulation and regulatory 
reform in small Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs), often micro-states, has been 
addressed within academic literature from a broad variety of perspectives including 
geopolitics, international political economy, tax law, and international law.  Financial 
services regulation and regulatory reform specific to the UKOTs has been discussed 
within the context of shared sovereignty inclusive of contingent liability considerations 
and existing precedent for the imposing of direct rule.  In both groupings of approaches, 
the literature does not discuss nor consider regulation of the UKOTs in terms of 
overregulation. Rather, they address regulation of small OFCs in the contexts of limiting 
harmful tax competition, facilitating greater financial transparency, and minimizing the 
contingent liabilities posed by the UKOTs. While not directly addressing overregulation, 
both groupings of approaches provide the context within which overregulation of the 
territories’ financial services industries has emerged.  
Competitive Advantage, with regard to small OFCs and the UKOTs specifically, 
is discussed within international political economy and tax law approaches. Within the 
literature specific emphasis has been placed on the differential and focus advantages in 
financial services built by the territories within the international financial regulatory 
framework over time. The review of literature will concisely cover both regulatory 
reform and competitive advantage in financial services of the UKOTs as small OFCs. 
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2.1 Geopolitics, International Political Economy, Tax Law & International Law 
 
The geopolitical approach describes the regulation of offshore financial centers as 
the product of geopolitical struggles among great and regional economic powers in the 
global economy to protect and preserve the Offshore Financial Centers of vital interest to 
their economies.12 Stability or changes in the international financial and economic 
regulatory framework are reflective of the greater geopolitical conflict for dominance or 
balance among the economic poles of the world.13   
The International Political Economy approach discusses regulation and regulatory 
reform of OFCs as the product of economic competition between large onshore financial 
centers and small offshore financial centers within the global economy.14 The 
competition is centered in financial services as microstates with small populations, 
territory, resources, and economic activity, have relatively few means to compete in the 
global economy or raise sufficient revenue from their tax base to fund state activity. They 
have successfully adopted an economic model that leverages their sovereignty, 
financialzing or commercializing it within the legal structure of the global economy to 
offer low tax (or no tax) transparency thin financial services.15 Large onshore centers in 
states with massive tax revenue requirements are unable to compete with these lower tax 
rates creating a political-economic conflict between small and large financial centers.16  
This political-economic conflict and resulting tax competition between large and 
                                                 
12 Vincent Piolet, “The city of London: Geopolitical Issues Surrounding the World’s Leading Financial 
Center,” Hérodote No 151 (2013/4): 102-119. DOI 10.3917/her.151.0102. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Iris H-Y Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax 
Havens and Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,” Connecticut Journal of Int’l Law, Vol. 
31:123 (2015): 3-24. 
15 Ibid, 4-8. 
16 Ibid. 
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small financial centers has been primarily mediated in multilateral liberal international 
financial institutions including the OECD, FACTA, G20, IMF, and EU.17 The 
multilateral institutions have sought to simultaneously minimize the harm to the large 
financial centers while maintaining the economic viability of the small centers. Financial 
and economic regulation has been the institutional tool to limit the harmful tax 
competition between jurisdictions and contain a race to the bottom in tax rates and 
transparency.18  The flux and change in international regulatory requirements is reflective 
of the ongoing conflict between large and small financial centers in the global economy.  
Varying multilateral strategies have been attempted to mediate the tax 
competition each with limited success. Morris & Moberg describe the attempted 
cartelization of international tax policy by G7 countries within the OECD as a basis for 
the regulating international tax competition prior to the 2007-08 financial crisis.19 This 
cartelization strategy was intended to create and formalize an institutional definition of 
harmful tax competition, establish international regulatory standards around the concept, 
and enforce it by sanctions in the form of a blacklist that restricts access to their 
markets.20  It was ultimately unsuccessful due to opposition from powerful G20 states 
outside the OECD including China and India who did not wish to see their OFCs (Hong 
Kong, Macau, Mauritius) under sanction.21 As a result no international consensus could 
be built multilaterally on harmonization or convergence of national tax rates via 
                                                 
17 Chew, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,” 9-11. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Andrew P. Morriss Lotta Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign against 
Harmful Tax Competition,” Columbia Journal of Tax Law, Vol. 4:1 (2012): 1-64. 
20 Ibid, 1-5, 45-46. 
21 Ibid, 53-55. 
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cartelization.  
In the absence of attaining agreement on regulating tax competition via 
cartelization, multilateral approaches then focused on transparency and automatic 
exchange of information strategies. These new approaches were pursued via responsive 
regulation based on dialogue teamed with meta-regulation.22 In this paradigm dialogue, 
negotiation, and progressively escalating sanctions were perceived as effective tools. This 
new regime paralleled the pre-crisis regulatory strategies where in the first decade of the 
2000’s economics and finance was governed by a paradigm of state deregulation and 
industry self-regulation. 23     
However, the crisis and post-crisis conditions initiated a crisis in international 
public law in regards to regulating financial and economic transnational flows in a world 
economy characterized by globalization.24 Globalization created an ambiguous and often 
conflicting space between jurisdictional authority, territoriality, nationality, in the 
application and enforcement of regulations in industry’s dominated by cross border 
flows. 25  State authority’s legal enforcement reach is limited to their own jurisdiction 
over their own nationals or those choosing to reside, as well as businesses originated in 
the state. Yet globalization grants the ability to participate in cross border trade and 
investment from different registration and domiciling jurisdictions bringing into question 
                                                 
22 Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of 
Offshore Sovereignty,” Law & Policy January (2007): 51-66. 
23 Ibid, 52-54. 
24 Mahmood Bagheri and Mohammad Jafar Ghanbari Jahromi, “Globalization and extraterritorial 
application of economic regulation: crisis in international law and balancing interests,” European 
Journal of Law and Economics, No. 41 (2016): 292-329. 
25 Ibid, 398-400. 
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whose regulatory authority and rules individuals or companies legally fall under.26  
The issue is particularly problematic in terms of taxation and profit shifting as the 
legal regulatory gap is exploited by aggressive tax planners as well as financial criminals 
to avoid paying little or no taxes (through the use of other jurisdictions such as OFCs).27  
There are no legal means to balance between the interests of states on their sovereign 
rights to determine the level of taxation within their own jurisdiction. Classical legal 
concepts of territoriality and nationality within international regimes of state sovereignty 
do not have an answer for this question.28 There is little or no legal recourse for states to 
recoup lost tax revenue or halt the supposed harm caused by exploitation of these 
sovereignty and territorial gaps.   
However, with occurrence of the global financial crisis, governments’ faith in the 
industry self-regulation paradigm was largely eroded given the numerous scandals at the 
heart of the economic collapse.29 There was a general consensus within the post-crisis 
regulatory paradigm that government needed to play a greater role in economic and 
financial regulatory matters beyond monitoring, sanctioning, or combatting terrorism & 
rogue regime financing.30 Chiu argues that these changes in international political 
economy in turn led to changes in the international legal order, resulting in a reversion to 
unilateral approaches to financial and economic regulation that parallel the command and 
control approaches of the past.31  Bagheri and Jahromi describe how concerned states 
                                                 
26 Ibid, 394-396. 
27 Ibid, 403, 408-411. 
28 Ibid, 399-400. 
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have implemented unilateral policies granting extraterritorial application of their national 
economic and financial regulations and laws in regard to their citizens and businesses 
operating within foreign jurisdictions. 32 The US, UK, and EU have each sought to 
impose their regulatory authority beyond their territorial jurisdictions (extraterritoriality) 
via Automatic Information Reporting Regimes (inclusive of the US’s Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act, the UK’s Finance 2016 Bill, and the EU’s Administration 
Cooperation Directive).33 
Lesage and Vermeiren describe this reversion to unilateral and pseudo command 
and control regulatory structures as a part of the new constitutionalism of disciplinary 
neo-liberalism in the post-crisis period.34 The structure of globalization created a 
political-geographical mismatch between private economic activity, the mobility of 
finance and capital, and political regulation. The financial crisis highlighted the weakness 
of lackluster financial regulation in managing this mismatch, which threatened the short 
term viability of neo-liberal globalization.35 Taxation is one of the key areas in which the 
mismatch is exploited, proving to be particularly problematic, ultimately requiring a new 
regulatory framework by which to address it.36  
Post-financial crisis neoliberalism has assumed disciplinary elements to govern 
the movement of capital within globalization which was partially responsible for the 
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crisis.37  New constitutional arraignments at the international level have been put in place 
to legally encode the regulatory dimension of neo-liberal globalization where gaps 
previously existed; particularly in regard to free movement of the products, production 
factors, and property rights.38 The result is unilaterally imposed reporting regimes 
coexisting alongside multilateral reporting regimes characterizing the international 
financial regulatory landscape. These reporting regimes have been the formal means 
through which overregulation of the UKOTs has been pursued in the post-crisis period. 
2.2 Shared Sovereignty: Contingent Liability and Direct Rule Precedents   
Specific to the UK Overseas Territories, the regulation of their financial services 
industries has been discussed within the context of the territories’ constitutional 
relationship with the United Kingdom.39 There are 14 populated United Kingdom 
Overseas Territories (UKOTs) located  in the Caribbean (Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks & Caicos Islands), West Atlantic (Bermuda), South 
Atlantic (St Helena, Tristan Da Cunha, Ascension, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands, Falkland Islands,), Indian Ocean (British Indian Ocean Territory ), 
Pacific (Pitcairn Islands), and Europe (Gibraltar).40  Most of the Territories are largely 
self-governing, each with its own constitution and its own government, which enacts 
local laws. The people of each territory freely choose whether or not to remain a UK 
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Overseas Territory presently and in the future.41 The majority of UKOTs are 
economically self-sufficient among a range of industries between them. Large offshore 
financial centers & tourism (Bermuda, BVI and Cayman Islands), extensive shipping 
trade and an online gaming (Gibraltar), and fisheries & agriculture (Falkland Islands) are 
the pillars of the wealthier territories.42 Nine of the UKOTs are directly associated with 
the European Union under the banner of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) 
Association (OCTA) since 2013 including Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St Helena and Turks and Caicos 
Islands.43 The OCTs have entered into an association agreement with the EU, but are not 
members and not directly subject to EU law.44  The OCT relationship with the EU serves 
to reinforce the sovereignty and self-determination of the UKOTs raising their 
international profiles.  
The millennial relationship between the UK and its OTs has been governed by a 
New Paradigm established by the 1999 white paper (Overseas Territories Bill: 
Partnership for Progress and Prosperity) and reaffirmed in the 2012 White Paper (OT:  
Security, Success and Sustainability). 45 The Partnership for Progress and Prosperity re-
organized and restructured the post-colonial relationship to allow for shared post-colonial 
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sovereignty after almost three decades of ambiguity following the British decolonization 
period.46 The territories were to be economically viable and self-sustaining, with the local 
governments responsible for localized governance, management of the economy 
inclusive of fiscal and taxation policy, and social stability. The UK government is 
responsible for internal security (police forces), external security (military), and the 
adherence of the territories to international standards of financial and economic 
regulation in their financial services industries, human rights, and environmental 
protection.47   
The UK recommitted itself to assuming responsibility for the contingent liabilities 
of the territories which included ﬁnancial sector failures, corruption, drug trafﬁcking, 
money laundering, migrant pressure and natural disasters. 48 The territories as UKOTs 
must also meet the UK’s legal obligations to comply with international standards of 
financial and economic regulation set by international bodies.49 The UK has the 
responsibility to ensure their territories are not facilitating financial crime, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, terrorist financing, or harmful tax competition practices. 
Clegg examines existing precedent for the imposition of instances of direct rule by the 
UK in the territories within the context of the new millennial relationship. All areas of 
contingent liability, including regulation of the financial services industry, may justify the 
imposition of direct rule to preserve or restore the social stability and economic 
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independence of the state.50 
While holding the territories to meeting international standards of regulation, 
particularly in regard to harmful tax competition and transparency, the UK government 
has been committed to defending the financial services industries of the territories in 
order to maintain their self-sustaining economic viability.51 The OT’s s economies suffer 
from acute economic vulnerability due to their narrow revenue bases.52 Their economies 
are housed on a few pillars including financial services, tourism and construction, of 
which financial services and tourism generate roughly some 50% of government revenue 
in the Caribbean and North Atlantic territories.53 Wherever possible, the UKOT 
governments seek to defend their financial services industries from harmful legislation 
emerging out of the UK, EU, or OECD. This shared sovereignty regime is intended to 
meet both the interests of the UK and its OTs.  
However, UK membership in the European Union also subjects the territories to 
some degree to regional regulatory standards. According to Woolard, once the British 
OTs citizens became UK citizens, and thereby European Union citizens with the right of 
abode in UK and EU, their new status required that standards of governance in human 
rights and financial and economic regulation meet EU standards.54  The UKOT’s 
integration into the EU-OCT Association (OCTA) created the EU expectation that the 
territories not only international financial and economic regulatory standards, but also 
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conforming to EU specific standards and initiatives. 55   
2.3 Competitive Advantage in Financial Services  
The UKOTs among other small OFCs have successfully built international 
competitive advantage among their competitors in the financial services industry to 
become industry leaders globally.56 The financial services model (competitive advantage 
strategy)  utilized among the territories allows the UKOTs to lure significant enough 
numbers of clients to their jurisdictions to compete with large states hosting substantial 
populations, economic productivity, and tax bases.57 Chiu describes how the economic 
model of small OFCs leverages their sovereignty, financialzing and commercializing it 
within the legal structure of the global economy to offer low tax (or no tax) transparency 
thin financial services.58 The UKOTs financial services model structures their services 
around the governing international regulatory regimes in a manner enabling them to offer 
not only low taxation rates, but also competitive prices and financial innovation that their 
competitors cannot. Their form of economic modelling drives international constituents 
such as multinational corporations with highly mobile international investment capital to 
the jurisdictions rather than to onshore competitors.59  
The competitive advantage strategy of the UKOTs has been based primarily on 
focus leadership and differentiation. The UKOTs have pursed a focus strategy of 
                                                 
55 Ibid, 1301-1307. The UKOTs are official members of OCTA, “2001/822/EC: Council Decision of 27 
November 2001 on the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European 
Community ("Overseas Association Decision") Official Journal L 314, 30/11/2001 P. 0001 – 0077. 
56 Iris H-Y Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax 
Havens and Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,” Connecticut Journal of Int’l Law, Vol. 
31:123 (2015): 3-24. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, 3-9. 
59 Ibid, 7. 
29 
 
specialization within niche markets. 60  The four larger financial centers specialize, with 
Bermuda having the third largest center for reinsurance in the world, and second largest 
captive insurance domicile; Cayman Islands having the world’s leading center for hedge 
funds; the British Virgin Islands being the world’s leading domicile for international 
business company registrations; and Gibraltar providing all three services as Europe’s 
financial services gateway to the UK, and the UK’s gateway to Europe. 61 The smaller 
OFCs of Anguilla, Montserrat, and Turks & Caicos Islands focus primarily on company 
incorporations.   
The differentiation strategy of the UKOTs centers on the provision of low tax 
rates, regulatory efficiency, privacy, UK based common law, political stability, and the 
provision of high quality customer service by a highly skilled labor force.62  Based on 
their small size and the minimal fiscal requirements of the UKOTs as microstates, they 
offer low to zero national and corporate tax rates.63 Due to the large scale of the fiscal 
requirements of the larger states, large onshore centers cannot significantly lower their 
taxation rates to compete with this level of taxation; granting the territories a distinct 
advantage.  
The territories are efficiently regulated, up to date and in compliance with 
international standards at the unilateral (US, UK), bilateral (UK), regional (EU) and 
multilateral levels (FATF, OECD, G20).64 They advertise themselves as safe, efficient, 
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well regulated jurisdictions continually instituting sound regulation backed by stable 
government administration.65 They have built their brands on reputations as credible 
jurisdictions for corporations and financial structuring relative to their often larger 
competitors.66  The territories have steered clear of financial crime, money laundering, 
black markets, low transparency activities, or exploitative arbitrage. This track record of 
regulatory efficiency and adherence to international standards provides a safe 
environment for the movement of capital given that it will not be frozen by law 
enforcement due to illegal practices and financial crime.67  
Local privacy laws guarantee a great degree of comfort for clientele while not 
compromising legal transparency in financial matters.68 The UKOTs financial services 
sectors utilize UK based common law, the preferred international legal standard utilized 
by London (as the world’s leading financial center) and other major financial centers 
globally (including Hong Kong, Singapore, and Mauritius).69 This allows for a great 
degree of compatibility with the laws of other financial center worldwide as well as for 
great mobility among lawyers and accountants between jurisdictions.   
Complimentary to competent local workforces educated in the English language, 
the UKOTs financial services sectors have been able to successfully recruit a sufficient 
amount of specialists in accounting, law, and IT services from around the globe.70 With 
few exception (Montserrat, Anguilla), the UKOTs have a relatively high quality of life 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Chiu, “From Multilateral To Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax 
Havens and Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,” 9. 
67 Rawlings, 58-63. 
68 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,” 3-9. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid.  
31 
 
with the basic infrastructure, comforts, and amenities as most areas of the developed 
world. They are all politically stable democracies in the Westminster tradition with 
shared sovereignty with the UK who serves as the defacto maintainer of order and 
stability.71 There is little fear of the likelihood of political disorder that would disrupt 
business. The combined differentiation elements of the UKOTs financial services sectors 
attract clients to their jurisdictions rather than their competitors. 
The comparative advantage strategy (cost strategy) of the UKOTs centers on 
multiple tiers of cost.72 The first tier of costs is derived from the territories differentiation 
strategy in which financial services companies operating within the jurisdiction charge 
premium prices for international access to high quality financial services products that 
take advantage of the privacy, low taxation, and regulatory security of the jurisdiction.73 
Those services are provided via a highly skilled workforce providing efficient customer 
services and quick turn around and response times, and command a higher price. The 
second centers on providing cheaper government based rates for incorporations, 
insurance, domiciling and other services that are paid directly to the regulatory authorities 
in the territories.74  
However, international financial and economic regulation hold the possibility of 
crippling the territories’ competitive advantages.75 Regulation can restrict competitive 
advantage factor endowments and create uneven competition (uneven playing field), 
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advantaging some parties, while placing others at a competitive disadvantage.76 The 
UKOTs have had to guard and defend against policies that would impede their ability to 
differentiate their product at a lower comparative cost than their competitors within their 
chosen niche markets.77  
Rawlings describes the manner in which the new regulatory regimes increase due 
diligence, labor, facilities, technology, and specialist cost. 78 Jurisdictions may lack the 
regulatory infrastructure in terms of personnel, technology, security, and political access 
necessary to maintain compliance with new international standards. Transparency and 
reporting regimes in the post crisis period have increased operating costs in the UKOTs 
and all jurisdictions globally, complicating the process of maintaining regulatory due 
diligence.79 Substantially increased due diligence costs lower the monetary benefits 
gained by governments hosting offshore facilities; possibly even below the price of 
profitability.80  
Regulation that minimizes the UKOTs’ ability to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors places them at a competitive disadvantage relative to their competitors. 
In practical terms, regulations that decrease privacy, penalize low or no taxation, and 
complicates or decrease regulatory inefficiency harm the ability of the UKOTs to 
compete. The combination of the decrease in comparative and differential advantages in 
turn undermines the ability of the UKOTs to effectively service niche markets or pursue 
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specialization within their focus strategy. Without being able to offer significant 
jurisdictional advantages, clients will choose different financial centers with whom to do 
business. The entire process may serve to eliminate any competitive advantages the 
UKOTs have built over time and collapse the entire financial services industry. 
2.4 Shortcomings of the Literature 
The literature’s conventional approaches are characterized by an agency deficit in 
which little agency is attributed to the territories in the regulatory reform process. The 
international political economy and tax law approaches attribute financial services reform 
in small OFCs to efforts by states with large onshore financial centers, including the UK, 
to regulate transparency gaps and harmful tax competition by small offshore financial 
centers unilaterally and via multilateral institutions. The geopolitics and shared 
sovereignty approaches attribute regulation and regulatory reform of the territories’ 
financial services to the UKs efforts to protect both the territories from regulation 
harmful to their economies and itself from potential liabilities caused by the territories’ 
financial services industries. Common to each approach is the regarding of the UKOTs as 
merely principals in regulatory processes in which they are actively involved for their 
own survival. 
Contrary to this paradigm, OFCs exercise agency actively lobbying both large 
states bilaterally as well as multilateral institutions to constrain regulatory efforts harmful 
to their financial services industries. In multilateral financial and economic institutions 
where large states have sought to delegitimize the financial services model of small 
OFCs, the OFCs have used the same institutions as forums by which to levy international 
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law to demand a level playing field with large countries in terms of regulatory 
requirements.81 The most effective OFCs have found the means to effectively preserve 
their financial services industries and bolster their sovereignty despite their small size and 
power deficit.82 While small OFCs do not place regulation or regulatory reform on the 
agenda of regulatory authorities, they are active in their responses to both the regulations 
and authorities. As such, the presentation of the UKOTs merely as principals is not 
wholly accurate as the literature does give some indications of agency exercised by small 
OFCs in their ability to respond to regulatory pressures.   
In the area of competitive advantage, the financial services literature on small 
OFCs and the UKOTs focuses primarily on differential and focus advantages, with little 
attention given cost advantages (comparative advantage). Costs are addressed primarily 
in terms of due diligence costs with little attention to labor, facilities, and technology 
expenses. However, cost is a significant factor in the success of the UKOT model. The 
fee structure in particular charged by OT governments is comparatively low in 
comparison to onshore competitors.  By contrast firms working within the industry 
charge premium prices based on quality of service. Firms pay top salaries to attract a 
highly competent cadre of specialists (lawyers, accountants) to very small islands, often 
distant from their place of origin. Cost structure, while not the most important factor in 
the success of UKOTs financial services model, is never the less important in their 
success warranting increased attention. 
                                                 
81 Morris and Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax 
Competition,”49-51.  
82 Rawlings, 58-63. 
35 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The review of literature pertinent to the case points to two possible causal 
mechanisms within the reform process capable of explaining the reform outcome: 
overregulation and competitive advantage. The literature implies that elements of 
overregulation are present in the post-crisis regulatory architecture/regimes, and would 
likely have a negative effect on the competitive advantages the UKOTs built in financial 
services over time. Overregulation theory is based on core principles identified within 
other aspects of positivist regulatory theory including public interest and market failure, 
capture and private interests, regulatory design & regulatory failure, and unintended 
consequences. The review of literature identifies very explicit references to competitive 
advantage in the financial services models of small OFCs. The theory of competitive 
advantage within economics and business was popularized by Michael Porter’s strategy 
based application of competitive advantage, and thereafter extended within those fields 
for greater application. Together, the theories of overregulation and competitive 
advantage in tandem form the theoretical framework upon which the study is built. They 
provide the foundation upon which the research method and design are constructed, 
informing the choice of method and type of evidence deemed necessary to substantiate 
the case. 
3.1 Hypothesis  
The reform pressures facing the UKOTs were characterized by elements of 
overregulation, and the adoption or rejection of each prescribed reform policy was based 
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on its negative or positive impact on the territories’ international competitive advantage 
in financial services. If a policy did not impose a likely decrease on competitive 
advantage, it was met with a compliance response and adopted as part of the reform. If a 
policy was likely to impose a decrease on competitive advantage, it was rejected, 
forgoing compliance and followed by an alternative response to overregulation. 
3.2 Over-Regulation Theory 
Overregulation theory is used within the study to provide the regulatory context 
within which the reform pressures are interpreted by the UKOTs.83 The theory provides a 
framework for explaining the territories’ responses to excessive regulation of their 
financial services industries by regulatory authorities. Over-regulation, defined as ‘over-
stringent’ and ‘over-prescriptive’ regulation that reduces the possibilities for innovation 
and research, is largely executed via command and control regulatory mechanisms.84 
Overregulation theory itself is founded on the assumption that government or institutional 
regulations imposed on firms or industry undermine their positive effects on the market 
place.85 Over-regulation constitutes a form of regulatory failure characterized by over-
precision, over-formalism, and punitive enforcement that may reduce the possibilities for 
cooperative relationships and healthy regulatory communications that produce self-
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defeating outcomes.86 Over-regulation is most commonly associated with command and 
control mechanisms and may come about as the product of either capture (private 
interests), ill-suited world views (ideas), poor regulatory design, as an unintended 
consequence of a meaningfully intended regulation, as the product of competing multiple 
regulatory regimes, or as a part of meeting public interest objectives.87  
Over-regulation as the product of capture suggests that the dominant entities 
within a given industry (private interests) lobby politically the institutions and individuals 
central to the development of regulation to structure the regulation in a manner granting 
them advantages over their competitors.88 In exchange for resources and political support 
those key individuals and institutions support the regulatory agenda of the dominant 
entities in the given industry. Over-regulation as an extension of a predominating world 
view or idea is subjectively assessed based on the ideas and economic climate of the 
governing authorities.89 Liberalization and privatization typically are associated with a 
positive view towards less regulation and are used to justify large scale de-regulation of 
industry; while redistributionism tends to be equated with greater regulation.90  
Overregulation may also come about as a product of regulatory designs that ill 
target the problem it seeks to solve through over and under inclusion, by emphasizing 
precision over objective based compliance, by valuing sanctions over persuasion, and by 
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penalizing ignorance and inability rather than creative compliance.91  Over-regulation 
may also come about as an unintended consequence of the unforeseen (or unknown) 
effects of a regulation.92 Those possible effects were not taken into consideration nor 
planned for in establishing the given regulation undermining the actual intended effect of 
the regulation.93 Competing regulatory regimes may also give rise to over-regulation, 
where individually each regime itself would be adequate and non-burdensome.94 Over-
regulation may be deemed as an acceptable regulatory outcome necessary to protect the 
public interest by rectifying select market failures or achieving social objectives related to 
equity, justice, solidarity, and safety.95 
Positivist regulatory theory largely suggests that overregulation over time will 
likely result in non-compliance, creative compliance (regulatory gaming), attempted 
capture, unregulated market emergence (black markets/black trade), innovation 
stagnation, firm/industry collapse, or regulatory rollback (deregulation or reregulation). 
In response to excessive regulation firms will likely first conduct an assessment of the 
regulator’s ability to monitor, enforce, and sanction those who do not comply. If the 
regulator cannot adequately perform one or a combination of these, firms are likely to opt 
for noncompliance.96 Firms will then conduct a cost benefit analysis as to whether 
compliance or sanctions yield a greater cost. If non-compliance yields a lower cost than 
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compliance firms will opt for noncompliance.97 If the costs of compliance is lower but 
still burdensome, firms may undertake creative compliance.98 They will seek to game the 
regulator by side-stepping the rules in a manner negating the regulation, but not actually 
breaking its terms. If both compliance and sanctions costs are too high, firms will likely 
attempt to capture the regulation process by lobbying the institutions and individuals 
central to regulatory development and implementation.99 They will exchange influence 
and resources for the re-structuring of regulation in their favor.  If both compliance and 
sanctions costs are too high, and the regulatory process cannot be captured, firms may 
resort to moving their activities to less regulated areas with less transparency, creating a 
competing unregulated black market.100  
Where over-regulation persists, innovation is hurt as regulation inhibits efficient 
competition, limits investment & innovation, and restricts the use and implementation of 
new technology & pursuit of new research.101 Regulation may minimize or eliminate 
market based incentives to innovate, ultimately resulting in stagnation and poorer product 
quality. The absence of both efficient competition and innovation incentives, teamed with 
significant compliance or sanctions costs, stands to drive firms out of business and 
ultimately collapse the entire industry due to heavy regulatory burden.102 Faced with non-
competitive or collapsing industry, governing entities must rollback the regulatory regime 
in favor of either deregulation, regulatory reform, or reregulation.103 Deregulation 
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removes significant government intervention into the market while reform or reregulation 
emphasizes less command and control tools in favor of smart, meta, legal, and market 
based approaches.104 
The UKOT financial services reform case represents a regulatory scenario 
characterized by overregulation.105 The post-crisis reform pressures for early, non-
universal, and targeting adoptions undermining their ability to effectively compete in the 
financial services industry are all elements present in the policies prescribed for UKOT 
adoption.106   The pre-financial crisis procedural standard of implementation established 
for international economic and financial regulatory standards was universal adoption 
within a fixed time frame.107  The introduction and adoption of international regulatory 
standards was typically coordinated on a multilateral basis by the FATF, G20, IMF, and 
OECD in order to maintain a level playing field in the regulatory order. Simultaneous 
implementation and universal adoption were used to maintain a level playing field and 
fair competition among competitors as none are relatively disadvantaged based on the 
chronology of implementation.  
By contrast, non-universal and early targeted policy adoptions, prescribed with the 
threat of both immediate and long term sanction for noncompliance, create an uneven 
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Vehicles in Cross-Border Transactions,” INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
ORGANISATION AND THE SOCIETY OF TRUST AND ESTATE PRACTITIONERS (2002): 10-
16, accessed July 1, 2017, 
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106 There requirements are present in US FATCA, UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, 
OECD CRS & AEOI, and EU AMLD4. See Appendix 1. 
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playing field with uneven competition by imposing greater regulatory requirements on 
some competitors as opposed to others within the same industry.108 Specific jurisdictions 
are targeted, imposing higher regulatory costs and operational restrictions on their 
industries, undermining their ability to compete with competitors not targeted by the 
regulations. The Level Playing Field Initiative was central in establishing a standard 
emphasizing common regulatory standards for all jurisdictions both large and small. 109 
The initiative was introduced at the behest of small OFCs to ensure that their ability to 
compete was not impeded by larger states in multilateral institutions. However, the 
implementation of the post-crisis financial and economic regulatory regimes have been 
characterized by these forms of overregulation with which small OFCs have had to 
contend. 
3.3 Theory of Competitive Advantage  
The theory of competitive advantage is used in the study to explain the basis for 
the UKOTs choice of response to existing reform pressures. Porter’s theory of 
competitive advantage describes competitive advantage as the pursuit of strategies 
allowing a company or state to produce goods and services at a lower price in a more 
desirable fashion than their competitors.110 Maximizing conditions that enhance 
competitive advantage allow a country or firm to generate more sales or superior margins 
than its competition.111 Competitive advantage factor attributes include cost structure, 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
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110 Joe G. Thomas and Bruce Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES,” Reference for 
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brand, quality of product offering, distribution network, intellectual property and 
customer support.112 The successful pursuit of a strategy that most effectively balances 
between price and quality within a given market, will usually lead to a successful product 
or service, ultimately increasing relative competitive advantage. Porter suggested that to 
maximize competitive advantage entities needed to organize and pursue  the factor 
endowments  through generic strategies centered on comparative advantage (cost),  
differential advantage (differentiation), and focus advantages (Niche 
Markets/Specialization).113  
Comparative Advantage describes an entities ability to produce a product or 
service at a lower cost than its competitors.114 Through cost advantages entities can 
increase market share by having the lowest price to value ratio, appealing to cost-
conscious or price-sensitive consumers.115 Cost advantages can be derived from 
economies of scale, more efficient internal systems, and location in geographies with low 
labor or low property expenses. Porter suggests that to maintain cost advantages entities 
must find either a low-cost base of labor, materials, facilities, or a combination of 
these.116 The more sustainable an entity is able to make its competitive advantages, the 
greater the difficulty for its competitors to narrow those advantages.  
Differential advantage describes those advantages gained by a firm or state 
providing products or services different to those of its competitors.117 Differential 
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115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
43 
 
advantages are created when those differing goods and services stand out from those 
offered by competitors and are seen as superior in quality or functionality. Differentiation 
may be achieved through improvements to goods and services resulting in the delivery of 
higher quality or specialized products for which consumers are willing to pay a premium 
price.118 Differential advantages are driven by advanced technology, patent-protected 
products & processes, unique technical expertise, superior personnel, innovation, 
customer service, faster delivery, marketing, and strong brand identity.119  Porter suggests 
that differentiation strategies are most appropriate where the target market or 
demographic is not price-sensitive, the market is competitive or saturated, specific needs 
in the market are possibly under-served, and where the entity has unique resources and 
capabilities to be able to satisfy those needs in a manner difficult to copy by 
competitors.120 A successful differentiation strategy not only inspires brand loyalty for 
specific product or services, but also allows for the charging of a premium price for 
goods and services.   
Focus Advantages are achieved through a strategy in which business or states 
target only select target markets, segmenting their focus both geographically and 
demographically to find a niche.121 Focus market strategies targets distinct groups with 
specialized needs within a given market or industry.122 Porter suggests that a focus 
strategy should target market segments that are less vulnerable to substitutes or where 
                                                 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Manktelow, ed. “Porter's Generic Strategies: Choosing Your Route to Success.” 
122 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
44 
 
competition is weakest to earn above-average return on investment.123 Once the focus is 
decided, necessary adjustments can be made to secure comparative and differential 
advantages within the target market. Small businesses or states are able to establish 
themselves in a niche market using a focus strategy where they would be unable to 
compete in more general markets. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Research Design  
 
Research Type: Case Study (Within Case) 
Research Method: Mixed Method - Explaining Outcome Process Tracing & crs-
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Single Outcome Study/ nongeneralizable) 
Causality Type: Generative 
Causal Mechanism:  Type - Eclectic Theorization (Combine of two Systematic Causal 
Mechanisms) – Overregulation & Competitive Advantage 
Theory: Overregulation theory is based on core principles identified within other aspects 
of positivist regulatory theory including public interest and market failure, capture and 
private interests, regulatory design & regulatory failure, and unintended consequences. 
Competitive Advantage within this study will mainly reference Michael Porter’s strategic 
application of the theory.  
 Design Objective: The objective of the research design is to craft a minimally sufficient 
explanation for the UKOT reform outcome, accounting for all important aspects of the 
reform without redundant factors present. The explanation should account for the 
adoption of reform policies between 2014 and 2016 by the territories from among polices 
prescribed by regulatory authorities.124   
                                                 
124 The research design is based on the Explaining Outcome model as described by Bearch and Pedersen. 
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R., “What is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process 
Tracing Methods and their Uses and Limitations,” University of Aarhus, (January 2011), 22-28, 
accessed July 1, 2017, http://https//www.researchgate.net/publication/228162928_What_is_Process-
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Design:  
The essential task in tracing the reform outcome lies is identifying how each 
policy populating the reform was chosen in meeting the territories’ interests. The 
literature and evidence surrounding the case present two possible causal mechanisms 
within the process explaining the choice of policy adoptions: overregulation and 
competitive advantage. Elements of overregulation present in the prescribed policies 
stood to do significant harm to UKOTs financial services by reducing the competitive 
advantages the territories built over time. Therefore it may be theorized that the basis for 
the reform package is likely either the product of efforts to mitigate the effects of 
overregulation, efforts to maintain competitive advantage, or the product of efforts to 
protect competitive advantage from the effects of overregulation. The likely answer is to 
be found in a deductive exploration of the reform process, tracing its evolution and 
eliminating those theories unable to provide a minimally sufficient explanation for the 
choice of policy adoptions. 
However, pursuit of the research question by conventional process tracing 
methods poses numerous challenges based on the nature of the case and question. The 
reform question is one of causality seeking to identify the relationship between variables 
driving the process towards the reform outcome. Whereas, the likely causal mechanisms 
at the center of the process are conditional in nature, designed to assess whether actions 
within the process parallel select characteristics within each theory.125  
                                                                                                                                                 
  
125 The conclusion is drawn in regard to overregulation theory and competitive advantage based on the 
explanations of Fischer & Maggetti. Manuel Fischer & Martino Maggetti Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis and the Study of Policy Processes, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
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Process tracing provides for the overall structure of the study, particularly in 
regard to identifying the complex causal relationships driving the reform process. It is an 
efficient means by which to pursue a reform question who’s hypothesis’ is founded on 
two systemic level theories.126 Process tracing however is not an efficient means for 
assessing overregulation responses and competitive advantage impact which are 
conditional in nature. A simple reproduction of events would only provide a record of 
adoptions and rejections without an explanation of the accompanying process. A mere 
rebuilding of a chronology of events based on evidence would not sufficiently inform as 
to how the reform was package was chosen. Given this limitation, an additional method 
must be paired with process tracing to assess conditionality, from whose results the 
tracing of the populating stage of the reform may be completed.  
The research question therefore warrants an unconventional mixed method 
approach. Qualitative Comparative Analysis is the most efficient means available among 
qualitative methods to assess causality via conditionality based on necessity and 
sufficiency.127 It provides the necessary complement to process tracing necessary to 
successfully pursue the research question. However, the combination of process tracing 
and QCA is uncommon and there are no clear guidelines for the process.128  This form of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Practice, (2016): 1-17, 
DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2016.1149281,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2016.1149281. 
126 Beach and Pedersen, “What is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process 
Tracing Methods and their Uses and Limitations,” 4-6. 
127 Fischer & Maggetti, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Study of Policy Processes,” 1-3. 
128 Carsten Q. Schneider and Ingo Rohlfing, “Combining QCA and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic Multi-
Method Research,” Sociological Methods & Research 42, no. 4 (March 22, 2013):  559-597, accessed 
July 22, 2017, www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0049124113481341 
smr.sagepub.com. 
Ibid, 560. “Although it is becoming more common in empirical research, there are only very limited 
guidelines on how to systematically integrate QCA and process tracing in a single analysis. Ragin 
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mixed method research can be particularly complex given the variations in both the types 
of process tracing and QCA.  With a minimum of three types of process tracing and 2 
types of QCA in each method, the possible combinations exceed 10. This study seeks to 
combine Explaining Outcome Process Tracing and Crisp Set QCA, with Process Tracing 
providing the overarching method and QCA used as an analytical tool within it.  
Through an explorative deductive process, Explaining Outcome Process Tracing 
seeks only to provide a minimally sufficient explanation for the reform outcome rather 
than build or test theory.129 A minimally sufficient explanation accounts for all they key 
elements of the reform without gaps in logic or chronology, and is not generalizable 
beyond the case.130 In the UKOT financial services reform case, a minimally sufficient 
explanation for the reform outcome includes: 
i. An explanation of the variety of responses to the policies prescribed by regulatory 
authorities. 
ii. An explanation of the basis for the choice of response to each policy. 
iii. An explanation for the adoption of a prescribed policy in a form other than its 
original presentation by regulatory authorities. 
These requirements are drawn from the literature and accompanying evidence 
                                                                                                                                                 
emphasizes the general importance of case studies—mainly because QCA, much as regression analysis, 
infers causation from a cross-case association. There is, however, no elaboration of how exactly process 
tracing and QCA should be linked…Case studies benefit from QCA by disciplining the analysis of set 
relational patterns that are difficult, if not impossible to identify in small-n research. At the same time, 
process tracing is an invaluable complement for QCA in order to discern the causal mechanisms behind 
a set relational pattern and further improve the theory and QCA model. Depending on the parameters of 
the study (necessity vs. sufficiency, etc.), we have shown how to use QCA results for systematic case 
selection, how to derive clues about the potential reasons of deviance from the results, and how process 
tracing insights feed back into the pre-QCA stage and the actual QCA.” 
129 Beach and Pedersen, “What is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process 
Tracing Methods and their Uses and Limitations,” 22-28. 
130 Ibid. 
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surrounding the case.131 A comparison of prescribed and adopted policy indicates that at 
least two policies were adopted by the UKOTs in a form other than their original 
presentation by the regulatory authority (FATCA, Public Central Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership).132 This immediately demonstrates a series of rejection and noncompliance 
responses (rejection of the original policy) in the reform process adjacent to the adoption 
and compliance responses that populated the reform. For a minimally sufficient 
explanation, all variations of response leading to the reform outcome must be accounted 
for by the theory including rejections.  The mechanism must distinguish between these 
individual responses and the motivations behind them in regard to each prescribed policy.    
QCA is applied within this overarching Explaining Outcome Process Tracing 
Model as an analytical tool rather than research method. The QCA’s purpose is limited to 
identifying which mechanism is operating at the decision making stage, but not extending 
into the other steps in the reform process. A full-fledged QCA design with a comparative 
analysis, as done in the using QCA as a research method, is not necessary to trace the 
decision making stage. In this limited QCA application, evidence surrounding the case is 
sufficient to inform whether the responses to each policy met the conditions for 
overregulation responses, and whether each prescribed policy meets the conditions for 
increasing or decreasing competitive advantage. The adjoining steps in the process are 
                                                 
131 Explaining outcome PT relies heavily on the researcher’s knowledge to determine the basis and 
configuration of a minimally sufficient explanation. 
132 “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),” US Department of the Treasury, Accessed July 1, 
2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx. Patrick 
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2016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/12/overseas-territories-
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traced through standard process tracing methods. 
However, the integration of limited application QCA in the process tracing 
requires a unique nonconventional application of QCA to be functionally compatible and 
meet the needs of the case. First, the unit of analysis assessed by the QCA is the Y 
variable in the operational form of policies rather than the typical case units used in QCA. 
The reform question fundamentally revolves around the adoption of policy from a set of 
prescribed policies within a single case. As a result the unit of analysis is policy. Second, 
the QCA will be based on deduction rather than the inductive form typical of QCA. A 
deductive rather than inductive application was preferable because the necessary & 
sufficient conditions for both overregulation responses and competitive advantage were 
present in the literature, official documents, and industry reports. There was little utility 
in using QCA to assess which conditions are necessary or present for overregulation 
responses or competitive advantage decreases & increases. The unknown in the process 
was whether the polices prescribed to the territories prompted responses mimicking the 
characteristic conditions of overregulation, or whether the policies met the conditions 
necessary to initiate prospective decreases or increases in competitive advantage. A 
deductive approach matching each policy’s effects to known conditions provides the 
answer. Traditional applications of QCA would take the opposite via induction and from 
the analysis inform what conditions are present and necessary or sufficient for the 
responses or impact.133  
Despite these peculiarities, the analytical process and structure of the QCA remain 
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conventional founded on a typical eight step process.134  
1. Refine the QCA Evaluation Question  
2. Select the Unit of Analysis and Outcomes to be Studied  
3. Select “General Conditions” 
4. Identify “Necessary & Sufficient Conditions”  
5. Collect and Compile Data into a “Raw Data Table”  
6. Calibrate the Data   
7. Group Sets of Practices Together in a “Truth Table”  
8. Summarize Findings  
From the QCA result a comparison between policy impact on competitive 
advantage and reform policy adoptions & rejections can be made. The comparison will 
inform as to whether policies with null or positive impact on competitive advantage were 
adopted, as well as whether those with a negative impact were rejected. The QCA result 
further provides for a comparison between responses to each policy and the dominant 
overregulation responses identified in the theory.  A positive match would confirm the 
variation of responses in the reform process beyond compliance & adoption, and 
noncompliance & rejection. 
Explaining Outcome Process Tracing was specifically chosen because its singular 
pursuit of a minimally sufficient explanation may be pursued through the combination of 
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multiple causal mechanisms.135 The literature and evidence surrounding UKOT financial 
services reform case points to overregulation & competitive advantage as the likely active 
mechanisms present in the reform process. If neither mechanism is able to sufficiently 
explain the outcome, this process tracing method allows them to be combined for a 
broader base of explanation.     
Design Structure: 
The study’s design begins with the division of the reform into five (5) steps 
contextualizing the emergence of reform pressures (X variable) and ending with the 
reform outcome (Y variable). The steps are based on a chronology informed by the 
review of academic literature. From this division the reform process is traced across five 
steps critical to the reform outcome. Figure 4.1 illustrates the process tracing method 
through 5 steps. 136 
Step 1:  Global Financial Crisis Erodes the Previous Regulatory Paradigm 
Step 2: The Post Crisis Regulatory Architecture: Information Reporting Regimes 
Step 3: Reform Pressures: Prescribed Policies by Multiple Regulatory Authorities 
Step 4: Overregulation: Prescribed Polices contain elements of Overregulation 
threatening the UKOT’s Competitive Advantage in Financial Services 
Step 5: Response to Reform Pressure and Choice of Policy Adoptions 
Steps 1-4 provide the background and critical events that set the context for the 
emergence of reform pressures characterized by overregulation. Step five is the critical 
step in the reform, the point at which the choice of policy adoptions versus rejections is 
                                                 
135 Beach and Pedersen, “What is Process Tracing Actually Tracing? The Three Variants of Process 
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136 See page 
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made that characterize the entire process. The element of choice is critical as it is the 
point in the process where the activity of primary interest occurs and the causal 
mechanism is most active.  The fifth step is therefore structured as a three stage deductive 
process of tracing, integrating QCA, to determine which mechanism dominated the 
decision making process.137  In stage one and two of the deductive process overregulation 
and competitive advantage are traced and analyzed individually for their capacity to 
provide a minimally sufficient explanation. The active mechanism is deduced by the 
logic of elimination dismissing mechanisms with insufficient explanation. If neither 
mechanism is successful, then their combination is examined as an option by which to 
explain the reform outcome.  
Specific to stage 1, QCA is used to confirm the overregulation responses of the 
territories to the policies prescribed by regulatory authorities. The result will inform 
whether the territories met the necessary and sufficient conditions for each overregulation 
response. The confirmation will be matched against the causal mechanism to illustrate 
whether the chronology of evidence parallels the causal mechanism accounting 
sufficiently for each step in the process of the reform outcome.  In the second stage, QCA 
will be used to confirm each policy’s negative or positive impact on competitive 
advantage. The result will inform whether each policy met the conditions for a significant 
decrease or increase in competitive advantage. The confirmation will be matched against 
the causal mechanism to illustrate whether the chronology of evidence parallels the 
causal mechanism accounting sufficiently for each step in the process in the reform 
outcome.  In the third stage, the results of the first two stages will be combined to 
                                                 
137 The three stage deductive method is used as described by Beach and Pedersen. 
54 
 
determine whether the hypothesized composite mechanism parallels the chronology of 
evidence in the process leading to the reform outcome closely enough to grant a 
minimally sufficient explanation.   
Each of the three stages is further subdivided divided into three levels including: 
theoretical level, empirical level, and testing.138  At the theoretical level, all relevant 
variables in the observed association are defined (X-Multilevel Reform 
Pressures/Independent, Y-Reform Outcome /Dependent Variable). The causal 
mechanism or explanatory variable (overregulation/competitive advantage) will be 
justified from the academic literature. It will explain why each segment of the mechanism 
is necessary, the manner in which each works individually and what it explains 
sufficiently (vs insufficiently). Specific to the third stage, the theoretical focus will be on 
the workings of the composite mechanism of overregulation and competitive advantage 
in tandem.  In the theoretical stage the necessary and sufficient conditions regarding 
overregulation responses and increases or decreases in competitive advantage are 
identified, justified, and calibrated according to the general methods of QCA.   
At the Empirical level all variables and mechanisms are operationalized and 
evidence is gathered on all variables and causal mechanisms.  Multilevel regulatory 
reforms pressures (X) are operationalized as prescribed policy, reforms as adopted policy, 
overregulation as responses (compliance, creative compliance, noncompliance, capture, 
black market/low transparency) and  competitive advantage as cost, differentiation, and 
segmentation (niche markets). Figure 4.2 lists the operationalization of the major 
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variables and mechanisms. 139  
 At the testing level, the evidence in the data set is evaluated against set necessary 
and sufficient conditions to determine if it parallels the causal mechanism under 
consideration.  
Figure 4.2: Operationalized Variables and Mechanisms 
 
Specific to testing in the third stage, the evidence (prescribed policy, adopted policy, 
rejected policy, adoption-evaluation-reporting-infractions-etc, collective costs, 
differential factors/niche markets) is matched against the composite competitive 
advantage-overregulation causal mechanism (Increase/Decrease in Competitive 
Advantage vs Overregulation Responses) to identify if the combination provides a 
minimally sufficient explanation of the reform outcome. Practically, the negative or 
positive impact of each prescribed policy (X) on competitive advantage factors is 
weighted against the chosen overregulation response to identify whether the causal 
mechanism logically mimics or parallels the pattern of adoptions constituting the reforms.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the three stage deductive process used for tracing step 5 using QCA. 
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4.2 Data sources:  Process Tracing & QCA 
 This study utilizes multiple data sources for process tracing and QCA. The 
academic literature provides the context and chronological reference for tracing the 
process. Prescribed policy provides the practical details of the independent variable, 
while adopted policy provides the practical details of the dependent variable. 
Figure 4.3: Explaining Outcome Three stage deductive Process Tracing 
Three Stage Explaining Outcome PT & QCA Model
Stage 1: Overregulation Theory
Stage 2: Competitive Advantage
Stage 3: Composite Mechanism
Stage Sub-Levels
Theoretical Level-->
Definition of Variables Emperical Level-->
and
Mechanisms Operationalization 
of
Variables & Mechanisms
and
Evidence Gathering Testing
QCA
Necessary
&
Sufficient
Conditions
 
Compliance and cost evaluations provide evidence of the activity of the overregulation 
and competitive advantage causal mechanism within the process. Lobbying and 
membership reports provide further evidence of the activity of the overregulation causal 
mechanism within the reform process. Figure 4.4 lists the study’s data sources and 
variable/mechanism operationalization, inclusive of each grouping of evidence. 
57 
 
Academic Literature-Scholar articles and academic writing on the topic of financial & 
economic regulation of small Offshore Financial Centers both generally and with specific 
reference to the UKOTs. This literature provides the context and evolution of the 
economic and financial regulatory architecture, describing the periodic change in regimes 
and their impact on small OFCs. 
Figure 4.4: Data Sources & Variable Operationalization 
                                                     Data Sources & Variable Operationalization
Data Sources Variables & Mechanisms Operational Indicators Evidence
Academic Literature Environmental & Chronological Context International Financial Regulatory Architecture/Regime Pre & Post Financial Crisis Regulatory Regime Changes: Reporting Regimes
Presecribed Policy by regulatory authorities Fomral Requirements:   UK-CDOT, UK-PubCenRegBenOwn,
Official Policy Documents by X - Multilevel Reform Pressures US-FATCA, OECD-CRS & AEOI, FAFT TransBenOwn
the Regulatory Authorities G20 BenOwnTrans, G20-MCMAATM, EU-AMLD4
Adopted Financial Services Policy 2014-2016 Terms of Agreement:   UK-CDOT, UK-CenRegBenOwn,
Formal Policy Adoptions Y - Outcome Variable US-UKOT FATCA IGA, OECD-CRS & AEOI, FAFT TransBenOwn
G20 BenOwnTrans, G20-MCMAATM, EU-AMLD4
Evaluations by the regulatory authorities  Overregulation Responses:  Level of Compliance: Adoption, Evaluated, Reported, Current Infractions
Regulatory Authority Memberships C.Mechanism-Overregulation:  X   "------"  Y Compliance, Creative Compliance, NonCompliance, Membership Groups
Lobbying reports Capture, Black Market/LwTrsp Lobbying Activity: Legislation Change, Removal of Policy/Legislation
 Competitive Advantage:  Comparative Advantage (Cost), Due Dillegence Cost, Operational Cost, Product Cost
Policy Implementation & C.Mechanism-Competitive Ad:  X   "------"  Y Differenatiation, and Segmentation factors. Tax, Privacy, Common Law, Stable, Regulated
 Cost Evaluations Segmentation (Niche Markets) Niche Market
All All All
Secondary Media Sources Provides a compliment or substitute where other Online Magazines, News Papers, Blogs, Journals
sources are absent or lacking.  
Official Policy Documents by the Regulatory Authorities-The policies prescribed to the 
territories by the various regulatory authorities. They represent the independent variable 
“reform pressures” in its operationalized form as prescribed polices, describing the 
detailed requirements each policy imposes on the UKOTs. They are necessary to identify 
the reform pressures exerted on the territories.  They are sourced electronically from the 
online data bases of the UK Treasury/Foreign & Common Wealth Office, US Treasury, 
EU Commission, FATF, G20, & OECD. Evidence of the operational form in the policy 
documents are found in the descriptions of the exact requirements expected by the 
regulatory authorities.   
-Example: Global Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for Automatic Exchange of 
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Financial Account Information (the AEOI Standard) - (UKOT7 - 2016).140 
 “Each country is required to annually automatically exchange with the other 
participating countries information on selected cases in their jurisdiction with regard to 
reportable accounts in the requesting concerned jurisdictions. CRS required reportable 
account information includes: name, address, Taxpayer Identification Number and date 
and place of birth of each Reportable Person, account number(s), the name and 
identifying number of the Reporting Financial Institution, the account balance or value as 
of the end of the relevant calendar, account closure details if the account was closed 
during such year or period.”141    
Formal Policy Adoptions-The policies formally adopted into the reform, officially 
outlining the commitment of the UKOTs to adhere to the requirements of each the given 
policy. They are the operationalized form of the dependent variable, necessary to 
distinguish between the policies adopted into the reform versus those rejected from those 
policies prescribed by the regulatory authorities. They are sourced both from the UK 
Treasury/Foreign & Common Wealth Office, US Treasury, EU Commission, FATF, 
G20, & OECD. Evidence for the operational form of the dependent and independent 
variables are the formal terms of agreement and requirements outlined in the document.  
-Example: The Technical protocol for the Sharing of Beneficial Ownership Information 
(in force April 8, 2016).142  
                                                 
140 “CRS by Jurisdiction,” OECD Global Forum, Last modified 3 August 2017, accessed August 3, 2017, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-
jurisdiction/#d.en.345489.  
141 “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters OECD (2014),” 
OECD Publishing, accessed June 4, 2017,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216525-en.  
142  GOV.UK, “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office.”  
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“The adoption of the protocol fulfills the ‘territories’ obligations to meet the multilateral 
and regional requirements of the EU–Fourth Money Laundering Directive of the 
European Union Non-cooperative  third countries (EU 2015/849, AMLD4), FATF-
Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, G20-High 
Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20-Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.”143  
“Requires the establishing and maintaining a central register, or equivalent system, 
containing accurate and current information on beneficial ownership for corporate and 
legal entities incorporated in their jurisdictions. Requires each jurisdiction to ensure 
effective and unrestricted access to this information to the other jurisdiction’s law 
enforcement and tax authorities (law enforcement has automatic right to the 
information).”144 
Evaluations by the regulatory authorities-They are necessary to provide an assessment of 
the UKOT’s response to each policy and the regulatory authority’s assessment of each 
territory relative to their compliance. They are evidence for the conditions of the 
overregulation causal mechanism at work, operationalized as select responses. The 
evaluations are sourced from the online databases of the UK Treasury/Foreign & 
Common Wealth Office, US Treasury, EU Commission, FATF, G20, & OECD. 
-Example: The OECD maintains records in the form of tables of the compliance level of 
each country’s level of compliance or noncompliance with the Global Common 
Reporting Standard(CRS)  for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information(the 
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AEOI Standard) - (UKOT7 - 2016).145  
Regulatory Authority Memberships-The positions the UKOTs hold on steering or other 
committees in multilateral regulatory authorities. They are necessary to assess the 
UKOT’s formal influence on the development or regulation and standards to which they 
are subject. They are sourced electronically from the online data bases of the FATF, G20, 
& OECD. 
-Example: The OECD forum and FATF keeps a detailed record of steering groups and 
regional memberships.146 
Lobbying reports-Records of both the formal and informal efforts of the territories to 
influence the regulatory authority and the development or implementation of regulation 
to which they are subject.147 They are necessary to provide an assessment of the UKOT’s 
influence on the development of regulation and standards to which they are subject. They 
are sourced both from informal undocumented reports provided by the respective UKOT 
offices and from localized UK media sources tracking lobbying activity.148 The reports 
                                                 
145 OECD Global Forum, “CRS by Jurisdiction.” 
146 “About the Global Forum,” Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/.  
147 See Appendix 3 
148 The formal and informal lobbying efforts of the UKOTs meets the definition of attempted capture. 
Secondary sources in UK media criticize the degree of influence the UKOTs have been able to secure 
with regards to the UK governments. Melanie Newman, “Lobbying’s Hidden Influence: Tax havens 
boost their lobbying efforts,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 
2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-19/tax-havens-boost-their-lobbying-
efforts. Melanie Newman, “Conservative peer hired as tax haven lobbyist,” The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 2017,   
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lobbyist. The British Virgin Islands as well as other UKOTs have formally organized and recruited 
groups of influential individuals to lobby the UK government in areas of strategic interests such as 
Financial services. “Friends of the BVI,” Government of the British Virgin Islands London Office, 
accessed July 1, 2-17, https://www.bvi.org.uk/londonoffice/friends. 
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merely state the dates and purpose of various meetings intended to influence regulation 
and regulatory authorities. 
Policy Implementation & Cost Evaluations-Assessments of the implementation and 
immediate & long term costs of policy adoption. They are the operationalized form of the 
competitive advantage causal mechanism at work. They are necessary to evaluate the cost 
compliance with each policy imposes on regulatees. The cost evaluations are evidence for 
policy impact on competitive advantage, operationalized as increases in comparative, 
differential, and focus costs. They are sourced from private sector financial services 
groups and contractors in the industry such as KPMG, Deliotte, and Accenture, as well as 
select journals and websites dedicated to the financial services industry for industry 
professionals. 
-Example:  ACCENTURE CRS/FATCA Impact Evaluation- “The demands of FATCA 
and CRS have impacted the entire financial services industry, being slated for universal 
global adoptions. The challenges posed by  reporting regimes are summarized to include 
Expanded Due Diligence as all jurisdictions and entities within them now face expanded 
due diligence and additional costs due to additional jurisdictional information required in 
reporting as well as increased information collection (all types of investment income, 
account balances, sales proceeds from financial assets). Larger amounts of data now 
come from multiple systems spread across dozens of regions around the world. The 
differences between FATCA and CRS create difficulties in using the same reporting 
procedures for both standards. The most accurate reporting is achieved by having a single 
centralized information retrieval and reporting platform. Complete Automatic Exchange 
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of Information solutions are more costly, increasing operational costs while lowering 
compliance costs.” 149 
Secondary Media Sources-Secondary sources from media outlets provide data where 
official sources are lacking and provide sources for the other data sources. News reports, 
investigative journalism, blogs, and other sources provide information where there is a 
gap in other academic and official sources. They are sources from online magazines, 
journals, newspapers, and blogs. 
Example:  “Britain’s Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies have been boosting 
their lobbying strength in the UK and Brussels in recent years amidst growing criticism 
of tax havens.”150 
4.5 QCA Data Configuration 
Overregulation QCA (Deduction Model) 
Unit of Analysis- Financial Services Policy (both prescribed and adopted): Rather than 
evaluating data for conditions across multiple cases, the evaluation is of data across 
multiple policies within a single case. 
Data Set-The data sets used in the analysis are generated from both prescribed and 
adopted financial services policy, evidence surrounding prescribed and adopted reform 
policies and the UKOTs responses.  
Data Set Calibration: Crisp- The QCA analysis will use “crisp” set calibration for the 
                                                 
149 “Automatic Exchange of Information Regime: An emerging compliance challenge,” Accenture (2014): 
4-10, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.accenture.com/t20150626T121157__w__/us-
en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_7/Accenture-
Automatic-Exchange-Information-Regime.pdf. 
150 Melanie Newman, “Lobbying’s Hidden Influence: Tax havens boost their lobbying efforts,” The Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-19/tax-havens-boost-their-lobbying-efforts. 
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coding of the qualitative data.  The use of crisp sets is preferable due to the conditions for 
competitive advantage increases/decreases and overregulation responses being binary or 
dichotomous in nature.151 The conditions do not vary in degrees, as the data does not 
provide the means to establish numerous cutoff points or variation.  Individual policy 
either displays the characteristics fully to meet the condition or does not. There is no 
means nor necessity to differentiate between different levels of belonging inbetween the 
binary values of 1 and 0. As the conditions do not have varying degrees of membership in 
a set, a fuzzy data calibration is not fitting nor necessary in the QCA analysis.152 
Membership Scores (1/0)-The data set is generated based on crisp set coding, with an 
assigned value of 1 for the presence of a contextual factor and 0 for the absence of a 
contextual factor. The conditions are binary or dichotomous, either present and fully in 
the set, or absent out of the set. 
Outcome Sets- compliance, creative compliance, noncompliance, capture, and black 
market/low transparency 
Decision Rules-For a given response to be confirmed, all of the necessary conditions 
must be present. The absence of any necessary condition disqualifies the response from 
the membership group. 
QCA Competitive Advantage (Deductive Model) 
Unit of Analysis-Financial Services Policy (Both prescribed and adopted): Rather than 
evaluating data for conditions across multiple cases, the evaluation is of data across 
                                                 
151 “Using qualitative comparative analysis to understand and quantify translation and implementation,”  
Transl Behav Med, 4:2, 201–208 (Jane, 2014): doi:  10.1007/s13142-014-0251-6, Accessed July 22, 
2017, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4041929/. 
152 Ibid. 
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multiple policies within a single case. 
Data Set-The data sets used in the analysis are generated from the UKOTs competitive 
advantage factors, both prescribed and adopted financial services policy, the evidence 
surrounding prescribed and adopted reform policies, and the UKOTs responses to those 
policies.  
Data Set Calibration: Crisp- The QCA analysis will use “crisp” set calibration for the 
coding of the qualitative data.  The use of crisp sets is preferable due to the conditions for 
competitive advantage increases/decreases and overregulation responses being binary or 
dichotomous in nature.153 The conditions do not vary in degrees, as the data does not 
provide the means to establish numerous cutoff points or variation.  Individual policy 
either displays the characteristics fully to meet the condition or does not. There is no 
means nor necessity to differentiate between different levels of belonging inbetween the 
binary values of 1 and 0. As the conditions do not have varying degrees of membership in 
a set, a fuzzy data calibration is not fitting nor necessary in the QCA analysis.154 
Membership Scores (1/0)-The data set is generated based on crisp set coding, with an 
assigned value of 1 for the presence of a contextual factor and 0 for the absence of a 
contextual factor. The conditions are binary or dichotomous, either present and fully in 
the set, or absent out of the set. Specific to the stage 2 analysis, the binary value of 1 has 
one representative figure. The binary value of 0 has two representative figures including a 
neutral (nill) figure with no impact.    
                                                 
153 “Using qualitative comparative analysis to understand and quantify translation and implementation,” 
Transl Behav Med, 4:2, 201–208 (Jane, 2014): doi:  10.1007/s13142-014-0251-6, Accessed July 22, 
2017, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4041929/. 
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Outcome Sets-Outcome sets are based on the combined impact of the 8 competitive 
advantage sub-factors and early & non-universal adoption. 
Decision Rules-For a given response to be confirmed, all of the necessary conditions 
must be present. The absence of any necessary condition disqualifies the response from 
the membership group. 
4.6 Assumptions 
This study carries a series of assumptions in seeking to answer the stated research 
question. First this study groups 7 of the 14 United Kingdom Overseas Territories with 
significant financial services industries as a unit. This group generally negotiates as a unit 
with the UK in regards to financial services issues. Second, this study considers the 
financial services legislation adopted by the territories between 2014 and 2016 as a long 
term reform package due to the scope of changes initiated that differentiates the pre and 
post reform regulatory regimes.  Third, overregulation theory predicts six likely 
responses to over regulation, but only five are used in the research. In the sixth response, 
deregulation, reregulation, or regulatory reform by the regulator is intentionally left out. 
Anticipation of regulatory failure would lead the regulated party to opt for either 
compliance or noncompliance due to low short term costs. As a result the sixth response 
is instead considered as a sub-response under both compliance and non-compliance.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
4.7 Limitations of the Study 
The study will be limited to the UK Overseas Territories Block of Seven housing 
substantial financial service industries. The reforms will be limited to the major financial 
services legislation adopted by all seven of the territories in the reform period between 
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2014 and 2016. The pre-reform period under consideration is the post 2007-08 Global 
Financial Crisis period to 2014. The study’s findings are non-generalizable, limited only 
to the case of the seven UKOTs. 
4.3 Deficiencies of the Study 
The most significant deficiency of this study is its time line.  Several of the policy 
and legislative adoptions come into force in 2017 making the period of their evaluation 
relatively short.  A second deficiency is the lack of official primary data on the UKOT7’s 
lobbying activities.  The specific details of the UKOTs lobbying activity has not been 
published for public review. As a result, the information on lobbying is based on 
unofficial data requests to the UKOT governments and secondary sources from various 
media outlets. 
Figure 4.1-Research Design 
Mixed Method: Explaining Outocme Process Tracing & QCA 
Case: UKOT7 Financial Services Reforms 2014-2016
Theoretical Level Causal Mechansim = Case Specific Combniantion of Systematic CM (Eclectic Theorization)
Causal Mechansim = Overregulation + Competitive Advantage
     Steps 1-4: Process Tracing Steps
                  Step 5: QCA
Deductive Path Towards a Minimally Sufficient Explanation
Stage 1. Overregulation Theory --->      Test --->     Insufficient Explanation
Stage 2. Competitive Advantage  ---> Test  -----> Insufficient Explanation
Composite 3. Overregulation / Competitive Advantage  ---> Test   ---> Minimally Sufficient Expl.
X >>>>>>>> Causal Mechanisms >>>>>>>>> Y
Multilevel Reform Pressures Competitive Advantage UKOT7 Financial Services Reforms
Overregulation
Observable Manifestations Observable Manifestations Observable Manifestations
Prescribed Regulatory  Policies Competitive Advantage Overregulation Adopted Policies
US FATCA US UKOT FATCA IGA
US UKOT FATCA IGA Compliance UK CDOT
UK CDOT Impact Impact Cost Response Creative- Choice Choice UK CenRegBenOwn
UK PubCenRegBenOwn >>>>>>>> Incr. Differentiation Compliance >>>>>>>> OECD CRS & AEOI
UK CenRegBenOwn Decr. Focus Noncompliance FATF RecBenOwn
OECD CRS & AEOI None Capture G20 TranBenOwn
FATF RecBenOwn Black Market/LwTrs G20 MCMAATM
G20 TranBenOwn EU ALMD4
G20 MCMAATM
EU ALMD4
Emperical Case Specific Level  
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CHAPTER 5 
PROCESS TRACING & QCA 
5.1 The Process 
The tracing of the process by which the UKOT7’s 2014-16 financial services 
reforms (Y) were adopted begins with reform pressures (X) exerted on the territories as a 
set of prescribed policy adoptions by multiple regulatory authorities following the 2007-
08 global financial crisis. The prescribed policies contained elements of overregulation 
including both non-universal and early adoption requirements targeting select 
jurisdictions. The policies were prescribed to the territories at the threat of both 
immediate and long term sanction for noncompliance. The elements of overregulation 
stood to harm (decrease) the competitive advantages built by the UKOTs in financial 
services over time by decreasing or restricting competitive advantage factor endowments 
relative to their competitors. In response, over a two year period the territories adopted a 
series of policies meeting both their national interests and satisfying the demands of 
regulatory authorities.  
This reform process may be traced across five chronological steps highlighting the 
most important elements in the evolution of the reform outcome. The proceeding sections 
will provide a detailed explanation of each step in the process from the origins of the 
reform pressure to the choice of adoptions populating the reform package. The steps are 
tabled displaying the chronology of events, dates, and data sources in the process. Figure 
5.1 lists the five stages of the financial services reform process. 
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Figure 5.1: Five Stage UKOT Financial Services Reform Process 
Process Tracing:  UKOT 2014-2016 Financial Services Case
The Process
Reform Pressures (X) Step 1:  Step 2: Step 3: Step 4: Step 5: Reform Outcome (Y)
Year 2007-08 2009-10 2010-15 2010-15 2013-16 2016-17
US-FATCA (2010) Global Financial Crisis The Post Crisis  Multiple Regulatory Overregulation: The UKOTs Respond US-UKOT7 FATCA IGA
G20 - MCMAATM (2010) Erodes the Previous Regulatory Architecture Authorities Issue New Prescribed Polices to the reform UK-CDOT
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" (2014) Regulatory Paradigm Established Based on Prescribed Policies contain elements of pressures **UK-Cen Reg Ben Own**
FATF - Trans Benf Own (2014) Information Reporting Internationally Imposing Overregulation both rejecting and OECD - "CRS & AEOI"
G20 - Ben Own Trans (2014) Regimes Reform Pressures threatening the adopting policies FATF - Trans Benf Own
EU - AMLD4 (2015) across the global financial UKOT’s Competitive from among those G20 - Ben Own Trans
UKPubCen Reg Ben Own (2015) system. Advantage in Financial presecribed by G20 - MCMAATM
Services (As well as regulatory authorities EU - AMLD4
other small OFCs)
Detail
Industry Self Regulation Retrenchment to USA, UK, EU Issue Early Non-Universal The UKOTs devise a The reform is populated 
Paradigm Fails and Pseudo Command and Unilateral Reporting targeting adoption frameowork by which to by policies without a
Faith Eroded in Control Mechanism in the Rporting (FATCA, CDOT, requirments targeting the respond to each contractionary effect on
Smart & Meta Form of Unilateral AMLD4). The OECD Gobal specific jurisdictions policy.They seek to Competitive Advantage.
Regulation Policies imposing forum creates an present in FATCA, CRS & protect their Competitive Harmful policies are
extrateritoriality international reporting AEOI, and UK Publ Cen Advantage from the rejected as part of the 
standard (CRS&AEOI) Registers of Ben Own effects of overrregulation reform 
Data Source
**Qualitative Comp Anal**
Academic Literature Academic Literature Compliance Evaluations
Official Policy Documents Academic Literature Academic Literature Official Policy Documents Official Policy Documents Memberships in regulatory Fomral Policy Adoptions
authority bodies
Lobbying Reports
Cost Evaluations
Secondary Media Sources Serve as a compliment or substitute where other sources are absent or lacking.  
5.2 Step 1:  The Global Financial Crisis Erodes the Previous Regulatory Paradigm 
The reform pressures facing the territories originate with the occurrence of the 
2007-08 global financial crisis. Originating in the US, the crisis began as a full-blown 
international banking crisis caused by excessive risk-taking by large banks globally.155 
The global banking system was close to collapse as numerous multinational banks were 
on the verge of failure. Massive state led bail-outs of financial institutions and drastic 
monetary and fiscal measures ultimately prevented a collapse of the world financial 
system.156 The crisis was followed by a global economic downturn negatively affecting 
most economies, thereafter continuing into Europe as a debt crisis in the banking system 
                                                 
155 Peter Temin, "The Great Recession & the Great Depression," Daedalus, Vol. 139:4, (2010): 115-124, 
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of the Euro-zone.157 The Eurozone countries at the center of the crisis were Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, and Ireland.158 The crisis largely eroded governments’ faith in the 
industry self-regulation paradigm given the numerous scandals at the heart of the 
economic collapse.159 The financial crisis highlighted the weakness of lackluster financial 
regulation in managing the mismatch between globalization and traditional regimes in 
international law for governing the movement of capital and individuals.160 There was a 
general consensus within the post-crisis regulatory paradigm that government needed to 
play a greater role in economic and financial regulatory matters beyond monitoring, 
sanctioning, or combatting terrorism & rogue regime financing.161 The smart and meta-
regulation of the late 1990s and early 2000s at the multilateral level was deemed 
insufficient to assist in the recovery and repair of the economic damage caused to states 
by the crisis.162 
The post crisis changes in the international political economy of the global order 
would in turn lead to changes in the international legal order.163 The post crisis regulatory 
regime would be characterized by a reversion to unilateral approaches to financial and 
economic regulation that parallel the command and control approaches of the pre-
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2000s.164  In response to the crisis, the new architecture of financial and economic 
regulation assumed a disciplinary character in order to govern the movement of capital 
within globalization.165   The result was unilaterally imposed reporting regimes coexisting 
alongside multilateral information reporting regimes characterizing the international 
financial regulatory landscape.166  
5.3 Step 2: The Post-Crisis Regulatory Architecture Centers on Reporting Regimes 
In response to the insufficiency of the pre-crisis financial regulatory regime, 
concerned states implemented unilateral policies granting extraterritorial application of 
their national economic and financial regulations and laws in regard to their citizens and 
businesses operating within foreign jurisdictions.167 The US, UK, and EU each sought to 
impose their regulatory authority beyond their territorial jurisdictions (extraterritoriality) 
via Automatic Information Reporting Regimes (inclusive of the US’s Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act, the UK’s Finance 2016 Bill, and the EU’s Administration 
Cooperation Directive).168 The OECD Global Forum took a multilateral initiative to 
create a global reporting standard in the form of the CRS & AEOI, a standard built by 
multilateral consensus.169 As a result information reporting regimes characterize the post 
crisis international financial regulatory landscape. 170    
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Reporting regimes revolve largely around taxable income.171 Taxation is one of 
the key areas in which the mismatch between globalization’s free movement of capital 
and the limitations of international law has created a regulatory gap exploited by 
aggressive tax planners to avoid paying taxes to the state.172 Information reporting 
regimes require jurisdictions to electronically share reportable account information with 
other jurisdictions in order to maximize transparency.173  
Post- crisis information reporting regimes have universally increased compliance 
costs in the areas of regulatory due diligence, facilities, technology, and specialists 
globally in the financial services industry.174 They have further created legal challenges 
for the privacy laws of numerous jurisdictions worldwide.175 The general increase in 
costs are the same across jurisdictions and firms, and each firm must find the most 
effective means available to them to  address increase costs and legal challenges.176 The 
demands of policies such as FATCA and CRS have impacted the entire financial services 
industry, being slated for universal global adoption.  
The challenges posed by reporting regimes are summarized to include:  
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i. Expanded Due Diligence-All jurisdictions and entities within them now face 
expanded due diligence and additional costs due to additional jurisdictional 
information required in reporting as well as increased information collection 
(all types of investment income, account balances, sales proceeds from 
financial assets).177 Larger amounts of data now come from multiple systems 
spread across dozens of regions around the world. 
ii. Facilities/Technology/Specialist- The new regimes require expensive technology 
and facilities upgrades as well as specialists to integrate and upgrade the new 
systems.178 Assessments of the cross compatibility of  processes and 
technology solutions for the requirements of CRS, UK CDOT, and US 
FATCA must be made to development logistically efficient ways to organize 
and consolidate the necessary capabilities in order to minimize operational 
costs.179 The differences between FATCA and CRS create difficulties in using 
the same reporting procedures for both standards.180 Complete Automatic 
Exchange of Information solutions are more costly, increasing operational 
costs while lowering compliance costs. Further staffing the new procedures 
and systems increases pressure on costs and learning curves.181 
iii. Lack of legal certainty – The reporting regimes often have compatibility issues 
with data privacy rules in several jurisdictions (information collection, storage 
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and reporting). 182 To implement the policies requires government’s 
authorizing reporting activities via legislation or court system. Much of the 
information required by both FATCA and CRS was not required for existing 
clients domiciled in jurisdictions with stringent privacy protection laws, for 
many clients the driving element in their choice of jurisdiction. 183 Legal 
process is required to change the contractual relationship with those clients to 
allow the reporting regimes to function.184 
iv. Penalty-In addition to the legal and due diligence challenges, the reporting 
regimes add to already excessive compliance costs by penalizing inaccurate 
filings or noncompliance with fines.185  These excessive compliance cost 
reduce firm profit margins in the interim period of instituting the reporting 
regimes. 
Information and Data Registers: Another form of the reporting regimes is formulated as 
Information and Data Registers.186 Information and data registers, in this case on 
beneficial owners of companies and trust, electronically store the details of the natural 
persons who ultimately own or control a financial entity. The jurisdiction housing the 
register is responsible for providing the technological base for such a register and for 
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maintaining adequate access, privacy, and storage consistent with state laws and 
international regulatory standards.187 The jurisdiction is also responsible for the 
population of the register by firms within its jurisdictions.188 The challenged posed by 
central registers is the technological costs of implementing such a system, maintenance 
costs, security, and due diligence costs of populating and access for the relevant 
authorities.189 Noncompliance, in the case of the UK OTs could prompt direct action by 
the UK for the implementation of the registers or shutting down of the industry by 
unknown measures. 
Recommended Standards of Implementation: 
Multilateral bodies not formally issuing reporting regimes or requirements, 
express support for universal principles that should be followed generally to meet the 
needs of the global economy.190  These recommended standards of implementation 
suggest or recommend principals by which to abide or guide regulatory development and 
policy adoption on given issues.191 In the absence of legally binding concrete policy 
punishable by sanctions, the concerned international bodies give recommendations in 
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support of established international standards and evolving standards. The G20 and FATF 
in particular provide such recommendations on international financial regulation.192 
States accept or agree to these standards as guides steering their national policies in line 
with the position or direction of international institutions and international standards. Few 
challenges are posed by the recommended standards to states, instead providing helpful 
guidance on issues of concern internationally. 
5.4 Step 3: Reform Pressures: Prescribed Policies by Regulatory Authorities 
Consistent with the new post crisis regulatory paradigm, regulatory authorities at 
the unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels began implementing the new 
regulatory architecture (structures) globally. The system of reporting regimes was 
entrenched between 2010 and 2016.193 The first of the unilateral reporting regimes was 
issue by the US in 2010, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).194 The 
international standard for reporting established by the OECD was finalized in 2014 to 
come into force in 2017.195 The EU issued its first regional requirement for registers of 
beneficial ownership in 2015.196 The implementation created reform pressures within the 
financial services industry to implement the necessary changes as formal policy 
adoptions across jurisdictions.  
As global level leading financial centers, the UKOTs were at the center of reform 
                                                 
192 Ibid. 
193 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. 
194 “OECD Common Reporting Standard A global FATCA-like regime,” EY:International Tax Alert, 
(February 18, 2014): 2-11, accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_OECD_Common_Reporting_Standard:_A_global_FATCA-like_regime/$FILE/EY-Client-alert-
OECD-Common-Reporting-Standard.pdf. 
195 Ibid. 
196 “Directive (EU) 2015/849 of The European Parliament and of the European Commission May 20 2015,” 
Official Journal of the European Union, (5.6.2015): L 141/73. 
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efforts despite their relatively small size, power, and influence. As industry and world 
leaders in reinsurance, captive insurance, hedge funds, and international business 
company registrations, four of the UKOTs (Bermuda, BVI, Cayman, Gibraltar) were 
under pressure from multilateral institutions to be early adopters (CRS & AEOI).  As EU 
OCTs, the territories are under regional pressure to conform to EU directives (AMLD4) 
even though not EU members subject to EU law. Bilateral pressure is exerted on the 
territories as elements of the UK legislative process hold the expectation that the UK’s 
specific transparency and corruption based reform measures be directly applicable to its 
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies (Public Central Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership). Unilateral pressure is exerted on the territories by the US and UK in their 
demands for reporting on the financial activities of their citizens in the territories 
(FATCA, CDOT).   
These reform pressures in the form of prescribed policies (Figure 4.1 ) include: 
UK-CDOT (2014 ), US-UKOT FATCA IGA (2014), UK-Central Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership (2016), Global Common Reporting Standard(CRS)  for Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information( 2016), FATF-Recommendations and Guidance on 
Transparency and Beneficial Ownership (2016), G20-High Level Principles on 
Beneficial Ownership Transparency (2016), G20-Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2016),  EU –Fourth Money Laundering 
Directive of the European Union (2016).197  
Of the prescribed policies, four are information reporting regimes, three require 
                                                 
197 See Appendix 1 for a complete cited list of each prescribed policy. The listing describes the 
requirements of each policy. 
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establishing central data registers, and three seek the acceptance of recommended 
standards. In addition three of the policies demand universal adoption, three made early 
adoption demands, and five impose punishable sanctions for noncompliance and non-
adoption. Figure 5.2 lists the policies prescribed to the territories by regulatory 
authorities.  
Figure 5.2: Reform Pressures as Prescribed Policy 
Multilevel Reform Pressures Prescribed Policy (Policy Demands)
Policy Type Requires Application Sanctions Year Intro Adopted EarAdopOpt
US-FATCA Infor. Reporting Regime Reporting on US Citizens Universal Yes 2010 No Yes
**US-UKOT7 IGA**(FATCA) Infor.Reporting Regime Reporting on US Citizens UKOT7 Yes 2014 Yes No
UK-CDOT Infor. Reporting Regime Reporting on UK Citizens UK OTs,CDs Yes 2014 Yes No
UK Pub Cen Reg Ben Own Information. Data Register Collecting of BenOwn Data UK OTs,CDs Yes 2015 No Yes
**UK-Cen Reg Ben Own** Information. Data Register Collecting of BenOwn Data Ots, CDs Yes 2016 Yes No
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Infor. Reporting Regime Autom. Exchange of Tax Data Universal No** 2014 yes Yes
FATF - Trans Benf Own Recommended Standard Collecting of BenOwn Data Universal No 2012 Yes No
G20 - Ben Own Trans Recommended Standard Collecting of BenOwn Data G20 No 2014 Yes No
G20 - MCMAATM Recommended Standard Cooperation on Tax Evasion G20 No 2010 Yes No
EU - AMLD4 Infor.DataRegist/RecomStd Col BenOwn Data, EnhDueDil EU No 2015 No No   
5.5 Step 4: Overregulation as a threat to UKOT Competitive Advantage 
The introduction of the new regulatory regime contained significant elements of 
overregulation in the implementation phase of the policies. UKOTs were under pressure 
to adopt policies with early, non-universal, and targeting requirements, each constituting 
elements of overregulation both in the financial services industry and generally. They 
were under pressure to adopt policies imposing a high cost on adoption while punishing 
noncompliance and rejection also with high costs. Four of the policies prescribed for the 
UKOTs’ adoption contained these elements of overregulation standing to possibly cripple 
the UKOTs financial services industries. They include the OECD CRS & AEOI, UK 
Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, US FATCA, and the EU AMLD4.  
While the OECD’s CRS & AEOI officially has voluntary early adoption and is 
universal, the UKOTs with large financial services sectors were obligated by their OT 
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status to make early entry along with the UK in adhering to international standards.198 
However, for small states the costs to do so are significant relative to both their monetary 
and logistical means.199 They do not have the resources, size, nor wealth of other early 
adopters such as the UK who given their size have implementation challenges. The 
territories must bear the brunt of the early expense rather than being able to wait for 
larger jurisdictions to incur the expense of perfecting the process and later import the 
finished product. The expense can only be justified in terms of the regulatory efficiency 
that will be derived from being ahead of the market in implementation. As early adopters, 
small OFCs will able to sell the regulatory efficiency gained in the process for a premium 
price within the industry for a period that their competitors cannot.  
The UK government sought to initially force its territories’ to adopt Public Central 
Registers of Beneficial Ownership along with the UK.200  The UK implemented public 
access as part of the government’s moral and ethical efforts to tackle both tax evasion and 
corruption following their chairmanship of the 2014 G8 summit.201 The UK 
government’s initial proposals sought to align the overseas territories beneficial 
ownership register policy with its own. However, it was a requirement beyond both 
regional and international standards imposed on the territories whose circumstances in 
the global economy are significantly different from the UK as a large onshore financial 
center. No regional or multilateral regulatory authority required the public access 
                                                 
198 Peter Clegg & Peter Gold, “The UK Overseas Territories: a decade of progress and prosperity?” 115-
120. 
199 The costs are general, but in absolute terms greater for small OFCs than larger onshore financial centers. 
“FATCA and CRS update,” Capita Asset Services, May 28, 2015, accessed July 1, 2017, 
http://www.capitaassetservices.com/articles/fatca-and-crs-update. 
200 James Brockhurst, “Old colonies; New Disputes,” New Law Journal Issue: 7656 (12 June 2015), 
accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/old-colonies-new-disputes.  
201 Ibid. 
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element. Including the UK, only two countries have committed to public registers public 
register of beneficial ownership presently and in the future.202 For the territories who 
have no moral or ethical incentive beyond adhering to international standards, the public 
registers undermine the privacy element as a selling point of their financial services 
industry.203 The territories’ high degree of economic vulnerability due to reliance on two 
economic pillars does not allow for policy considerations beyond international standards 
based on the UK’s moral and ethical considerations. As the world’s leading financial 
center within a diversified economy, the UK can absorb the loss in competitivity due to 
reduced privacy that the UKOTs cannot.  
US-FATCA imposed intrusive reporting requirements on the territories and the 
world, with the US knowingly unable to fulfill the reciprocation reporting component 
with any other state.204 The US requires all other jurisdictions to report to it, but is unable 
and unwilling to reciprocate as was promised in the initial legislation. Through FATCA, 
the US effectively granted itself distinct privacy advantages over competing jurisdictions 
worldwide.205 No jurisdictions large or small have been able to challenge the policy, 
having only noncompliance as an option that is punishable by steep penalties. 
From 2014 the EU has been conducting negotiations for the development of 
criteria for a listing of non-cooperative third country jurisdictions of which no or low 
                                                 
202Sophie Haggerty, “Norway Latest Country to Adopt Public Registry of Beneficial Ownership,” Global 
Financial Integrity, June 15, 2015, accessed July 1, 20017, http://www.gfintegrity.org/norway-latest-
country-to-adopt-public-registry-of-beneficial-ownership/.  
203 Brockhurst, “Old colonies; New Disputes.” 
204 Laurie Hatten Boyd, “Are Problems Looming for FATCA and the “Reciprocal” IGA?,” The Tax 
Adviser, June 1, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/jun/problems-
looming-for-fatca-and-reciprocal-iga.html. 
205 “How the U.S.A. became a Secrecy Jurisdiction,” Tax Justice Network, November 27, 2015, 
https://www.taxjustice.net/2015/11/27/how-the-u-s-a-became-a-secrecy-jurisdiction-2/.   
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taxation have been discussed as recently as 2017.206 Punitive action towards low taxation 
policies could possibly be initiated by the EU under the AMLD4 in the future by linking 
blacklist criteria to money laundering.207 The policy at present calls not only for registers 
of beneficial ownership, but also for enhanced due diligence checks.208 The penalizing of 
low or no taxation as part of future measures could target the UKOTs whose differential 
advantage in financial services is housed largely on both low taxation and high degrees of 
privacy. 
The overregulation elements present in the reform pressures posed a distinct threat 
to the competitive advantages the UKOT’s had built in financial services over time to 
become industry leaders. Regulations that decrease privacy, penalize low or no taxation, 
and complicates or decreases regulatory inefficiency harm the differential advantages of 
the UKOTs.209  Regulation that significantly increases due diligence, labor, facilities, 
technology, and specialist cost also harm their comparative advantage.210 Increased costs 
decrease the profitability of the premium price charged by firms within the industry for 
high quality financial services. The combination of the decrease in comparative and 
differential advantages in turn undermines the ability of the UKOTs to effectively service 
niche markets or pursue specialization within their focus strategy. The resulting absence 
of the ability to efficiently compete or innovate, combined with significant compliance or 
                                                 
206 Jean Comte, “EU moving toward common Blacklist of Tax Havens,” EU Observer, February 2, 2017, 
accessed July 1, 2017, https://euobserver.com/justice/136769.  
207 Lara McNamee, “4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive: How does it affect you?” Acuity, March 21, 
2016, accessed July 1, 2017,  https://accuity.com/accuity-insights-blog/4th-money-laundering-directive-
how-does-it-affect-you/.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. 
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sanctions costs, stands to drive firms out of business and possibly collapse the entire 
industry. 211 Without being able to offer significant jurisdictional advantages, clients will 
simply choose a different financial center with whom to do business.  
5.6 Step 5: Response to Reform Pressure and Choice of Policy Adoptions 
In the fifth step, the UKOTs responded to the reform pressures with which they 
were faced. They ultimately adopted eight policies from among those prescribed by 
regulatory authorities as a reform package. The reform includes: UK-CDOT (2014 ), US-
UKOT FATCA IGA (2014), UK-Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership (2016), 
Global Common Reporting Standard(CRS)  for Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Account Information( 2016), FATF-Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency 
and Beneficial Ownership (2016), G20-High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership 
Transparency (2016), G20-Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters (2016),  EU –Fourth Money Laundering Directive of the European Union 
(2016).212  
The fifth step is critical as the choice of adoptions versus rejections is the defining 
characteristic of entire process where the causal mechanism is most visibly active. 
However, tracing the process by which the choice of adoptions versus rejections were 
made is elusive and not readily discernable from a mere chronological and contextual 
reproduction of events from the historical record.  The UKOTs ultimate goal was to 
figure out how to satisfy multiple regulatory requirements while mitigating any possible 
                                                 
211 Dudley and Brito, 67-71. 
212 See Appendix 1 for a complete cited list of each adopted policy. The listing describes the requirements 
and terms of adoption. 
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harmful effects to their competitive advantage in financial services. Failure to do so could 
have ultimately resulted in the collapse of their financial services industries which are the 
economic lifeline of the UKOT economies. The essential task in tracing the decision 
making step of the process lies is identifying how each policy populating the reform was 
chosen in meeting the territories’ interests. An alternative tool of analysis beyond process 
tracing must be employed decipher the basis for choice at this stage of the process. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis will provide the compliment to process tracing in 
tracing the fight step. 
The review of academic literature presented two possible causal mechanisms 
explaining the choice of policy adoptions: overregulation and competitive advantage. The 
context in which they are presented suggest that elements of overregulation present in the 
prescribed policies would do significant harm to the UKOTs financial services industries,  
reducing the competitive advantages they built to become industry leaders over time. 
From the context, three possible scenarios maybe be derived from the literature. The 
element of choice was likely either the product of efforts to mitigate the effects of 
overregulation, efforts to maintain competitive advantage, or the product of efforts to 
protect competitive advantage from the effects of overregulation. The answer is to be 
found in a deductive exploration, assessing each theory’s ability to sufficiently explain 
the choice, eliminating those options unable to provide a minimally sufficient 
explanation.  
5.7 Stage 1 QCA: Overregulation 
The previous step in the process (4), identified that the reform pressures were 
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characterized by overregulation. Overregulation theory describes six responses to 
overregulation or attempted overregulation: compliance, creative compliance, 
noncompliance, capture, and black market/low transparency.213 QCA is used to confirm 
these responses in the UKOTs’ response to each prescribed policy in the reform 
process.214 In the UKOT case the unknown is whether the elements of overregulation 
present in each policy determined the UKOTs response to that policy in terms of adoption 
or rejection. The analysis matches case evidence against outlined conditions for each 
overregulation response to identify which are present in response to each policy. Once the 
responses are confirmed, they can be compared/matched with the choice of adoptions and 
rejections. The paralleling of overregulation responses and adoptions versus rejections 
will be used to explain the process of populating of the reform package.    
Conditions for Overregulation Responses: 
Among the six regulatory authorities prescribing policies for the territories there is 
no common set of conditions for compliance, creative compliance, noncompliance, and 
black market/low transparency activities. However, the most common basic elements 
among the authorities provide a base of conditions by which to evaluate them. They are 
based on policy adoption and evaluation questions.215  The conditions for capture are 
derived from applying theory to the case based on lobbying, policy structure, and 
                                                 
213 Baldwin, and Cave, and Martin, 72-77. 
214 See chapter 4 for the full structure, design, and parameters of the QCA analysis.  
215 As is common within the QCA method, assessment of conditions for the group of responses is 
subjective within the context of the case, requiring much discretion on the part of the researcher. From 
the evaluation pages of each regulatory authority, the commonalities was greatest on adoption and 
evaluation questions. Manner of assessment and standards of compliance differed, but they all evaluated 
and gave ratings of at least compliance, partial compliance, and listed sanctionable offences. The 
conditions were therefore built around these commonalities within confines of the theory’s definitions 
description of each response. 
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regulation impact questions. The conditions for compliance, creative compliance, 
noncompliance, capture, and black market/low transparency responses are tabled in 
Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3: Overregulation Responses General Conditions 
 Overregulation Theory                                Conditions
Response:
Com,CrCom,NonCom,BlkMkt/LwTr Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions
Capture Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific 
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages  
1. Policy Adoption-For each policy there must be an existing option for policy 
adoption versus non adoption.  Without a suggested policy requirement there 
would be no reform pressures. 
2. Conducted Evaluation-For each policy there must be an existing active evaluation 
process, with an active reporting mechanism measuring compliance versus 
noncompliance by the relevant regulatory authorities. Without an active 
evaluation process there is no means for judging compliance versus 
noncompliance, and no basis for sanctions for infractions.  
3. Reported level of compliance (inclusive of compliant, partial compliance, and 
noncompliance)-The evaluation process must clearly outline the requirements of 
compliance, define noncompliance within the reporting mechanism.  
4. Reported or Current Infractions-Reporting on the level of compliance must 
include definitions or description of infractions and the sanctions associated those 
infractions. Without a definition of reportable punishable infractions there is in 
reality no distinction between compliance and noncompliance. 
The response conditions for capture include: 
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1. Verifiable lobbying activity in the development of regulation or regulatory 
standards to which the regulatee is subjected. Regulatory capture requires 
regulatees to actively seek influence over the development of regulation to which 
they are subjected.216  Without their pursuit of influence there is no attempted 
capture. 
2. Membership/Participation in regulatory Steering or Committee Groups- 
Regulatory capture requires regulatees to actively seek influence over regulatory 
development either from within or outside of the regulatory authority. In addition 
to lobbying from outside the regulatory authority, regulatees may seek to 
influence the regulation process through formal memberships in institutions or 
organizations that develop regulation or regulatory standards to which they are 
subject.217 
3. Significant changes in the structure of proposed legislation, as capture may be 
assessed in comparative terms in which the structure of the regulation changed 
from its initial introduction in a manner either favorable or less harmful to the 
regulatee actively seeking influence over its development. The comparative 
change is an indicator of regulatory capture.218 
4. Removal of policy or policy elements harmful to the regulate seeking to capture 
the regulatory process. Capture may be assessed in terms of the elimination of the 
regulation or aspects of it harmful to the regulatee. The elimination is an indicator 
of regulatory capture. 
                                                 
216 Dudley and Brito, 15. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. The capture theory is predicated on a change in the regulation in some form or fashion. 
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5. Changes in the initial structure of the regulatory policy granting significant 
advantages to the regulatee over their competitors.  The granting of specific 
advantages to one regulate over others are an indicator of regulatory capture.219 
Necessary & Sufficient Conditions: 
While the conditions are general, each response differs in terms of the necessity or 
sufficiency within the context of the case.  Each set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
is fixed, as all necessary conditions must be met for confirmation of the response.220 The 
evidence surrounding each policy must meet the specific set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions to confirm the response. The necessary and sufficient conditions for each 
response are tabled for analysis in the QCA.221 From each regulatory authority’s 
evaluation page, the data set is scored and populated into five tables of set membership 
scores for each response according to its necessary and sufficient conditions.222 The 
scores are then compiled into a single table (Figure 5.4) by policy for score comparisons 
to identify which policy met a specific response.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 Ibid. 
220 The QCA used here is an inductive model with the necessary & sufficient conditions known. The 
purpose of the analysis is to identify if the responses to each policy meet the conditions to be 
categorized as one of the overregulation categories. 
221 See Appendix 2 for the full listing of necessary and sufficient conditions and response definitions. 
222 See Appendix 2 for the full QCA analysis including all tables of set membership scores and summary 
explanations by policy are placed in Appendix 2. The details of the QCA design are listed in the 
Chapter 4 Research Design section. 
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Figure 5.4: Overregulation: Necessary & Sufficient Conditions  
 Overregulation Theory               Necessary & Sufficient Conditions
                                  Conditions
Response: Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions
Compliance Necessary Necessary Necessary NA NA Necessary NA
Creative Compliance Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Necessary NA Sufficient NA
NonCompliance Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Sufficient
Black Market/LwTr Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Necessary 
                                  Conditions
Capture Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific 
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages
Nec & Suff Conditions Capture Necessary Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Sufficient  
5.8 Stage 1 QCA Result 
The QCA results are derived deductively, starting with fixed necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the five overregulation responses, then moving backwards to 
identify which policy responses parallel those of overregulation. Consistency thresholds 
and coverage scores are therefore not set ahead of the analysis. Likewise, the process of 
condition minimization and consolidation for the elimination of redundancies and 
contradictions are not the first steps of the analytical process. With established 
conditions, the process begins with an examination of the patterns and trends in the truth 
table.  
The relationships between combinations of conditions and the outcome of interest 
(overregulation response) are summarized in a truth table (Figure 5.5). The truth table is 
built from the collection of tables of set memberships for each overregulation response.223 
The table summarizes crisp conditions, grouping together the combinations of set 
membership scores leading to the particular overregulation responses in response to the 
10 prescribed policies. All values in the table are binary listed as 1 for the presence of the 
condition or factor, or 0 for the absence of a given condition or factor. The table identifies 
                                                 
223 See Appendix 2 for the tables of set memberships. 
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which policies prompted a combinations of activities and characteristics identified 
specifically with each of the five overregulation responses. The truth table displays where 
variation in response occurred leading to a common outcome. The response outcome is 
listed in the third end column displaying whether the response met the necessary and 
sufficient conditions required for that particular overregulation response. The final 
column lists the reform outcome indicating if the policy associated with the response was 
adopted as part of the reform or rejected. The consolidated truth table is displayed in 
Figure 5.5.  
Figure 5.5: Overregulation Truth Table 
QCA: Overregulation Truth Table 
Policy No. Policy:                                   Conditions Response Ratio/Prop OutCome
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Nec & Suff Conditions Compl Necessary Necessary Necessary NA NA Necessary NA
P1 US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P2 UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P3 UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl 2.3|1  / 7|10 Adopt (1)
P4 OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P5 FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P6 G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
P7 G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions Creat Compl Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Necessary NA Sufficient NA
P8 EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) No Yes (+) NA Yes (1) NA CreatCompl 1|9 / 1/10 Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions NonCompl Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Sufficient
P9 US-FATCA Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA Yes  (1) NA No (0) NonCompl 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)
Nec & Suff Conditions BlkMk/LwTr Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Necessary 
                            -          -            -                     -                       -                       -                      -                     - BlackMarket/LwTr  -  - 
                                  Conditions
Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific 
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages
Nec & Suff Conditions Capture Necessary Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Sufficient
P10 UK-Public Central Reg Beneficial Own Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) Capture 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)  
An examination of the consolidated truth table reveals the trends present in the 
data set, in particular the relationship between conditions and their characteristics. The 
details of the set relations are summarized and tabled in figure 5.6. Compliance, having 
four necessary and no sufficient conditions, consequently displayed only a single 
configuration among 7 out of 10 policies (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7) with a marked 
consistency score of 0.70. The raw and unique coverage of the compliance response 
paralleled this 0.70 score of the 10 policies. The fitness scores indicate that the necessary 
conditions for compliance are the mutually dependent and the most prevalent action 
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prompted by the reform policies.224  
Figure 5.6: QCA Overregulation-Result Summary  
QCA Result:  Overregulation Responses
Result Summary
Necessary Sufficient Possible Displayed Consistency of Raw/Unique
Responses Conditions Conditions Configurations  Configuration Configuration Coverage Total Policies: 10
Compliance 4 0 32 1 .7 (70%) 0.70 (70%)  P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7(7 total) 
Creative Compliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10)%  P8 (1)
Noncompliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P9
Capture 2 3 64 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P10
Black Market Low Transparency Activities 3 1 32 1 0 0 0
 
 The creative compliance response, subject to 2 necessary and 3 sufficient 
conditions, displayed only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 in relation to policy 8 
(P8). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency 
score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. Likewise 
the noncompliance response subject to 2 necessary and 2 sufficient conditions, displayed 
only 1 configuration out of a possible 32 in relation to policy 9 (P9). The configuration 
was only present in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with 
identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. The capture response, subject to 2 
necessary and 3 sufficient conditions, displayed  only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 
in relation to policy 10 (P10). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 
policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique 
coverage scores. Last, the black market/low transparency response, subject to 3 necessary 
and 1 sufficient condition, was markedly absent in response to any of the 10 policies and 
                                                 
224 Fit scoring and numbering was calculated according to the standard calucations used in crsQCA. All 
scores were calculated manually without the use of software. Leila KahwatiEmail author, Sara Jacobs, 
Heather Kane, Megan Lewis, Meera Viswanathan and Carol E. Golin, “Using qualitative comparative 
analysis in a systematic review of a complex intervention,” BioMedCentral: Systematic 
Reviews20165:82, May, 42016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13643-016-0256-y.  
:  
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as a result has no accompanying fit scores. 
In practical terms, the QCA results indicate the UKOTs response met the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for compliance with: US/UKOT FATCA IGA, UK-
CDOT, UK-Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, OECD – CRS & AEOI, FATF-
Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, G20-High 
Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20-Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The regulatory authorities responsible 
for the different policies have cited the territories as compliant.225  The UKOTs response 
met the necessary and sufficient conditions for creative compliance only with the EU-
AMLD4. Their response met the necessary and sufficient conditions for noncompliance 
with regard to US-FATCA.  They met the necessary and sufficient conditions for capture 
with regard to the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership. The results indicate the 
UKOTs did not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for black market and low 
transparency activities in any regard. 226  
 Under the assumption of overregulation as the active causal mechanism in the 
process, its chronology proceeds from conditions of overregulation in the regulatory 
environment brought about multiple prescribed policy adoptions by regulatory 
authorities. These conditions prompt an overregulation response to each policy. 
Compliance and creative compliance responses lead to adoption of policy as part of the 
reform, while noncompliance and black market/low transparency activity responses lead 
to a rejection of policy. Capture and strategic noncompliance towards reregulation or 
                                                 
225 The evaluations are sourced from the pages of the accompanying regulatory authorities. 
226 See Appendix 2 for a full explanation of the Stage 1 QCA result by policy. 
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regulatory reform lead to a reevaluation of policy for consideration as part of the reform.  
These responses are consistent with the policy adoptions included in the reform and 
rejections that were not. The parallel is sufficient to explain the range of possible 
responses, and the regulatory context in which those options emerge. The QCA result 
displays evidence of the presence of each response with the exception of black market 
and low transparency activities. The opaque nature of black markets or low transparency 
activities make the difficult to detect in which case they may be present but not visible. 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the entire process and fifth step with overregulation as the active 
causal mechanism.227 
5.9 Overregulation Theory: Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
However, overregulation theory as a causal mechanism accounts only for the 
variety of responses to the prescribed policies. Overregulation provides no further 
insights as to why or how a specific policy was chosen or rejected. The theory only 
indicates the chosen response to a given policy leaving the basis for each choice to the 
realm of assumption. A logical gap is left between choice of possible responses, and the 
actual response chosen in regard to the reform. As a result overregulation provides no 
logical basis for adoptions or rejections, and by extension no comprehensive explanation 
for the choice of response to each policy.  
Overregulation further fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the changes in 
a policy from its original form after being rejected to later being adopted after having 
changed form.  It sufficiently accounts for the responses involved in the changes, but not 
                                                 
227 See page 91. 
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for the process by which the changes took place. The territories did not comply with 
FATCA or the UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership until a second 
FATCA option in the form of the IGA was made available, and the “public” component 
of Registers of Beneficial Ownership was eliminated. The processes by which those 
policies were amended involved regulatory capture as well as strategic noncompliance 
towards initiating reregulation or regulatory reform. Yet overregulation does not place 
these actions within the context of a process that explains the adoption of some policies, 
rejection of others, and attempted change of a few. Overreguation theory is unable to 
satisfy all three aspects of a minimally sufficient explanation, by itself unable to explain 
the adoption process populating the final reform.   
Figure 5.7: Overregulation: Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
Overregulation Theory Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation
Causal Mechanism:  Reform Pressure  >>>  Overregulation >>> Response Options >>> Chosen Response = Insufficient
Sufficient Sufficient Insufficient
              >>>>>            >>>>>              >>>>>
Prescribed Policies (X) Overrgulation Response Options Chosen Response???? Reform Outcome (Y)
No Basis for the choice
UK CDOT of Response!!
FATF-BenOwnshp
G20-BenOwnshp Compliance
G20-MoneyLaund
UK-Public Register
of Beneficial Non-Universal Adoption Capture
Ownerhsip US FATCA Policy Adoption
UK-PubRegBenOwn Compliance
OECD-CRS/AIOE Creative Compliance
OECD-CRS/AIOE Early Adoption AMLD4
Creative Compliance UK CDOT
FATF-BenOwnshp
US FATCA Force Adoption of G20-BenOwnshp
Competitively G20-MoneyLaund
Disadvantageous
AMDL4 Polocy NonCompliance
Policy Rejection
Noncompliance
Black Market/Lw Trs
Black Market/
Low Transparency
 
5.10 Stage 2: QCA Comparative Advantage  
 The theory of comparative advantage explains the sources of the relative 
advantages firms or states have over their competitors within a given market. The reform 
pressures imposed on the UKOTs were characterized by elements of overregulation 
94 
 
threatening to diminish the competitive advantages built by the territories in financial 
services over time. The UKOT case marked by two unknowns regarding competitive 
advantage. The first is whether the competitive advantage impact of each policy 
determined the UKOTs response to that policy in terms of adoption or rejection. The 
second is whether each policy assessed within the case impose conditions mimicking the 
characteristic conditions known to increase or decrease competitive advantage and can be 
categorized as such.  
To resolve these unknowns, QCA will be used to match the evidence surrounding 
each prescribed policy against outlined conditions for increases or decreases in 
competitive advantage factors. The impact result is then compared to the UKOTs choice 
of response towards adopting or rejecting policy as part of the reform package. The 
analysis will dually inform as to whether a policy’s positive impact on competitive 
advantage parallels its adoption as part of the reform, or whether its negative impact 
parallels the policy’s rejection.  
Competitive Advantage Impact Conditions 
Impact on competitive advantage is measured by general increases or decreases in 
the three central components of competitive advantage: comparative advantage (cost), 
differential advantage, focus advantages.228 Comparative advantage is further subdivided 
into due diligence costs, labor costs, and facilities/technology/and specialist costs.229 An 
increase in any of these sub-factors decreases comparative advantage. Differential 
advantages are subdivided into discounted tax rates, privacy, common law, and 
                                                 
228 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
229 Accenture, “Automatic Exchange of Information Regime: An emerging compliance challenge.” 
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regulatory efficiency.230 A decrease in any of these in turn decreases differentiation 
capacity. Focus advantages are achieved in specialization or niche markets.231 An 
imposed decrease in market share or reduced ability to service the niche market decreases 
focus advantages. In total there are 8 combined competitive advantage factor 
endowments that condition its increase or decrease. Each policy is weighted against the 
possible increases or decreases that it imposes on competitive advantage factors and sub-
factors.232  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for decreases and increases of competitive 
advantage are weighted on the configuration of the combined degree of impact (positive, 
negative, nil) of the eight factors plus the presence or absence of non-universal or early 
adoption (overregulation factors). Each set of necessary and sufficient conditions is fixed, 
as all necessary conditions must be met for confirmation of decrease or increase. 
Negative impact decreases are the most significant to the study as positive increases or no 
impact are likely to result in compliance responses and adoption. Negative impact will 
prompt a series of other responses which are not all opaque, transparent, and easily 
traceable. Negative impact is recorded when the proportion of negatively impacted sub-
                                                 
230 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. 
231 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
232 Unlike overregulation, competitive advantage literature is very transparent on the conditions imposing 
increases or decreases in competitive advantage. The literature surrounding the case as well as financial 
services industry reports on reporting regimes is very clear about the factors and sub-factors of 
importance in financial services regarding competitive advantage. Michael Porter’s classical work on 
competitive advantage lays out the three main factors of cost, differentiation, and focus. Chiu addresses 
differentiation and cost advantages within the context of financial services. Industry professional such 
as Accenture and EY outline the costs associated with the new reporting regimes and their impact on 
competitiveness. Policy based Increases and decreases in competitive advantage were simply weighted 
on the combined negative, positive, or null impact of the eight competitive impact sub-factors plus their 
relative impact across all competitors. Universal adoption and application mooted the effect on 
competitive advantage, but non-universal, early, or targeting adoptions disadvantaged some competitors 
relative to others. 
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factors (1s) is greater than positively impacted sub-factors (0s). Likewise positive impact 
is recorded when the proportion of sub-factors positively impacted (0s) is higher than the 
sub-factors negatively impacted (1s).233  
The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to impose a decrease 
on competitive advantage include:  
i. Very High Negative Impact Decrease – Sufficient,  
ii. High Negative Impact Decrease-Necessary + either Non-Universal Adoption -
Sufficient  or Early Adoption-Sufficient or both,  
iii. Moderate Negative Impact-Sufficient + Non-Universal Adoption-Necessary + 
Early Adoption-Necessary 
The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to impose an increase 
decrease on competitive advantage include: 
i. Positive Impact-Sufficient 
The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to have a null impact on 
competitive advantage include: 
1. Moderate Negative Impact-Sufficient 
 
2. Low Negative Impact-Sufficient 
From the official requirements of each policy and the inherent costs associated 
                                                 
233 As is common within the QCA method, assessment of the necessary and conditions for competitive 
advantage increases and decreases is subjective within the context of the case, requiring much 
discretion on the part of the researcher. A proportional measurement of increases versus decreases plus 
relative impact provided the simplest measure but is still subject to challenges. This form of assessment 
equally weights all sub-factors where in reality they could carry different weights of impact on 
competitive advantage. However, the weighting of the sub-factors is still itself conditional depending on 
the environment and international context. Increasing costs in 1 context may carry impose a different 
degree of impact in a second context. As a result within the study they are all weighted equally as there 
is no means to impose a universal context on all the factors or policies. 
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with each reporting regime and recommended standards according to industry 
professionals, the data set is scored across the eight sub-factors for increase (1), decreases 
(o), or null effect (0). The scores are populated into a single table of set membership 
scores for each policy.  The scores are then compiled into a single table by impact to 
identify the parallels impact and adoption.234 
5.11 Stage 2 Result  
The stage 2 QCA results are also derived deductively, starting with fixed 
necessary and sufficient conditions for competitive advantage increases and decreases, 
then moving backwards to identify whether policies meet the conditions imposing a 
likely increase or decrease on competitive advantage. Consistency thresholds and 
coverage scores are therefore not set ahead or as a prerequisite to the analysis. Likewise, 
the process of condition minimization and consolidation for the elimination of 
redundancies and contradictions are not the first steps of the deductive analytical process. 
With established conditions, the process begins with an examination of the patterns and 
trends in the truth table.  
The relationships between combinations of conditions and the outcome of interest 
(competitive advantage impact) are summarized in a truth table (Figure 5.8). The truth 
table is built from the collection of tables of set memberships for competitive advantage 
impact on sub-factors.235 The table summarizes crisp conditions, grouping together the 
combinations of set membership scores leading to the particular outcomes (competitive 
                                                 
234 Appendix 2. The full QCA analysis including all tables of set membership scores, conversion thresholds, 
and summary explanations by policy are placed in Appendix 2. The details of the QCA design are listed 
in the Chapter 4 Research Design section. 
235 See Appendix 2 for the competitive advantage table of set memberships. 
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advantage increases/decreases) imposed by the 10 policies. All values in the table are 
binary listed as 1 for the presence of the condition or factor, or 0 for the absence of a 
given condition or factor.236 Each policy is listed by its degree of impact followed by its 
adoption requirements and impact decrease or increase. The impact outcome is listed in 
the second end column displaying whether each policy met the necessary and sufficient 
conditions required for increase or decrease. The final column lists the reform outcome 
indicating if the policy associated with the increase or decrease was adopted as part of the 
reform or rejected. The table displays where variation exists leading to a common 
increase or decrease outcome by different policies. The truth table identifies which 
policies would create the conditions characteristically identified with competitive 
advantage increases and decreases. Figure 5.8 presents the truth table of consolidated 
stage 2 QCA results. 
Figure 5.8: Competitive Advantage Truth Table 
QCA Comparative Advantage:       Truth Table  
Policy Policy                 Competitive Adv Impact               Adoption Reform Outcome
No. Proportion Degree NonUniversal Early Impact
P1 **US-UKOT7 IGA (FATCA)** 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Moderate (Neg) Yes (1) No (0) Nill (0) Adopt (1)
P2 UK-CDOT 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Moderate (Neg) Yes (1) No (0) Nill (0) Adopt (1)
P3 **UK-Cen Reg Ben Own** 1=2, 0=1, n=5 Low (Neg) Yes (1) No (0) Nill (0) Adopt (1)
P4 OECD - "CRS & AEOI" 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Moderate (Neg) No (0) Yes (1) Nill (0) Adopt (1)
P5 FATF - Trans Benf Own 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Increase (Positive)/Nill No (0) No (0) Incr (0) Adopt (1)
P6 G20 - Ben Own Trans 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Increase (Positive)/Nill Yes (1) No (0) Incr (0) Adopt (1)
P7 G20 - MCMAATM 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Increase (Positive)/Nill Yes (1) No (0) Incr (0) Adopt (1)
P8 EU - AMLD4 1=4, 0=1, n=3 High (Neg) Yes (1) No (0) Decr (1) **Adopt** (1)
P9 US-FATCA 1=5, 0=3, n=0 Very High (Neg) No (0) No (0) Decr (1) Reject (0)
P10 UK Pub Cen Reg Ben Own 1=5, 0=3, n=0 Very High (Neg) Yes (1) No (0) Decr (1) Reject (0)
Ratio 2.33|1 1|9 1|2.33 1|4
Proportion 7|10 1|9 3|10 8|10  
An examination of the consolidated truth table reveals the trends present in the 
data set, in particular the relationship between conditions and their characteristics. The 
details of the set relations are summarized and tabled in figure 5.9. Very high impact 
decreases are subject to a single sufficient condition and no necessary conditions, 
                                                 
236 Conversion thresholds for the combined sub-factors into scores of 1 & 0s are tabled in Appendix 2). 
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displaying only a single configuration among 2 of the 10 policies in relation to policies 9 
and 10 (P9, P10). Very high impact decreases have a calculated consistency score of 0.20 
(20%), a raw coverage score of 0.30%, and unique coverage score of 0.20 (20%). The 
fitness scores indicate that a single condition can impose a decrease in competitive 
advantage independent of other conditions.237  
Figure 5.9: QCA Competitive Advantage-Result Summary 
   QCA Result:  Competitive Advantage Impact
Result Summary
Necessary Sufficient Possible Displayed Consistency of Raw Unique
Impact Conditions Conditions Cofigurations  Configurations Configuration Coverage Coverage Total Policies: 10
Decrease Very High 0 1 2 1 0.2 (20%) 0.3  (30%) 0.2 (20%)  P9, P10,  (2 total) )
Decrease High 1 2 8 1 0.1 (10%) 0.3 (30%) 0.10 (10)% P8 (1)
Null 0 2 4 2 0.4 (40%) 0.4 (40) 0.40 (%) P1, P2, P3, P4 (4 total)
Increase 0 1 1 1 0.3 (30%) 0.30 (30%) 0.30 (30%) P5, P6, P7 (3)
 
High impact decreases are subject to 1 necessary and 2 sufficient conditions, 
displaying only a single configuration among the 10 policies in relation to policy 8 (P8). 
The high impact decrease has a calculated consistency score of 0.120 (10%), a raw 
coverage score of 0.30 (30%), and unique coverage score of 0.20 (20%). Null impact is 
subject to 2 sufficient conditions and no necessary conditions, displaying two 
configurations among the 10 policies in relation to policies 1, through 4 (P1, P2, P3, P4). 
Null impact has a calculated consistency score of 0.120 (10%), a raw coverage score of 
0.40 (40%), and paralleling unique coverage scores of 0.40 (40%). Competitive 
advantage increases are subject to 1 sufficient condition and no necessary conditions, 
                                                 
237 Fit scoring and numbering was calculated according to the standard calculations used in crsQCA. All 
scores were calculated manually without the use of software. Leila Kahwati, Sara Jacobs, Heather Kane, 
Megan Lewis, Meera Viswanathan and Carol E. Golin, “Using qualitative comparative analysis in a 
systematic review of a complex intervention,” Bio Med Central: Systematic Reviews20165:82, May, 
42016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13643-016-0256-y.  
:  
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displaying one configuration among the 10 policies in relation to policies 5 through 7 
(P5, P6, P7). High impact has a calculated consistency score of 0.120 (10%), a raw 
coverage score of 0.30 (30%), and paralleling unique coverage scores of 0.30 (30%). 
In practical terms, the second stage QCA result indicates that full compliance and 
adoption of US-FATCA, the UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, and 
the EU-AMLD4 would each significantly decrease the UKOTs comparative advantage in 
financial services. The impact of OECD-CRS & AEOI, US-UKOT FATCA IGA, and 
UK-CDOT on competitive advantage factors are moderate with non-universal adoption 
and no early adoption.  As a result they have a null effect on competitive advantage. The 
UK-Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership has low impact on competitive advantage 
factors and an overall null effect on competitive advantage. The three recommended 
standards, the FATF-Transparency in Beneficial Ownership, G20-Benenficial Ownership 
Transparency, and G20-MCMAATM have positive impact with the effect of increasing 
competitive advantage.  
Under the assumption of competitive advantage as the active causal mechanism in 
the process, its chronology proceeds from conditions of overregulation in the regulatory 
environment brought about by multiple prescribed policy adoptions by regulatory 
authorities. These conditions prompt the UKOTs to evaluate each prescribed policy 
against its negative or positive impact (increase/decrease) on their competitive advantage 
in financial services. Based on this assessment they choose to adopt or reject the policy as 
part of the reform package. If the policy stands to significantly decrease competitive 
advantage, it is rejected and met with a noncompliance response. However, if the policy 
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has relatively no impact on competitive advantage (or increases competitive advantage) it 
is met with a compliance response and adopted as part of the reform package. Figure 5.7 
illustrates the sufficiency of competitive advantage as the active causal mechanism in the 
reform process. 
The stage 2 QCA result illustrates parallels between compliance and adoption 
responses of policies that did not negatively impact (decrease) comparative advantage; 
and rejection responses to policies negatively impacting (decreasing) comparative 
advantage.238 UK CDOT, FATF Transparency in Beneficial Ownership 
Recommendations, G20 Beneficial Ownership Transparency, and G20 MCMAATM, 
having the least negative impact on competitive advantage, were adopted directly by the 
territories. Where decreases impacted a third or less of the competitive advantage factors 
(decreases in 3 or less of the comparative advantage factors), compliance and adoption 
were the response.  By contrast, the UKOTs rejected those policies that stood to 
significantly decrease competitive advantage. US-FATCA and UK-Public Central 
registers displayed the greatest negative effect of all prescribed policies and consequently 
were rejected and not met with compliance responses. Where decreases impacted greater 
than a third of the comparative advantage factors (decreases in 4 or more of the 
comparative advantage factors) rejection and noncompliance or capture were the 
responses. The QCA sufficiently models the relationship between impact on competitive 
advantage and compliance towards adoptions of the policies that constitute the reforms. 
The reform package is only populated by policies that pose little or no threat to the 
UKOTs competitive advantage in financial services. In this regard the theory of 
                                                 
238 See Appendix 2 for a full explanation of the Stage 2 QCA result by policy. 
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competitive advantage sufficiently explains obvious compliance & adoption, and 
noncompliance & rejection responses to regulatory pressures. The mechanism provides a 
sufficient explanation for the basis of the choice of response to each policy. 
5.12 Competitive Advantage:  Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
However, the competitive advantage mechanism does not sufficiently explain or 
account for the variety of responses to the prescribed policies beyond merely compliance 
and noncompliance (Figure 5.10), as the evidence surrounding the case indicates alternate 
responses.239 The UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership was rejected but 
not met with a noncompliance response. It was instead met with an effort to change 
aspects of the regulation that would allow the territories to comply (capture). The EU 
AMLD4 was not met with a compliance response and adoption, but rather with partial 
compliance (creative compliance) and adoption where the territories complied only with 
those components of the policy that do not significantly harm competitive advantage 
(Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership). The UKOTs rejected all non-sanctionable 
aspects that hold the possibility of harm even if not immediate. Each of these responses 
must be accounted for by the causal mechanism to provide a minimally sufficient 
explanation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
239 The variety of responses are taken from the stage 1 QCA result. 
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Figure 5.10: Competitive Advantage Causal Mechanism: Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
QCA: Competitive Advantage Sufficient/Insufficient Explanation
Causal Mechanism - Reform Pressures -> Assessment-> Choice -> Response -> Reform
Policy (X) Impact Reform Outcome (Y)
                       Assessment Response Reform
Reform Pressures Very High Impact Decr                           Choice
US-FATCA (2010) 1=5, 0=0, n=3 >>>>>>> Sufficient >>>>>>>
NonCompliance Rejection
<<<<<<< Insufficient <<<<<<<
???Process/Response???
Moderate Nill Impact+ NonUnivAdopt
**US-UKOT7 IGA (FATCA)**(2013) 1=3, 0=1, n=4 >>>>>>> Sufficient >>>>>>> Compliance Adoption
Very Hight Impact Decr 
UK Pub Cen Reg Ben Own 1=5, 0=0, n=3 >>>>>>> Sufficient >>>>>>>
NonCompliance Rejection
<<<<<< Insufficient <<<<<<<
???Process/Response???
Low Nill Impact >>>>>>> Sufficient >>>>>>> Compliance Adoption
**UK-Cen Reg Ben Own** 1=2, 0=1, n=5
High Impact Decr +NonUnivAdopt ?? ??
EU - AMLD4 **1=4, 0=1, n=2 >>>>>>> Insufficient >>>>>>> Compliance Adoption
NonCompliance Rejection
Moderate Nill Impact  
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" 1=3, 0=1, n=4 EarlyAdopt
UK-CDOT 1=3, 0=1, n=4
Positive Impact
FATF - Trans Benf Own 1=0, 0=1, n=7 >>>>>>> Sufficient >>>>>>> Compliance Adoption
G20 - Ben Own Trans 1=0, 0=1, n=7
G20 - MCMAATM 1=0, 0=1, n=7
 
In addition, competitive advantage makes no distinctions between the motivations 
for both compliance and noncompliance beyond maintaining competitive advantage. 
Both compliance and noncompliance have multiple motivations of which reregulation, 
deregulation, and regulatory reform by the regulating authority are included.240 
Competitive advantage does not account for these varied responses beyond basic 
compliance and adoption or noncompliance and rejection. 
Further, the competitive advantage mechanism provides no sufficient explanation 
for the changes in a policy from its original form after initial rejection, to a later form 
adopted as part of the reform.  The territories did not comply with FATCA or the UK 
Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership until a second FATCA option in the 
                                                 
240 Dunne, 143-145. 
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form of the IGA was made available, and the “public” component of Registers of 
Beneficial Ownership was eliminated. Competitive advantage does not account for the 
role of the regulatee in this process of change beyond noncompliance and rejection. The 
processes by which those policies were amended involved other responses such as 
regulatory capture, as well as strategic noncompliance to initiate reregulation or 
regulatory reform.  
Capture was the means utilized by the UKOTs to eliminate the public component 
from the registers of beneficial owners as they had significant localized influence they 
could bring to bear on UK parliamentary process.241 The UKOTs opted for a 
noncompliance response to US-FATCA awaiting reregulation or regulatory reform. 
Based on the universal nature of its challenges and the scope of the problems it posed 
worldwide, reregulation or regulatory reform by the US would be necessary in the short 
term. The territories successfully waited until other regulatory options were made 
available by the US administration then adopted the FATCA version that did not threaten 
their competitive advantage. The territories were active in both processes of change to 
decrease or negate the degree of loss in competitive advantage imposed by the original 
policy.  
The theory of competitive advantage as a causal mechanism does not meet all of 
the requirements for a minimally sufficient explanation of the reform outcome. Unable to 
account for the complexity and variation in responses, nor the changes in prescribed 
policy, competitive advantage as a causal mechanism provides an incomplete explanation 
for the populating of the reform.  
                                                 
241 Conclusion derived from the stage 1 QCA result. 
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5.13 Stage 3 QCA: Composite Mechanism  
With both overregulation and competitive advantage unable to provide a 
minimally sufficient explanation for the adoption stage of the process, the combining of 
both mechanisms is the next option in the deductive elimination process in seeking to 
explain the choice of adoptions versus rejections. Individually, they were each unable to 
provide for all the aspects of a minimally sufficient explanation for the reform outcome. 
Overregulation is sufficient to explain the variety of responses to each policy, but 
insufficient to explain the basis for the choice of response. Competitive advantage is 
sufficient to explain the basis for the choice of reform in terms of positive or negative 
impact on competitive advantage factors, but insufficient to explain responses beyond 
compliance & adoption and noncompliance & rejection.  As a composite mechanism 
however, the theories are expected to provide a minimally sufficient explanation covering 
all necessary facets of the decision making stage of the reform process.  The stage 3 QCA 
references the stage 1 and stage 2 QCA results as a basis for explaining the composite 
mechanism. 
In the stage 1 QCA, overregulation theory as a causal mechanism provided a 
sufficient explanation for the variety of responses to the prescribed policies. The 
mechanism is sufficient to explain the range of possible responses and the regulatory 
context in which those options emerge. Yet by itself was insufficient to explain the basis 
for the choice of response to a particular policy. The QCA result demonstrated evidence 
for the presence of each overregulation response with the exception of black market and 
low transparency activities. The responses parallel overregulation theory’s suggested 
responses. 
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In the stage 2 QCA, competitive advantage as a causal mechanism provided a 
sufficient explanation for the basis of the choice of response to each policy. The theory 
adequately defines the basis for the choice of response to reform pressures as impact on 
competitive advantage.  The stage 2 QCA results illustrate parallels between compliance 
and adoption responses to policies that did not negatively impact (decrease) comparative 
advantage, and a rejection response to those standing to decrease comparative advantage. 
The reform package is only populated by policies that pose little or no threat to the 
UKOTs competitive advantage in financial services. Even so, the mechanism was 
insufficient to explain responses beyond compliance & adoption, and noncompliance & 
rejection. 
In the stage 3 QCA, with both theories combined, the composite mechanism 
dually dictates that the impact of each policy on competitive advantage determined the 
choice of response to that policy, and that the variety of available responses were ramed 
by the elements of overregulation present in the policy.  The central elements of the 
composite causal mechanism include a competitive advantage impact assessment and 
overregulation framed choices of response.  
Under the assumption of the combined theories as the active causal mechanism in 
the process, the chronology of the reform proceeds from conditions of overregulation in 
the regulatory environment brought about by multiple prescribed policy adoptions by 
regulatory authorities. These conditions prompt the UKOTs to first conduct a competitive 
advantage impact assessment to determine whether each policy stands to decrease or 
increase their competitive advantages in financial services. If the policy did not stand to 
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decrease competitive advantage or enhanced it, the policy was met with a compliance 
response and adopted as part of the reform. If the policy stood to decrease competitive 
advantage, compliance was forgone and it was rejected then met with either 
noncompliance or one of the other three overregulation responses. Those responses 
included capture, black market/low transparency, or noncompliance while awaiting 
reregulation-deregulation-regulatory reform.  
If changes occurred in the policy via capture or reregulation, it was reassessed, 
and if found to no longer decrease competitive advantage, was then met with a 
compliance and adoption response. If the policy had both sanctionable and non-
sanctionable elements, of which some parts negatively impacted competitive advantage 
while others does not, a creative compliance response was followed by adoption as part 
of the reform.   
The end result was the reform outcome comprised of eight policy adoptions of 
which seven are compliance responses, and one a creative compliance response. Two of 
the policies were rejected (FATCA, Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership), 
one with a noncompliance response, the other with a capture response.  The two rejected 
policies were later adopted in a different form from their initial introduction by regulatory 
authorities (UKOTs FATCA IGA, Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership).242 Figure 
5.11 illustrates the entire process and step five as a product of the composite 
overregulation-comparative advantage mechanism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
242 See Appendix 2 for a full explanation of the Stage 3 QCA result by policy. 
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Figure 5.11: The Composite Causal Mechanism 
Composite Causal Mechanism: Competitive Advantage + Overrgulation Reform Pressures ->Overregulation ->Assessment->Choice -> Reform Outcome"
                       Policy (X) Impact Reform Outcome (Y)
Response
    Choice
Reform Pressures >>>              >>>>>> Compliance Adoption      >>>
Overreguation  Elements Increase Competitive Advantage
USA-FATCA    >>>
UK-PubCenRegBenOwn                                 CompAd. Assessment NonCompliance Rejection
EU-ALMD4                                        >>> US-UKOT FATCA IGA
UK-CDOT UK-CenRegBenOwn
OECD-CRS & AEOI UK-CDOT
FATF-RecBenOwn     Choice       >>> ***EU-ALMD4***
G20-TranBenOwn Decrease Competitive Advantage           >>>>>>> OECD-CRS & AEOI
G20-MCMAATM >>> Creative Adoption FATF-RecBenOwn
Compliance G20-TranBenOwn
    Choice G20-MCMAATM
US-UKOT FATCA IGA
UK-CenRegBenOwn <<< Capture/
Reregulation
  >>> Black Market Adoption    >>>
Low Transparency Rejection
 
5.14 Composite Mechanism: Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
The stage 1 result indicated that overregulation is sufficient to explain the variety 
of responses to each policy, but insufficient to explain the basis for the choice of 
response. The combine with competitive advantage eliminated this short coming. The 
stage 2 result indicated that competitive advantage is sufficient to explain the basis for the 
choice of reform in terms of positive or negative impact on competitive advantage 
factors, but insufficient to explain responses beyond compliance & adoption and 
noncompliance & rejection. The combine with overregulation eliminated this short 
coming in regard to the requirements for a minimally sufficient explanation.  
However, neither mechanism was able to sufficiently explain the adoption of a 
prescribed policy in a form other than its original presentation by regulatory authorities. 
Overregulation described only the responses by which the change occurs, while the 
competitive advantage describes only the basis for accepting the changes. Neither was 
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able to provide a complete explanatory process for the change and as a result were unable 
to fulfil the requirements for a minimally sufficient explanation. Even so, the combine of 
both mechanisms is also capable of eliminating this shortcomings. The composite 
mechanism can provide an explanatory element capable of explaining the entire process 
in the structural change of a policy for later adoption after having been initially rejected.  
The process of change begins with the territories’ assessment of the impact of 
each policy on its competitive advantage in financial services. It the policy stands to 
decrease competitive advantage it is rejected with either a noncompliance or capture 
response. Capture is pursued with the intent of using both formal and informal influence 
to bringing about changes in the structure of the policy mitigating its negative impact on 
competitive advantage. Strategic noncompliance is pursued in order to initiate, or 
awaiting reregulation or regulatory reform based on inherently structural problems within 
the policy. Once the policy is reintroduced by the regulatory authority in a secondary 
format, it is reassessed for its impact on competitive advantage. If the impact is null or 
positive, then the policy is met with a compliance response and adopted into the reform 
package.  
The UKOTs initially rejected both US FATCA and the UK Public Central 
Registers of Beneficial Ownership due to their negative impact on competitive advantage. 
Four years after FATCA’s introduction the UKOTs adopted the UKOTs FATCA IGA, 
and over a year after its initial introduction adopted a nonpublic version of the UK-Public 
Central Registers. US-FATCA was rejected due to the universal nature of challenges 
posed by FATCA to jurisdictions worldwide. The territories entered into negotiations 
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with the US (after initial permission by the UK) citing their inability to comply with 
FATCA in its initial form and sought a solution that would allow for their compliance 
with US reporting requirements.243 After these types requests mass mounted against 
FATCA by numerous states worldwide, the US restructured the policy to accommodate 
the individual needs of select jurisdictions in the form of Intergovernmental Agreements 
(IGAs).244 The US-US/UKOT7 FATCA IGA was agreed between the territories and US in 
2014.245 The IGA had only a null effect on the territories competitive advantage in 
financial services and was fully complied with and adopted as part of the reforms.246 
Within the financial services industry the reregulation process regarding FATCA was 
well documented, detailing the numerous challenges it posed throughout the global 
financial services sector. 
The UK Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership was initially rejected based on 
its legal incompatibility with the privacy laws of the territories.247 Rather than opt for 
noncompliance rejecting the registers altogether, the territories pursued a capture strategy 
employing localized diplomatic resources in the UK to influence the structure of the 
policy in their favor by removal of “public” requirement.248 The attempt was successful 
                                                 
243 Philip Graham, “BVI & Cayman Funds Round-Up: From FATCA to Fund Directors,” Harneys 
Publication, October 30, 2012, accessed, July 1, 2017, http://www.harneys.com/publications/legal-
updates/bvi-and-cayman-funds-round-up-from-fatca-to-fund-directors 
244 Laurie Hatten Boyd, “Are Problems Looming for FATCA and the “Reciprocal” IGA?.” 
245 “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),” US Department of the Treasury, Accessed July 1, 
2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx. 
246 The null effect conclusion is taken from the stage 2 QCA result.  
247 James Brockhurst, “Old colonies; New Disputes.” 
248 The formal and informal lobbying efforts of the UKOTs meets the definition of attempted capture. 
Secondary sources in UK media criticize the degree of influence the UKOTs have been able to secure 
with regards to the UK governments. Melanie Newman, “Lobbying’s Hidden Influence: Tax havens 
boost their lobbying efforts,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 
2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-19/tax-havens-boost-their-lobbying-
efforts. Melanie Newman, “Conservative peer hired as tax haven lobbyist,” The Bureau of Investigative 
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as the “public” element was withdrawn and the policy presented as the UK Central 
Registers of Beneficial Ownership in 2016.249  The revision had a null effect on 
competitive advantage allowing the territories to comply and adopt the policy as part of 
the reforms.250 The evidence surrounding the case in terms of lobby reports lends 
credence to the capture claim.  
The explanation of change described by the composite mechanism parallels the 
chronology of evidence and events surrounding both FACTCA and the Registers of 
Beneficial Ownership. The parallel is consistent enough to provide a sufficient 
explanation for the adoption of a prescribed policy in a different form than that originally 
proposed by the regulatory authority. The provision of this explanation, together with 
explanations of the choice of response and response options provide a complete 
explanation of the populating of the reform. It addresses all facets of the adoption or 
rejection of the reform policies prescribed by the varying regulatory authorities.  The 
composite mechanism therefore provides a minimally sufficient explanation for the final 
step of the reform process without outstanding gaps of logic, events, or time in the 
process. Figure 5.12 illustrates the sufficiency of the composite mechanism in explaining 
the reform outcome. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 2017,   
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-17/conservative-peer-hired-as-tax-haven-
lobbyist. The British Virgin Islands as well as other UKOTs have formally organized and recruited 
groups of influential individuals to lobby the UK government in areas of strategic interests such as 
Financial services. “Friends of the BVI,” Government of the British Virgin Islands London Office, 
accessed July 1, 2-17, https://www.bvi.org.uk/londonoffice/friends. 
249 Patrick Wintour, “Overseas territories spared from UK law on company registers,” The Guardian, April 
12, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/12/overseas-
territories-spared-from-uk-law-on-company-registers. 
250 The conclusion of null effect is taken from the stage 2 QCA result. 
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Figure 5.12: Composite Causal Mechanism: Sufficient vs Insufficient Explanation 
Composite Mechanism:  Competitive Advantage +Overregulation Sufficient/Insufficient Explanation
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
6.1 Summary of Research Findings 
The hypothesis proposed at the outset of the research suggested that the reform 
pressures facing the UKOTs were characterized by elements of overregulation, and the 
adoption or rejection of each prescribed reform policy was based on its negative or 
positive impact on the territories’ international competitive advantage in financial 
services. If a policy did not impose a likely decrease on competitive advantage, it was 
met with a compliance response and adopted as part of the reform. If a policy was likely 
to impose a decrease on competitive advantage, it was rejected, forgoing compliance and 
followed by an alternative response to overregulation. 
The minimally sufficient explanation provided by the composite overregulation-
competitive advantage mechanism parallels this hypothesis.  The composite mechanism 
explains the varying facets of the reform including the structure of reform pressures 
(overregulation), the variety of possible responses (overregulation), the basis for policy 
adoption and rejection (competitive advantage), and the process by which rejected 
policies are morphed into policies eventually adopted (composite mechanism) by the 
UKOTs.  
The evidence appears to support the hypothesis and composite mechanism, 
granting increased confidence that the explanation is sufficient to explain the reform 
outcome.  The QCA results provided evidence for the presence of four out of the five 
overregulation responses within the decision making stage with the exception of black 
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market/low transparency activities. The absence of evidence for a black market or 
movement to low transparency activities by the UKOTs does not invalidate the findings 
in any regard. The opaque nature of low transparency financial services makes their 
presence difficult to detect or prove, requiring extensive resources and efforts by 
regulatory authorities such as the FATF. While not likely given the quality based 
competitive advantage strategy of the UKOTs, it is possible that black market or other 
low transparency activities exist but have not yet been uncovered by the relevant 
authorities. The presence of the parallel between UKOT responses and overregulation 
responses lends confidence to the claims that overregulation characterizes the reform 
pressures and sets the range of available responses to each prescribed policy.  
The QCA results further provided evidence that those policies with a calculated 
positive or null impact were adopted directly, while those with a largely negative impact 
were either rejected outright, or as part of a capture or reregulation/regulatory 
reform/deregulation strategy.  The parallel lends confidence to the claims of the central 
role of competitive advantage in the decision making stage of the reform process.  
The deductive process of extracting the active causal mechanism by elimination 
demonstrated the shortcomings of explanations based solely on overregulation or 
competitive advantage. Overregulation provided the regulatory context and variety of 
responses, but no basis for choice of response. Competitive advantage provided the basis 
for choice of response, but not the regulatory context or variety of responses. Combined, 
the theories provided greater explanatory power than individually in regard to the reform 
outcome. 
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6.2 Validity of the Findings 
The validity of the collective findings are assessed by standard process tracing 
testing.251 The dual hypothesis presented at the study’s beginning will be tested in its 
composite parts for certainty and uniqueness relative to the initially stated theoretical 
positions of competing explanations in geopolitics, international political economy, 
international law, tax law, and shared sovereignty as examined in the review of literature. 
The hypothesis will be tested in its component parts for practicality as it ultimately 
reflects two different causal mechanisms at work which necessity and sufficiency tests 
cannot assess at the same time. 
The first conditional claim of the hypothesis suggests that if a policy did not 
impose a likely decrease on competitive advantage, it was met with a compliance 
response and adopted as part of the reform. The competitive advantage founded claim of 
the hypothesis is not unique however, as the political economy and tax law approaches 
also confirm the same claim that the major consideration of small OFCs in international 
financial regulation is the ability to effectively compete.252 The approaches highlight tax, 
transparency, and regulatory competition in particular, all major aspects of the UKOTs 
differentiation strategy.253 Therefore compliance and adoption responses to policies that 
enhance or do not impact these areas of competition is the likely outcome in those 
approaches. As a result the hypothesis and findings are low in uniqueness.  
                                                 
251 Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Straws-in-the-wind, Hoops and Smoking Guns: What can 
Process Tracing Offer to Impact Evaluation?” CDI PRACTICE PAPER Centre for Development Impact 
(April 10, 2015): 1-8, accessed July 1, 2015,  
252 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational 
Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty55-65. 
253 Ibidl. 
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However, the certainty of the evidence for the hypothesis is high based not only 
on the other two disciplines confirmation of the result, but also the numerous reports of 
financial services industry professionals on the great negative impact of the new 
regulatory regimes on the ability of jurisdictions and firms to compete successfully.254 
The industry professionals cite the increased due diligence cost and labor burden 
negatively impacting competition within the industry. Countries and firms have avoided 
compliance for as long as possible requesting extensions and numerous exceptions to 
minimize or defer any possible negative impact. The result has been the pushing back of 
multiple implementation dates.255  The first claim of the hypothesis therefore 
categorically passes a Hoops test with High Certainty and Low Uniqueness, being 
insufficient for inferring causation relative to the reform.256 The competitive advantage 
neutral/increase policy adoption claim of the hypothesis is therefore not validated, but is 
neither invalidated by competing explanations. 
The second claim of the hypothesis suggests that if a policy was likely to impose a 
decrease on competitive advantage, it was rejected, forgoing compliance and followed by 
an alternative response to overregulation. In contrast to the first claim, the second claim is 
unique. By the same reasoning applied to the first claim, competing explanations in 
political economy, international law, and tax law would again confirm the competition 
based claim of rejection of policies impeding the relative ability of small OFCs to 
compete. Yet they provide no similar assessment of a range of responses beyond rejection 
                                                 
254 Reports on cost from the financial services industry were used as a key data source for this study. 
Accenture, “Automatic Exchange of Information Regime: An emerging compliance challenge.” 
255 Hatten Boyd. “Are Problems Looming for FATCA and the “Reciprocal” IGA?” 
256 Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Straws-in-the-wind, Hoops and Smoking Guns: What can 
Process Tracing Offer to Impact Evaluation?” 1-8. 
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and noncompliance other than adoption and compliance. Overregulation is unique among 
the explanations in its framing of capture, creative compliance, and black market 
activities. Those responses are founded within the realm of regulatory theory. 
However, while the responses linked to the claim are unique, the certainty of 
finding and confirming them is relatively low. Capture and black market/low 
transparency activities are opaque by nature without great transparency. Proving capture 
is a significant challenge when seeking proofs beyond the realm of examining formal and 
transparent lobbying. The greater degree of events and activities linked to capture are 
veiled in secrecy.257 Similarly, black markets take significant efforts for detection and 
may be present for considerable periods without financial authorities’ knowledge. Low 
transparency activities are intentionally conducted in a manner bypassing detection.258 
Likewise, creative compliance is an activity intentionally shrouded in opaqueness for the 
purpose of the bending of the rules without punishment.259 Detection of the three 
responses is significantly challenging for law enforcement as well as regulatory 
authorities. Therefore the second claim of the hypothesis is characteristic of a Smoking 
Gun, being unique, but highly uncertain.260 The second claim is only sufficient for a 
confirmation of causal inference lending credence to existence of alternative rejection 
response claims that are not likely to be verified due to their opaque nature.261  
The collective result of a combination of a hoops test and smoking gun test on the 
                                                 
257 Dubley and Brito, 15. 
258 Baldwin and Cave, and Martin, 70. 
259 Baldwin and Cave, and Martin, 70-71, 232. 
260 Melanie Punton and Katharina Welle, “Straws-in-the-wind, Hoops and Smoking Guns: What can 
Process Tracing Offer to Impact Evaluation?” 1-8. 
261 Ibid. 
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hypothesis suggests that there is likely evidence for competitive advantage impact being 
the basis for policy adoptions or rejections, but the evidence will possibly confirm other 
competing hypothesis or alternative explanations. The tests further suggest that rejection 
response alternatives to non-compliance including creative compliance, capture, or black 
market/low transparency activities are very likely, but unlikely to be found due to 
detection and transparency problems. By this measure confidence in the findings would 
not be increased or nor high. 
However, subjecting the study’s findings to a comparative evaluation based on its 
internal requirements for a minimally sufficient explanation yield a different result. Based 
on the study’s internal requirements, competing explanations in geopolitics, international 
political economy, international law, tax law, or shared sovereignty could not be 
validated due to their inadequacy in addressing each component required of the 
minimally sufficient explanation set for this study.  
Regarding the first requirement of explaining the variety of responses to each 
prescribed policy, they each fail to provide an explanation for responses beyond adoption 
& compliance and rejection and non-compliance. Each of the conventional approaches 
distinguishes only between compliance & adoption, and rejection & noncompliance. The 
field of regulatory theory specifically addresses the issue of policy and compliance 
responses. The AMLD4 and Public Central Registers each prompted responses from the 
territories other than adoption & compliance or rejection & noncompliance. These 
responses would have to be accounted for in a minimally sufficient explanation of the 
reform outcome.  
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Regarding the basis for the choice of response to each prescribed policy, the 
political economy and tax law approaches do point to competition factors as the basis for 
the choice of response to each policy.262 The geopolitical and shared sovereignty 
approaches however, attribute the basis for choices of adoption or rejection of policy as 
being dictated by the UK.263  Evidence contradicts this view based on the territories’ 
rejections of the initial forms of FATCA and the Public Central Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership.  The US’s greater power position would mean the territories would have to 
accept FATCA in its initial form and not be able to negotiate on behalf of themselves 
given the power imbalance. Yet they rejected the initial version and negotiated with the 
US successfully. The territories’ acted in their own interests. Regarding the central public 
registers there was no geopolitical competition between the UK and any other power for 
its implementation. Rather, the UK merely sought an alignment of policy between itself 
and its OTs, not the balance or appeasement of a competing power. The UKOTs rejected 
this alignment with UK policy as it was outside the scope of their shared sovereignty 
arrangement for the OTs to be forced into financial and economic regulatory 
commitments beyond international or EU standards.264 
The geopolitics and shared sovereignty approaches are in agreement that the UK 
exercises its sovereign responsibility to protect the economic viability of its OTs and at 
                                                 
262 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational 
Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty55-65. 
263 Vincent Piolet, “The city of London: Geopolitical Issues Surrounding the World’s Leading Financial 
Center,” 102-110. Peter Clegg & Peter Gold, “The UK Overseas Territories: a decade of progress and 
prosperity?,” 115-120. 
264 Peter Clegg & Peter Gold, “The UK Overseas Territories: a decade of progress and prosperity?” 127-
129. 
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the same time ensure that they adhere to international regulatory standards.265 However, 
in contrast to the UK centered explanations for the reform, the territories actually had a 
more immediate incentive to implement financial services reforms. To remain 
internationally competitive regulatory efficiency is necessary and the territories pursue 
reforms as part of their competitive advantage strategy moreso than meeting any UK 
based legal obligations.266 Up to date regulatory compliance is necessary for the 
marketing of the jurisdiction and sale of its products globally. The shared sovereignty 
approach does not take into consideration this ulterior motive for reform and distinguish 
it from the territories’ constitutional legal obligations to the UK’s in the reform process. 
It is therefore unclear whether the territories adopted reform policies based on the UK 
government or for reasons informed by their own economic self-interests. 
Last, in regard to providing a minimally sufficient explanation, the conventional 
approaches provide no sufficient explanation for the adoption of a prescribed policy in a 
form other than its original presentation by the regulatory authority.  Geopolitical and 
international political economy approaches suggest that the changes are due to changing 
power dynamics in the international system and economic competition.267 However, the 
changes in the Public Central Registers involved no other major powers but the UK 
whose power vastly outweighed those of its OTs. The policy did not make the UK more 
competitive nor sought to do so.  There was no regional or multilateral requirement for a 
public register. There was no transparency competition between the OTs and the UK who 
                                                 
265 Ibid. 
266 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational 
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support and defend the viability of the OT’s financial services economy’s as a pillar of 
their development. The UK merely sought to align the territories’ policies with its own 
regulatory standards.268 The change in the structure of the policy therefore must be 
attributed to something other than geopolitics, economic competition, or international 
law. The shared sovereignty approach is steeped in contradiction on the question as the 
UK sought to impose a non-international standard on their OTs that would harm their 
short and long term economic development.  
Likewise, accommodations for changes in FATCA were made by the US to both 
large and small competing jurisdictions of varying power and influence. International and 
tax law do give sufficient explanation for the provision of the FATCA IGA in the form of 
legal incompatibility problems.269 The geopolitics and shared sovereignty approaches 
highlight the role of the UK in attaining IGAs for both themselves and their OTs. The 
political economy approach however provides no answer on the changes in FATCA 
policy.   
None of the conventional approaches provide a comprehensive explanation of 
post-rejection policy change that covers all of the policies prescribed to the territories. An 
explanation covering each policy is a requirement of a minimally sufficient explanation. 
The composite mechanism gives a comprehensive explanation of the changes while 
competing approaches do not. 
Therefore, while not scoring higher in necessity and sufficiency testing, the 
                                                 
268 Houlder, “UK reaches tax agreement with overseas territories.”  Rogers, British Overseas Territories in 
the Caribbean agree to central registries of beneficial ownership information – the first step on the 
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hypothesis and accompanying composite overregulation-competitive advantage causal 
mechanism can be held with increased confidence relative to competing methods based 
on the study’s internal requirements for a minimally sufficient explanation. Competing 
explanations at the level of theory would not meet these requirements to be considered 
valid explanations. 
6.3 Limitations of the Analysis 
The parameters of the analysis were relatively strict, seeking to explain the reform 
outcome based on a minimally sufficient rather than general or systemic explanation. 
Therefore the research design and method impose structural limitations on the case 
analysis. The study’s results are not generalizable beyond the case, a condition intrinsic 
to single case (within case) research designs and explaining outcome process tracing in 
particular. Systematic mechanisms (theory) are used in the analysis, but their use is 
expressly limited to the case. While possibly informative for a retroactive analysis of 
previous reforms, the analysis is incapable of predicting the UKOT response to future 
reform pressures. 
 A major challenge of the research findings is the great degree of subjectivity 
required in conducting the QCA portion of study. As is common within the QCA method, 
assessment of conditions for the group of overregulation responses is highly subjective 
within the context of the case, requiring extensive knowledge much discretion on the part 
of the researcher. While evaluation, adoption, and compliance questions were the 
preferred basis of assessing overregulation responses, an alternative formulation is also 
possible using another grouping of characteristics that could deliver a different result. At 
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the testing stage, the alternate findings could have the same outcome which would 
possibly invalidate both sets of findings.  
Another challenge paralleling the subjectivity question in QCA was a 
measurement problem in the assessment of competitive advantage increases and 
decreases. The choice of a proportional measurement of increases versus decreases plus 
relative impact based on simply adding the amount of increased factors versus decrease 
factors provided the simplest measure, but is not necessary the most accurate. The 
proportional assessment equally weights all competitive advantage sub-factors where in 
reality they could carry different weights of impact. Increased taxation rates by 
themselves could substantially decrease competitive advantage whereas increased due 
diligence could be manageable. However in higher tax areas due diligence could be the 
crippling increase and taxation not. Yet there was no solvent means to address the 
problem. An alternate weighting of the sub-factors would still be subjective and 
conditional depending on the environment and context. Increasing costs in 1 context may 
impose a different degree of impact in a second context. As a result within the study the 
decision was made to weight changes in all the factors equally as there is no means to 
impose a universal context on all the competitive advantage factors or policies. While the 
method had consistency, in terms the calculated decrease imposed by each policy, it is 
possible that the conversion thresholds provided in the study have a degree of inaccuracy 
where less ranked impact polices may actually have a higher threshold for harm. 
Further, in regards to increases in the costs of labor imposed by each policy, all 
the values were chosen as neutral. This was due to an inability to track labor costs across 
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the industry in terms of increased personnel, increased work hours, or sub-contracting 
costs. Accommodating the increased work load has been achieved in different ways. As a 
result labor costs are posted as neutral, where in reality some policies may affect labor 
costs more greatly in specific jurisdictions than others. 
Last, the findings are limited by select aspects of the data sources. Policy impact 
cost evaluations were used in the study taken from entities that service the industry and 
know the costs, but have an interest inflating them to receive greater business and higher 
profits. As a result the cost assessments of the impact of the new reporting regimes may 
actually be stated higher than they actually are in reality. Therefore assessments based on 
that data have questionable accuracy and may not reflect actual costs. Even so, there was 
no nonacademic industry alternative that would provide the same level of access to cost 
structure and scrutiny of the reporting regimes. 
The capture aspect of the findings had significant challenges in that none of the 
UKOTs was willing to give an open admission of actively seeking to capture the process, 
nor formal documents on their lobbying activities. They were willing to undertake 
informal verbal conversations, but no formally recognized written statements. The 
capture claim had to be pursued through investigative reporting media sights and general 
media whose claims cannot be substantiated. Compounding the information shortfall is 
the generally opaque nature of capture which by definition is secretive. Therefore this 
study’s capture claims are subject to low levels of validation  
6.4 Contribution to the Research Topic 
 The findings contribute to the study of the UKOTs financial services reforms 
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between 2014 and 2016 by examining the reforms as a package rather than each policy 
individually. There has been research on the impact of FATCA and the CRS & AEOI on 
financial services globally both individually and combined.  Research has also been 
conducted on the imposing of registers of Beneficial Ownership on EU members and its 
impact on the EU itself. Numerous discussions on CDOT have taken place regarding its 
impact of the UKOTs & Crown Dependencies. This study creates a framework within 
which to collectively assess post-crisis UKOT financial service policy reform. The 
literature lacked a framework for collective assessment, nor established a general 
paradigm for policy adoption or reform.  
The integration of overregulation theory is a significant contribution to the topic, 
changing the context of the academic discussion from international regulators seeking to 
safeguard against the harmful practices of small offshore financial centers; to 
consideration of the possibly harmful effects of regulatory efforts on small OFCs 
operating within the legal parameters of international financial and economic regulation. 
The approach is distinct in its granting of agency to the territories where the conventional 
approaches maintain an agency deficit. Small OFCs do not set the regulatory agenda, but 
their designation solely as principals is not reflective of their activity in the regulatory 
process. The territories are actively involved in the regulatory process seeking to defend 
their own national interests. The study demonstrates that the territories were able to 
undertake a variety of responses to regulation and regulatory authorities not dictated by 
the UK or larger financial centers. 
While being non-generalizable, the case does have some capacity for illustrating 
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the efficiency of explanation by comparative advantage and overregulation theory. The 
composite causal mechanism is based on two systematic mechanisms (general theories). 
Therefore indirectly the findings give some indication as to whether the case meets the 
predictions of overregulation theory and the theory of comparative advantage. 
Overregulation theory’s proofs lie in identifying overregulation and confirming it based 
on the responses of regulatees. The UKOTs case identifies both the overregulation 
elements in the prescribed policies and the accompanying overregulation responses to 
those elements with the exception of black market/low transparency responses.  Previous 
scholarship adequately explained the tenets of the competitive advantage strategy by 
which both small OFCs such as the UKOTs have become successful and world leaders in 
financial services. Those claims are substantiated in the findings, demonstrated by the 
UKOTs efforts to protect those advantages gained in financial services over time. 
Moreso, the case contributes to the literature by specifically explaining how the UKOTs 
protect their competitive advantages from regulatory threats. The study outlines a specific 
strategy by which a group of small OFCs met the regulatory obligations of harmful 
policies while maintaining their competitive advantage.  
This study also contributes to studies of microstate international relations. It is 
illustrative of how microstates successfully navigate the demands of the international 
system and its larger actors in meeting their national interests. The power deficit in the 
global economy suggests that microstates do not wield a significant enough degree of 
economic or political power to resist the demands of larger actors.  Yet in the UKOT 
reform case the territories successfully met their national interests relative to larger actors 
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in the center of the international financial infrastructure or the global economy.   
6.5 Future Research Prospects 
From this study, the next stage of research would be a comparative study of the 
UKOT response to the overregulation of their financial services industry, and the 
responses of other individual or groups of small OFCs. Such a study could reveal whether 
the UKOT’s responses and decision making process are general and not just unique to 
this specific case. The cases would provide confirmation of overregulation theory, fitting 
into the greater population of cases within overregulation theory. Similarly, in the case of 
competitive advantage a comparative study of frameworks for combating regulatory 
threats to competitive advantage by small OCFs could determine whether the responses 
are general or unique to each OFC. The framework developed in this study can be used to 
retroactively assess previous reforms in the UKOTs to determine if the process contains 
the same elements as part of a longer term behavioral trend. 
Another possible area of research within which the study could possibly be 
integrated is an examination of the collapse of small OFCs based on changing regulatory 
regimes. It is not a highly developed area of research with only a few cases in the Pacific 
Ocean having been studied.270 A failure to navigate the reform pressures of a financial 
system in flux is possibly a greater threat to the viability of the UKOTs than the financial 
crisis itself. Regulatory burden may be the source of collapsing a financial center. Among 
the UKOTs the smaller financial centers (Turks & Caicos Is., Anguilla, Montserrat) have 
greater vulnerability than their large larger counterparts (Bermuda, British Virgin Is., 
                                                 
270 Gregory Rawlings, “Taxes and Transnational Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of 
Offshore Sovereignty55-65. 
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Cayman Is., Gibraltar). A comparative study of other OFCs that have collapsed under the 
weight of regulatory changes globally with the success the UKOTs could give great 
insight about managing periods of turbulent change in the international financial system 
for the smaller UKOT financial centers.  Measures of success and failure could be pitted 
against each other to derive a complete base of operating principles in such 
circumstances. 
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APPENDIX 1 
POLICY SUMMARY 
A1.1 Reform Pressures: Policy Summary 
The formal policy demands, or prescribed policies include: US-FACTA, UK-
CDOT, UK-Public Central Register of Beneficial Ownership, OECD-CRS & AEOI, 
FATF-Transparency in Beneficial Ownership, G20-Beneficial Ownership Transparency, 
G20 Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and 
the EU-Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive.  Of the prescribed policies, four are 
information reporting regimes, three require establishing central data registers, and three 
seek the acceptance of recommended standards. In addition three of the policies demand 
universal adoption, three made early adoption demands, and five impose punishable 
sanctions for noncompliance and non-adoption. Figure A1.1 lists the policies prescribed 
to the territories by regulatory authorities.  
Figure A1.1: Reform Pressures as Prescribed Policy 
Multilevel Reform Pressures Prescribed Policy (Policy Demands)
Policy Type Requires Application Sanctions Year Intro Adopted EarAdopOpt
US-FATCA Infor. Reporting Regime Reporting on US Citizens Universal Yes 2010 No Yes
**US-UKOT7 IGA**(FATCA) Infor.Reporting Regime Reporting on US Citizens UKOT7 Yes 2014 Yes No
UK-CDOT Infor. Reporting Regime Reporting on UK Citizens UK OTs,CDs Yes 2014 Yes No
UK Pub Cen Reg Ben Own Information. Data Register Collecting of BenOwn Data UK OTs,CDs Yes 2015 No Yes
**UK-Cen Reg Ben Own** Information. Data Register Collecting of BenOwn Data Ots, CDs Yes 2016 Yes No
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Infor. Reporting Regime Autom. Exchange of Tax Data Universal No** 2014 yes Yes
FATF - Trans Benf Own Recommended Standard Collecting of BenOwn Data Universal No 2012 Yes No
G20 - Ben Own Trans Recommended Standard Collecting of BenOwn Data G20 No 2014 Yes No
G20 - MCMAATM Recommended Standard Cooperation on Tax Evasion G20 No 2010 Yes No
EU - AMLD4 Infor.DataRegist/RecomStd Col BenOwn Data, EnhDueDil EU No 2015 No No   
Unilateral:–  
i. US-FATCA (US-2010) - Requires foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to report to 
the IRS information about financial accounts held by US taxpayers, or by 
foreign entities in which US taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest. 
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FFIs are encouraged to either directly register with the IRS to comply with the 
FATCA regulations (and FFI agreement, if applicable) or comply with the 
FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements (IGA) treated as in effect in their 
jurisdictions. Failure to adopt the legislation and comply is subject to 
sanctions by the US government. 271 
ii. US-US/UKOT7 IGA (FATCA)(US-2013) - Requires  the governments of the 
UKOTs (rather than FFIs) to report to the IRS information about financial 
accounts held by US taxpayers, or by foreign entities in which US taxpayers 
hold a substantial ownership interest. The local governments are responsible 
for collecting the information by their own means according to their local laws 
and legislation. Failure to report the information to the local authorities is 
subject to sanction by the local government, who thereafter can report the 
entity to US authorities for a further round of sanctions.  Failure to adopt the 
IGA legislation and comply is subject to sanctions by the US government. 272 
iii. UK-CDOT (UK-2014) - Requires Financial Institutions in the UKOTs to identify 
and report information regarding accountholders who are UK Specified 
Persons (UK tax residents) or offshore entities that are controlled by UK 
Specified Persons. The UK enters into Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGA) 
establishing reciprocal tax information sharing agreements with the UK 
                                                 
271 “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),” US Department of the Treasury, Modified March 
29, 2017, accessed June 4, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx.  
272 Ibid. “FATCA IGA Global Summary,” Deloitte, June 8, 2016, accessed June 17, 2017, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-fatca-iga-global-summary-
060816.pdf.  
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Crown Dependencies & Gibraltar, and non-reciprocal agreements with the 
UKOTs. UK Financial Institutions must identify and report information 
regarding accountholders who are Crown Dependencies or Gibraltar Specified 
Persons or certain entities which have Controlling Persons who are Crown 
Dependency or Gibraltar Specified Persons. Failure to adopt the legislation 
and comply is subject to sanctions by the UK government. 273 
Bilateral:  
i. UK – Public Central Register of Beneficial Ownership Information (June 2016). -
Established a central publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership for 
the UK (People with Significant Control Register-PSC register). Requires all 
companies incorporated in the UK to give information about their people with 
significant control to Companies House with their annual confirmation 
statement. The information on the register is publicly available with necessary 
exceptions to protect information about individuals at risk. Failure to adopt the 
legislation and comply is subject to sanctions by the UK government. 274 
 
                                                 
273 “Statutory guidance-Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements: other UK agreements,” HM 
Revenue Customs: Gov. UK, September 8, 2014, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-
agreements/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-agreements. Out-Law.Com, “UK 
FATCA-the disclosure to HMRC of information about reportable accounts held by UK taxpayers in the 
Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories.” “UK FATCA-The disclosure to HMRC of information 
about reportable accounts held by UK taxpayers in the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories,” 
Out-Law.Com, Last Modified April 2016, accessed June 4, 2017, Out-Law.com https://www.out-
law.com/topics/tax/tax-for-entrepreneurs/uk-fatca---the-disclosure-to-hmrc-of-information-about-
reportable-accounts-held-by-uk-taxpayers-in-the-crown-dependencies-and-overseas-territories-/.  
274 “A register of Beneficial Owners of Overseas Companies and Other Legal Entities: Call for evidence on 
a register showing who owns and controls overseas legal entities that own UK property or participate in 
UK government procurement” Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (April 2017): 9-
10, accessed June 4, 2017, www.gov.uk/government/consultations/property-ownership-and-public-
contracting-byoverseas-companies-and-legal-entities-beneficial-ownership-register.  
132 
 
Multilateral:  
i. OECD - Global Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information (the AEOI Standard) - (OECD-2014).275   
a. Requires each country to annually automatically exchange with the other 
participating countries information on selected cases in their jurisdiction 
with regard to reportable accounts in the requesting concerned 
jurisdictions.  
b. Requires utilizing the Common Reporting Standard for reportable 
accounts to include: the name, address, Taxpayer Identification Number 
and date and place of birth of each Reportable Person, account number(s), 
the name and identifying number of the Reporting Financial Institution, 
the account balance or value as of the end of the relevant calendar, account 
closure details if the account was closed during such year or period.  In the 
period of universal adoption beyond 2018 failure to adopt the legislation 
and comply is subject to sanctions by the OECD Global Forum. 
ii. FATF-Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial 
Ownership (FATF-2012).276 
a. Strongly advises countries take measures to prevent the misuse of legal 
persons or legal arrangements for money laundering or terrorist financing. 
Countries should ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely 
                                                 
275 “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters OECD (2014),” 
OECD Publishing, accessed June 4, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216525-en.  
276 “FATF guidance TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP,” FATF, Last Modified 
October 2014, accessed June 23, 2017, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/transparency-and-
beneficial-ownership.html. 
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information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that 
can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities. 
In particular, countries that have legal persons that are able to issue bearer 
shares or bearer share warrants, or which allow nominee shareholders or 
nominee directors, should take effective measures to ensure that they are 
not misused for money laundering or terrorist financing. Countries should 
consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control 
information by financial institutions and DNFBPs. 
iii. G20-High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency (G20-
2014).277 
a. Strongly advises countries to ensure that competent authorities (including 
law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, supervisory authorities, tax 
authorities and financial intelligence units) have timely access to adequate, 
accurate and current information regarding the beneficial ownership of 
legal persons. Countries could implement this, for example, through 
central registries of beneficial ownership of legal persons or other 
appropriate mechanisms. 
iv. G20-Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(G20-2010).278  
                                                 
277 “G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency (2014),” accessed May 23, 2017, 
http://www.g20australia.org/official_resources/g20_high_level_principles_beneficial_ownership_transp
arency.html. 
278 “Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” OECD Last updated - May 2017 
Accessed  May 23, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-
administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters.htm.  The OECD and Council of Europe (2011), The 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative assistance in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010 
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a. The Convention is a freestanding multilateral agreement designed to 
promote international cooperation for a better operation of national tax 
laws, while respecting the fundamental rights of taxpayers. The 
Convention was developed by the OECD and the Council of Europe but is 
now open to all countries. It provides a solid legal framework to facilitate 
international cooperation through inter-country exchanges of tax 
information and assistance. Its objective is to enable each Party to the 
Convention to combat international tax evasion and better enforce its 
national tax laws, while at the same time respecting the rights of 
taxpayers. 
Regional:  
i. EU – (EU 2015/849) (AMLD4) Fourth Money Laundering Directive of the 
European Union Non-cooperative third countries (EU-2015).279  
a. Requires member states to establish a central register of beneficial owners 
and enshrine their use into law no later than 26 June 2017. 
b. Requires Enhanced Customer Due Diligence (EDD) to be carried out 
when dealing with natural persons or legal entities established in third 
countries identified by the Commission as high-risk third countries and 
other cases of higher risk identified by member states or obliged entities. 
The identification of high-risk third countries is based on a clear and 
objective assessment which focuses on a jurisdiction’s compliance with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protocol, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-en.  
279 “Directive (EU) 2015/849 of The European Parliament and of the European Commission May 20 2015,” 
Official Journal of the European Union, (5.6.2015): L 141/73. 
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Directive (EU) 2015/84 regarding its legal and institutional anti-money 
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
framework, the powers and procedures of its competent authorities for the 
purposes of combating money laundering and terrorist financing and the 
effectiveness of the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of 
terrorism  based on the (AML/CFT) system in addressing money 
laundering or terrorist financing risks of third countries. 
A1.2 UKOT7 Reform Legislation and Policy Adoption 
Between 2014 and 2016 the territories adopted three key pieces of financial services 
legislation on Beneficial Ownership, Common Reporting Standards, and Automatic 
Exchange of Information.   
The legislative adoptions include: 
1. Technical protocol for the Sharing of Beneficial Ownership Information (in force 
April 8, 2016).280 
i. Requires the establishing and maintaining a central register, or equivalent system, 
containing accurate and current information on beneficial ownership for 
corporate and legal entities incorporated in their jurisdictions. 
ii. Requires each jurisdiction to ensure effective and unrestricted access to this 
information to the other jurisdiction’s law enforcement and tax authorities. 
(law enforcement has automatic right to the information) 
                                                 
280  “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office.” Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office: UK.Gov, April 21, 2016Accessed July 
1, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/beneficial-ownership-uk-overseas-territories-and-
crown-dependencies. 
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iii. Note:  The exchange of notes between the UKOTs and the UK on the adoption of 
the Technical protocol for the Sharing of Beneficial Ownership Information 
states that the adoption of the protocol is intended to fulfill the territories’ 
obligations to meet the multilateral and regional requirements of the FATF-
Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, 
G20-High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20-
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,  
EU –Fourth Money Laundering Directive of the European Union Non-
cooperative  third countries (EU 2015/849, AMLD4).281 
2. Global Common Reporting Standard(CRS)  for Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Account Information(the AEOI Standard) - (UKOT7 - 2016) 282 
3. US-US/UKOT7 IGA (FATCA)(US-2013)283 
4. UK-CDOT (2014)284 
 
                                                 
281 Ibid. 
282 “CRS by Jurisdiction.” OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf. 
283 “FATCA IGA Global Summary,” Deloitte, June 8, 2016, accessed June 17, 2017, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-fatca-iga-global-summary-
060816.pdf.  
284  “Statutory guidance-Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements: other UK agreements,” HM 
Revenue Customs: Gov. UK, September 8, 2014, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-
agreements/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-agreements. Out-Law.Com, “UK 
FATCA-the disclosure to HMRC of information about reportable accounts held by UK taxpayers in the 
Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories.”  
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APPENDIX 2 
QCA SUMMARY 
A2.1 Stage 1 QCA:  Overregulation 
Conditions for Overregulation Responses: 
Among the six regulatory authorities prescribing policies for the territories there is 
no common set of conditions for compliance, creative compliance, noncompliance, and 
black market/low transparency activities. However, the most common basic elements 
among the authorities provide a base of conditions by which to evaluate them. They are 
based on policy adoption and evaluation questions.285  The conditions for capture are 
derived from applying theory to the case based on lobbying, policy structure, and 
regulation impact questions. The conditions for compliance, creative compliance, 
noncompliance, capture, and black market/low transparency responses are tabled in 
Figure A2.1 
Figure A2.1: Overregulation Responses General Conditions 
 
Necessary & Sufficient Conditions: 
While the conditions are general, each response differs in terms of the necessity or 
                                                 
285 As is common within the QCA method, assessment of conditions for the group of responses is 
subjective within the context of the case, requiring much discretion on the part of the researcher. From 
the evaluation pages of each regulatory authority, the commonalities was greatest on adoption and 
evaluation questions. Manner of assessment and standards of compliance differed, but they all evaluated 
and gave ratings of at least compliance, partial compliance, and listed sanctionable offences. The 
conditions were therefore built around these commonalities within confines of the theory’s definitions 
description of each response. 
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sufficiency within the context of the case.  Each set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
is fixed, as all necessary conditions must be met for confirmation of the response. The 
evidence surrounding each policy must meet the specific set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions to confirm the response. The necessary and sufficient conditions for each 
response are listed within a table for application in the QCA. From each regulatory 
authority’s evaluation page, the data set is scored and populated into five tables of set 
membership scores for each response according to its necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The scores are then compiled into a single table (A2.2) by policy for score comparisons 
to identify which policy met a specific response. 
Figure A2.2: Overregulation: Necessary & Sufficient Conditions  
 
Compliance: Within the context of this study Compliance constitutes adhering to both the 
practice and principle of a given regulation without deviation.286  The necessary and 
sufficient conditions for compliance include: 
i. Policy or Legislative Adoption - Necessary 
ii. Conducted Evaluation - Necessary 
iii. Reported as Compliant by the relevant evaluating bodies-Necessary 
iv. No reported or Current Infractions-Necessary 
The table of set membership scores (Figure A2.3) displays the binary values for the 
                                                 
286 Lodge and Wegrich, 76-80. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for Compliance. 
Figure A2.3: Compliance Table of Set Membership Scores 
QCA: Overregulation   Compliance Response
Compliance                Conditions
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Outcome
Necessary Necessary Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Compl
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
US-FATCA No (0) Yes (1) No (0) NA NA yes (1) NA No (0)
US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
UK Pub CenRegBenOwn No (0) Yes (1) No (0) NA NA yes (1) NA No (0)
UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Yes (1)
G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Yes (1)
EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) No (0) NA NA yes (1) NA No (0)
Ratio 2.3|1 4|1 1|1 NA NA 4|1 NA 2.3|1
Proportion 7|10 8|10 5|10 NA NA 8|10 NA 7|10  
Creative Compliance: Within the context of this study Creative Compliance constitutes a 
side-stepping the regulatory rules in a manner negating the regulation, but not actually 
breaking its terms.287 The necessary and sufficient conditions for creative compliance 
include: 
1. Policy or Legislative Adoption - Sufficient 
2. Conducted Evaluation - Necessary 
3. Reported as Compliant by the relevant evaluating bodies-Sufficient 
4. Reported as Partially Compliant by the relevant evaluating bodies-Necessary 
5.        No reported or Current Infractions-Sufficient 
The table of set membership scores (Figure A2.4) displays the binary values for the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for Creative Compliance. 
 
 
                                                 
287 287 Baldwin and Cave, and Martin, 70-71, 232. 
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Figure A2.4: Creative Compliance Table of Set Membership Scores 
QCA: Overregulation Table of set membership scores:  Creative Compliance Response
Creative Compliance                Conditions
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Necessary NA Sufficient NA CrCompl
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
US-FATCA No (0) Yes (1) No (0) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
UK Pub CenRegBenOwn No (0) Yes (1) No (0) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1)  Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) NA yes (1) NA No (0)
G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD
G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD
EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) NA yes (1) NA Yes (1)
Ratio 2.3|1 4|1 1|1 1|9 NA 4|1 NA 1|9
Proporation 7|10 8|10 5|10 1|10 NA 8|10 NA  1|10  
Non-Compliance: Within the context of this study Non-Compliance  constitutes not  
adhering to the requirements of the regulation in any regard, and may also be inclusive of 
not formally adopting the regulatory policy.288 The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for non-compliance include: 
1. No Policy or Legislative Adoption - Sufficient 
2. Conducted Evaluation - Necessary 
3. Reported as Non-Compliant by the relevant evaluating bodies-Necessary 
4. Reported or Current Infractions-Sufficient 
The table of set membership scores (Figure A2.5) displays the binary values for 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for Non-Compliance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
288 Lodge and Wegrich, 76-80. 
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Figure A2.5: Non-Compliance Table of Set Membership Scores 
QCA: Overregulation Table of set membership scores: NonCompliance Response
NonCompliance                Conditions
Non-Adopt Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Sufficient NonCompl
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
US-FATCA Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA Yes (1) NA No (0) Yes (1)
US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
UK-CDOT No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
UK Pub CenRegBenOwn No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No** (0)
UK-CenRegBenOwn No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
FATF - Trans Benf Own No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
G20 - Ben Own Trans No (0) FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD FATF/OECD
G20 - MCMAATM No (0) FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD FATF/OECD
EU - AMLD4 Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
Ratio 1|4 4|1 NA NA 1|9 NA 0|10 1|9
Proportion 1|10 8|10 NA NA 1|10 NA 0|10 1|10  
Black Market/Low Transparency:  Within the context of this study Black Market/Low 
Transparency Activities constitute the establishing of a competing unregulated financial 
services market providing low transparency services outside of the international financial 
regulatory framework.289 Black market and low transparency activities include money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats (narcotics & small arms 
trafficking) to the integrity of the international financial system.290  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for Black Market/Low Transparency 
activities include: 
1. Policy or Legislative Adoption – Sufficient  
2. Conducted Evaluation – Necessary  
3. Reported as Non-Compliant by the relevant evaluating bodies-Necessary  
4. No reported or Current Infractions-Necessary 
The table of set membership scores (Figure A2.6) displays the binary values for the 
                                                 
289 Baldwin and Cave, and Martin, 70. 
290 Ibid. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for Black Market/Low Transparency Activities. 
Figure A2.6: Non-Black Market/Low Transparency Activities Table of Set Membership Scores 
QCA: Overregulation Table of set membership scores: Black Market/Low Trans
Black Market/Low Trans                Conditions
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Necessary BlkMkLwTr
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
US-FATCA No (0) Yes (1) NA NA Yes (1) NA No (0) No (0)
US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
UK Pub CenRegBenOwn No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD FATF/OECD
G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA FATF/OECD FATF/OECD
EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) NA NA No (0) NA No (0) No (0)
Ratio 2.3|1 4|1 NA NA 1|9 NA 0|10 0|10
Proportion 7|10 8|10 NA NA 1|10 NA 0|10 0|10  
Capture: Within the context of this study Regulatory Capture constitutes a regulatee 
successfully lobbying the institutions and individuals central to the development of the 
concerned regulation to structure the regulation in a manner granting them advantages or 
protections.291 The necessary and sufficient conditions for Regulatory Capture:   
1. Lobbying of institutions and individuals-Necessary 
2. Membership/Participation in regulatory Steering or Committee Groups-Sufficient 
3. Significant changes in the structure of proposed legislation-Necessary  
4. Removal of Policy or Legislation harmful to the regulatee-Sufficient  
5. Policy or Legislation granting the regulatee significant advantages over their 
competitors-Sufficient 
The table of set membership scores (Figure A2.7) displays the binary values for 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for Capture. 
 
                                                 
291 Dudley and Brito, 15. 
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Figure A2.7: Capture Table of Set Membership Scores 
QCA: Overregulation Table of set membership scores: Capture
Capture                Conditions
Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific Result
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages
Necessary Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Sufficient Capture
Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
US-FATCA No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA No (0) No (0) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) No (0)
UK-CDOT No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
UK Pub CenRegBenOwn No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1)
OECD - "CRS & AEOI" No (0) Yes (1) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
FATF - Trans Benf Own No (0) Yes (1) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
G20 - Ben Own Trans No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
G20 - MCMAATM No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No (0)
EU - AMLD4 Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) No (0) No (0)
Ratio 1|4 1|2.3 1|4 1|3.3 0|10 1|10
Proportion 2|10 3|10 2|10 3|10 0|10 1|10  
A2.2 Stage 1 QCA Result 
The QCA results are derived deductively, starting with fixed necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the five overregulation responses, then moving backwards to 
identify which policy responses parallel those of overregulation. Consistency thresholds 
and coverage scores are therefore not set ahead of the analysis. Likewise, the process of 
condition minimization and consolidation for the elimination of redundancies and 
contradictions are not the first steps of the analytical process. With established 
conditions, the process begins with an examination of the patterns and trends in the truth 
table.  
The relationships between combinations of conditions and the outcome of interest 
(overregulation response) are summarized in a truth table (Figure 5.5). The truth table is 
built from the collection of tables of set memberships for each overregulation response.292 
                                                 
292 See Appendix 2 for the tables of set memberships. 
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The table summarizes crisp conditions, grouping together the combinations of set 
membership scores leading to the particular overregulation responses in response to the 
10 prescribed policies. All values in the table are binary listed as 1 for the presence of the 
condition or factor, or 0 for the absence of a given condition or factor. The table identifies 
which policies prompted a combinations of activities and characteristics identified 
specifically with each of the five overregulation responses. The truth table displays where 
variation in response occurred leading to a common outcome. The response outcome is 
listed in the third end column displaying whether the response met the necessary and 
sufficient conditions required for that particular overregulation response. The final 
column lists the reform outcome indicating if the policy associated with the response was 
adopted as part of the reform or rejected. The consolidated truth table is displayed in 
Figure A2.8.  
Figure A2.8: Overregulation Truth Table 
QCA: Overregulation Truth Table 
Policy No. Policy:                                   Conditions Response Ratio/Prop OutCome
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Nec & Suff Conditions Compl Necessary Necessary Necessary NA NA Necessary NA
P1 US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P2 UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P3 UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl 2.3|1  / 7|10 Adopt (1)
P4 OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P5 FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P6 G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
P7 G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions Creat Compl Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Necessary NA Sufficient NA
P8 EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) No Yes (+) NA Yes (1) NA CreatCompl 1|9 / 1/10 Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions NonCompl Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Sufficient
P9 US-FATCA Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA Yes  (1) NA No (0) NonCompl 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)
Nec & Suff Conditions BlkMk/LwTr Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Necessary 
                            -          -            -                     -                       -                       -                      -                     - BlackMarket/LwTr  -  - 
                                  Conditions
Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific 
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages
Nec & Suff Conditions Capture Necessary Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Sufficient
P10 UK-Public Central Reg Beneficial Own Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) Capture 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)  
An examination of the consolidated truth table reveals the trends present in the 
data set, in particular the relationship between conditions and their characteristics. The 
details of the set relations are summarized and tabled in figure 5.6. Compliance, having 
four necessary and no sufficient conditions, consequently displayed only a single 
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configuration among 7 out of 10 policies (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7) with a marked 
consistency score of 0.70. The raw and unique coverage of the compliance response 
paralleled this 0.70 score of the 10 policies. The fitness scores indicate that the necessary 
conditions for compliance are the mutually dependent and the most prevalent action 
prompted by the reform policies.  
Figure A2.9: Overregulation Result Summary 
QCA Result:  Overregulation Responses
Result Summary
Necessary Sufficient Possible Displayed Consistency of Raw/Unique
Responses Conditions Conditions Configurations  Configuration Configuration Coverage Total Policies: 10
Compliance 4 0 32 1 .7 (70%) 0.70 (70%)  P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7(7 total) 
Creative Compliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10)%  P8 (1)
Noncompliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P9
Capture 2 3 64 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P10
Black Market Low Transparency Activities 3 1 32 1 0 0 0
 
 The creative compliance response, subject to 2 necessary and 3 sufficient 
conditions, displayed only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 in relation to policy 8 
(P8). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency 
score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. Likewise 
the noncompliance response subject to 2 necessary and 2 sufficient conditions, displayed 
only 1 configuration out of a possible 32 in relation to policy 9 (P9). The configuration 
was only present in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with 
identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. The capture response, subject to 2 
necessary and 3 sufficient conditions, displayed  only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 
in relation to policy 10 (P10). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 
policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique 
coverage scores. Last, the black market/low transparency response, subject to 3 necessary 
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and 1 sufficient condition, was markedly absent in response to any of the 10 policies and 
as a result has no accompanying fit scores. 
In practical terms, the QCA results indicate the UKOTs met the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for compliance with: US/UKOT FATCA IGA, UK-CDOT, UK-
Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, OECD – CRS & AEOI, FATF-
Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership, G20-High 
Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20-Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The regulatory authorities responsible 
for the different policies have cited the territories as compliant.293   
The US and UK cite the territories as compliant with all FATCA, CDOT, and 
Beneficial Ownership Register requirements.294 Regarding the adoption and 
implementation of the Global Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for Automatic 
Exchange of Financial Account Information (the AEOI Standard), the OECD has 
reported the territories as largely compliant.295 The FATF, in regards to their 
Recommendations and Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership has ranked 
all seven of the territories as compliant.296 With the exception of Gibraltar, each of the 
                                                 
293 The evaluations are sourced from the pages of the accompanying regulatory authorities. 
294 “Statutory guidance-Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements: other UK agreements,” HM 
Revenue Customs: Gov. UK, September 8, 2014, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-
agreements/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-agreements. “Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),” US Department of the Treasury, Modified March 29, 2017, accessed 
June 4, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx. 
295 “CRS by Jurisdiction.” OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, accessed July 1, 2017,  https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf. 
295 “FATCA IGA Global Summary,” Deloitte, June 8, 2016, accessed June 17, 2017, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-fatca-iga-global-summary-
060816.pdf.  
296 “Members,” Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.cfatf-
gafic.org/index.php/member-countries. 
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territories is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). The 
organization is comprised of states and territories in the Caribbean basin who have agreed 
to implement common counter-measures against money laundering.297  The G20, in 
regards to the High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency & G20-
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, defers to 
the OECD and FATF in the compliance reporting, relying on their evaluation 
processes.298  
The results further indicate the UKOTs met the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for creative compliance only with the EU-AMLD4. With the exception of 
Gibraltar, the UKOTs as nonmember states are not required to implement EU laws.299 
However, via shared post-colonial sovereignty with the UK, the territories are obligated 
to implement standards consistent with the UK’s legal obligations to the EU.300 Within 
the EU the UK government has the responsibility to certify that its territories are 
compliant. The UK has certified the compliance of its territories on the requirements of 
the to establish Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership inclusive of its territories.301 
Regarding the other requirements of the AMLD4, at present the territories are not 
                                                 
297 Ibid. 
298 “G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency (2014),” accessed May 23, 2017, 
http://www.g20australia.org/official_resources/g20_high_level_principles_beneficial_ownership_transp
arency.html. “Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” OECD Last updated - 
May 2017 Accessed  May 23, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-
on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters.htm.  The OECD and Council of Europe (2011), 
The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative assistance in Tax Matters: Amended by the 
2010 Protocol, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-en 
299 Peter Clegg & Peter Gold, “The UK Overseas Territories: a decade of progress and prosperity,” 116-
117, 127-129. 
300 Ibid. 
301 “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office.” Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office: UK.Gov, April 21, 2016Accessed July 
1, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/beneficial-ownership-uk-overseas-territories-and-
crown-dependencies. 
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obligated to meet its requirements at the threat of formal sanctions, even though expected 
to comply.302 The ALMD4’s proposed listing for high-risk third countries (countries) has 
been proposed for but not clearly established or finalized. The list is intended to target 
jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
Terrorist Financing.303 Increased measures proposed for the AMLD4 would require banks 
to apply enhanced due diligence regarding transactions with listed countries. There is a 
possibility that the UKOT’s could be targeted by this EU listing as was previously done 
in the 2015 EU listing of non-cooperative financial jurisdictions.304 After having retracted 
the 2015 list by 2016, the EU has been trying to finalize criteria for a new list of non-
cooperative third country financial services jurisdictions.305 However the effort has had 
little success. Based on the past behavior of the EU, the EU proposal of a second list of 
high risk countries under the AMLD4 poses a high potential threat to the UKOTs.  
The first stage results indicate the UKOTs met the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for noncompliance with regard to US-FATCA.  The UKOTs notified the US 
government in 2014 that they could not fulfill the requirements of FATCA because of its 
incompatibility with localized privacy laws and the structure accountability in the 
reporting mechanism.306 The absence of US reciprocation also presented significant 
                                                 
302 “European Commission - Fact Sheet Questions and Answers: Anti-money Laundering,” Directive 
MEMO/16/2381, EU Commission, July 5, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-2381_en.htm.  
303 Ibid. 
304 “EU releases world tax havens blacklist,” EU Business, June 18, 2015, accessed July 1, 2017, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/economy-politics.120n.  
305 “Taxation: Council agrees criteria for the screening of third country jurisdictions,” PRESS RELEASE 
640/16, Council of the EU, 08/11/2016, accessed July 1, 2017, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/08-taxation-criteria-third-country-
jurisdictions/. 
306 Philip Graham, “BVI & Cayman Funds Round-Up: From FATCA to Fund Directors,” Harneys 
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political problems in passing domestic legislation to bring it into force. As such the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
territories did not comply with the first version of the policy.307  
The UK-Public Central Register of Beneficial Ownership Information closely 
mimic the necessary and sufficient conditions of noncompliance with the exception that 
the UK government did not report the UKOTs as noncompliant.308 The two parties 
continued ongoing negotiations until an amenable settlement was achieved.309 Ultimately 
the UKOTs were exempted by the UK government from the publicly accessible 
component in their requirement to establish Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership.310 
In the initial phase the territories did not adopt or comply, but were not held accountable 
by UK authorities who pursued different means of having the OTs achieve compliance. 
By agreement between the territories and the UK government, the Registers of Beneficial 
Ownership Information in the territories would only be accessible by law enforcement 
authorities for the purpose of criminal or legal enquiries.311 Thereafter, the UK 
government has deemed the territories compliant in meeting the infrastructural, security, 
accessibility, and cooperative requirements for the central registers which became 
                                                                                                                                                 
     Publication, October 30, 2012, accessed, July 1, 2017, http://www.harneys.com/publications/legal-
updates/bvi-and-cayman-funds-round-up-from-fatca-to-fund-directors.  
307 Ibid. 
308 Carlyle K Rogers, “British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean agree to central registries of beneficial 
ownership information – the first step on the slippery slope to full disclosure has been taken,”  Cayman 
Financial Review, January 28, 2016, http://www.caymanfinancialreview.com/2016/01/28/british-
overseas-territories-in-the-caribbean-agree-to-central-registries-of-beneficial-ownership-information-
the-first-step-on-the-slippery-slope-to-full-disclosure-has-been-taken/.  
309 Patrick Wintour, “Overseas territories spared from UK law on company registers,” The Guardian, April 
12, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/12/overseas-
territories-spared-from-uk-law-on-company-registers. 
310 Ibid. 
311 “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office.” Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office: UK.Gov, April 21, 2016Accessed July 
1, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/beneficial-ownership-uk-overseas-territories-and-
crown-dependencies. 
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accessible in 2017.312 
 The results indicate the UKOTs did not meet the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for black market and low transparency activities in any regard. The Financial 
Action Task Force is the multilateral institution exclusively tasked with tracking low 
transparency and black market activities within their mandate of combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats (narcotics & small arms 
trafficking) to the integrity of the international financial system.313 The FATF identifies 
jurisdictions with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing 
relative to its recommendations, the standard for international anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism and proliferation (AML/CFT).314  
With the exception of Gibraltar all the UKOTs are members of the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and have not been found out of compliance with 
FATF standards in (AML/CFT).315  The UKOTs are not found to be involved in low 
transparency financial services or a financial services black markets. The countries out of 
compliance with FATF requirements in 2017 include Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, 
Syria, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen.316 The territories have limited or no financial services 
contacts with these states. 
Last, the first stage results indicate the UKOTs met the necessary and sufficient 
                                                 
312 Ibid. 
313 “Who we are,” FATF, Accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/. 
314 Ibid. 
315 “Member Countries,” Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/index.php/member-countries.  
316 “High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions FATF,” Accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/#high-risk.  
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conditions for capture with regard to the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership.317 In 
opposition to the “Public” component of the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership 
Information’s application to the territories, the UKOTs lobbied intensely to be exempted 
from the public access requirement of the UK plan.318 In 2013 the UK agreed to set up 
central registers of Beneficial Ownership, set out in the UK’s G8 Action Plan.319 In 
October 2013 the UK government publicized that the central registry would be publicly 
accessible.320  In negotiations with the UK government, at the Dec. 1-2, 2015 Joint 
Ministerial Council (JMC) in London the UKOTs agreed to also create central registers 
of beneficial ownership information.321  The territories agreed to set up registries given 
that they were not public, only automatically open to law enforcement agencies 
(primarily the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office) who had to request 
the information in regard to investigations.322 Existing Lobby groups of ministers of 
parliament and other influential individuals, formed by the territories to support their 
agendas in the UK, were instrumental in gaining parliamentary support against the public 
                                                 
317 The formal and informal lobbying efforts of the UKOTs meets the definition of attempted capture. 
Secondary sources in UK media criticize the degree of influence the UKOTs have been able to secure 
with regards to the UK government. 
318 See Appendix 3 for the British Virgin Islands London Office Lobby Report. The office states that the 
UKOTs successfully made intense lobbying efforts to remove the public component. 
319 “Policy Paper-G8 action plan principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal arrangements,” 
Prime Minister's Office: UK.GOV, June 18, 2013, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-
companies-and-legal-arrangements/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-companies-and-
legal-arrangements.  
320 “Public Register to Boost Company Transparency (Press Release),” Prime Minister's Office: UK.GOV, 
October 31, 2013, accessed July 1, 2017,  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/public-register-to-
boost-company-transparency. 
321 “Beneficial ownership: UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office.” Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office: UK.Gov, April 21, 2016Accessed July 
1, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/beneficial-ownership-uk-overseas-territories-and-
crown-dependencies. 
322 Ibid. 
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provision.323 These included the Friends of the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and 
Cayman Islands groups comprised of UK MPS and legislators.324 A second unsuccessful 
attempt to require the territories to make their registers public was made in proposed 
amendments to the 2017 Criminal Finance Bill.325 The territories again repeated their 
intense lobbying efforts to remain exempt from the opening of their registers to the 
public.326  
The UKOTs made no visible effort to capture the regulatory processes of any 
other policy. The territories did not establish specific lobby groups against US FATCA 
nor UK CDOT. In the case of FATCA the UKOTs with the permission of the UK 
government formally notified the US government that they could not comply with all of 
the requirements of the policy and were looking for a solution.327 In OECD Global 
Forum, though having a representative on the Steering Group (British Virgin Islands) 
                                                 
323 See Appendix 3 for the British Virgin Islands London Office Lobby Report. The office states that the 
UKOTs successfully made intense lobbying efforts to remove the public component.  
 Secondary sources in UK media criticize the degree of influence the UKOTs have been able to secure with 
regards to the UK governments. Melanie Newman, “Lobbying’s Hidden Influence: Tax havens boost 
their lobbying efforts,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 2017, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-19/tax-havens-boost-their-lobbying-efforts.  
Melanie Newman, “Conservative peer hired as tax haven lobbyist,” The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, April 19 2012, accessed July 1, 2017,   
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-17/conservative-peer-hired-as-tax-haven-
lobbyist. 
324 The British Virgin Islands as well as other UKOTs have formally organized and recruited groups of 
influential individuals to lobby the UK government in areas of strategic interests such as Financial 
services. “Friends of the BVI,” Government of the British Virgin Islands London Office, accessed July 
1, 2-17, https://www.bvi.org.uk/londonoffice/friends. 
325 “Criminal Finances Bill” (CFB 06), Public Bill Committee: Session 2016-17,  Parliament.UK, May 11, 
July 2016, accessed July 1, 2017,  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmpublic/CriminalFinances/memo/CFB06.htm.  
326 See Appendix 3 for the British Virgin Islands London Office Lobby Report. The office states that the 
UKOTs successfully made intense lobbying efforts to maintain the absence of the public component. 
Philip Graham, “BVI & Cayman Funds Round-Up: From FATCA to Fund Directors,” 
Harneys Publication, October 30, 2012, accessed, July 1, 2017, 
http://www.harneys.com/publications/legal-updates/bvi-and-cayman-funds-round-up-from-
fatca-to-fund-directors.  
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which prepares and guides the future work of the forum, the territories made no visible 
efforts to seek changes in the CRS policy.328 While Gibraltar is a full EU member, the 
territories had no membership or representation in the negotiations of extending ALMD4 
measures.  
A2.3 Stage 2 QCA:  Competitive Advantage 
Competitive Advantage Impact Conditions: 
Impact on competitive advantage is measured by general increases or decreases in 
the three central components of competitive advantage: comparative advantage (cost), 
differential advantage, focus advantages.329 Comparative advantage is further subdivided 
into due diligence costs, labor costs, and facilities/technology/and specialist costs.330 An 
increase in any of these sub-factors decreases comparative advantage. Differential 
advantages are subdivided into discounted tax rates, privacy, common law, and 
regulatory efficiency.331 A decrease in any of these in turn decreases differentiation 
capacity. Focus advantages are achieved in specialization or niche markets.332 An 
imposed decrease in market share or reduced ability to service the niche market decreases 
focus advantages. In total there are 8 combined competitive advantage factor 
endowments that condition its increase or decrease. Each policy is weighted against the 
possible increases or decreases that it imposes on competitive advantage factors and sub-
                                                 
328 “Steering Group,” OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, last updated: January 2017, accessed July 1, 2017, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/steeringgroup.htm.  
329 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
330 Accenture, “Automatic Exchange of Information Regime: An emerging compliance challenge.” 
331 Chiu, “From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and 
Financial Centers in the International Legal Order,”16-20. 
332 Thomas and Walters, “GENERIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.” 
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factors.333  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for decreases and increases of competitive 
advantage are weighted on the configuration of the combined degree of impact (positive, 
negative, nil) of the eight factors plus the presence or absence of non-universal or early 
adoption (overregulation factors). Each set of necessary and sufficient conditions is fixed, 
as all necessary conditions must be met for confirmation of decrease or increase. 
Negative impact decreases are the most significant to the study as positive increases or no 
impact are likely to result in compliance responses and adoption. Negative impact will 
prompt a series of other responses which are not all opaque, transparent, and easily 
traceable. Negative impact is recorded when the proportion of negatively impacted sub-
factors (1s) is greater than positively impacted sub-factors (0s). Likewise positive impact 
is recorded when the proportion of sub-factors positively impacted (0s) is higher than the 
sub-factors negatively impacted (1s).334  
                                                 
333 Unlike overregulation, competitive advantage literature is very transparent on the conditions imposing 
increases or decreases in competitive advantage. The literature surrounding the case as well as financial 
services industry reports on reporting regimes is very clear about the factors and sub-factors of 
importance in financial services regarding competitive advantage. Michael Porter’s classical work on 
competitive advantage lays out the three main factors of cost, differentiation, and focus. Chiu addresses 
differentiation and cost advantages within the context of financial services. Industry professional such 
as Accenture and EY outline the costs associated with the new reporting regimes and their impact on 
competitiveness. Policy based Increases and decreases in competitive advantage were simply weighted 
on the combined negative, positive, or null impact of the eight competitive impact sub-factors plus their 
relative impact across all competitors. Universal adoption and application mooted the effect on 
competitive advantage, but non-universal, early, or targeting adoptions disadvantaged some competitors 
relative to others. 
334 As is common within the QCA method, assessment of the necessary and conditions for competitive 
advantage increases and decreases is subjective within the context of the case, requiring much 
discretion on the part of the researcher. A proportional measurement of increases versus decreases plus 
relative impact provided the simplest measure but is still subject to challenges. This form of assessment 
equally weights all sub-factors where in reality they could carry different weights of impact on 
competitive advantage. However, the weighting of the sub-factors is still itself conditional depending on 
the environment and international context. Increasing costs in 1 context may carry impose a different 
degree of impact in a second context. As a result within the study they are all weighted equally as there 
is no means to impose a universal context on all the factors or policies. 
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The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to impose a decrease 
on competitive advantage are tabled in Figure A2.10 including:  
i. Very High Negative Impact Decrease – Sufficient,  
ii. High Negative Impact Decrease-Necessary + either Non-Universal Adoption -
Sufficient  or Early Adoption-Sufficient, or both,  
iii. Moderate Negative Impact-Sufficient + Non-Universal Adoption-Necessary + 
Early Adoption-Necessary 
The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to impose an increase 
decrease on competitive advantage include: 
ii. Positive Impact-Sufficient 
The necessary and sufficient conditions required for policies to have a null impact on 
competitive advantage include: 
3. Moderate Negative Impact-Sufficient 
 
4. Low Negative Impact-Sufficient 
Figure A2.10: Competitive Advantage: Necessary & Necessary & Sufficient Conditions 
Competitive Advantage: Necessary & Sufficient Conditions
N&S Conditions Impact
Very High Impact-Sufficient Decrease
High Impact-Necessary
 +NonUniversal Adoption-Sufficient Decrease
and/or
 +Early Adoption-Sufficient
Moderate Impact-Sufficient Decrease
 +NonUniversal Adoption-Necessary
 +Early Adoption-Necessary
Manageable Decrease Null
based on the configuration of factors
Increase (Positive)/Nill
Increase/Nill Increase  
 From the official requirements of each policy and the inherent costs associated 
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with each reporting regime and recommended standards according to industry 
professionals, the data set is created according to binary scores across the eight 
competitive advantage sub-factors.  The scores are populated into a single table of set 
membership scores (Figure A2.11) for each policy with a value of (1) for an imposed 
increase, (o) for an imposed decrease, or (0) for a null effect. Scoring increases versus 
decreases varies however between the 3 sub-factors of competitive advantage.  
Comparative advantage scoring is based on individual factor increases imposing a 
decrease on competitive advantage. Therefore sub-factor increases are scored as (1) for 
their overall decreasing effect. Differential and focus advantage scoring is based on 
individual factor decreases imposing a decrease on competitive advantage. Therefore 
sub-factor decreases are scored as 1 for their overall decreasing effect. Neutral or null 
impact is scored as 0 along with any positive value due to it not imposing an overall 
decrease.  
Figure A2.11: Competitive Advantage-Table of Set Membership Scores  
QCA Comparative Advantage: Competitive Advantage Factors
Comparative Advantage Differential  Advantanges Focus Advantages Competitive Advantage Reform Outcome
Policy Policy Regulatory Due Labor Facilities/Technology/ Tax Rate Discount Privacy Common Law Regulatory Niche Markets Impact
No. Dillegence Costs Costs Specialist Costs Efficiency
Incr(1)/Decr(0)/Nill(0) Incr(1)/Decr(0)/Nill(0) Incr(1)/Decr(0)/Nill(0) Incr(0)/Decr(1)/Nill(0) Incr(0)/Decr(1)/Nill(0) Incr(0)/Decr(1)/Nill(0) Incr(0)/Decr(1)/Nill(0) Incr(0)/Decr(1)/Nill(0) Proportions Impact
1 **US-UKOT7 IGA (FATCA)** Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
2 UK-CDOT Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
3 **UK-Cen Reg Ben Own** Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Nill (o) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=2, 0=1, n=5 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
4 OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Decr** (1) Nill (0) Drc/Incr(1,0)* Nill (0) 1=3, 0=1, n=4 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
5 FATF - Trans Benf Own Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
6 G20 - Ben Own Trans Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
7 G20 - MCMAATM Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) 1=0, 0=1, n=7 Incr/Nill (0) Adopt (1)
8 EU - AMLD4 Incr**(1) Nill (0) Incr (1) *?Decr?*(1) Decr (1) Nill (0) Incr (0) Nill (0) **1=4, 1=1, n=3 Incr/Nill (0) **Adopt** (1)
9 US-FATCA Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Decr (1) 1=5, 0=0, n=3 Decr (1) Reject (0)
10 UK Pub Cen Reg Ben Own Incr (1) Nill (0) Incr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Nill (0) Decr (1) Decr (1) 1=5, 0=0, n=3 Decr (1) Reject (0)
Ratio 2.3|1 0|10 2.3|1 1|10 3|2 0|10 1|2.3 1|5 2.3|1 4|1
Proporation 7|10 0|10 7|10 1|10 6|10 0|10 3|10 2|10 7|10 8|10  
The final column of figure A2.11 listing the competitive advantage impact 
increase or decrease imposed by each policy is calculated proportionally.  Impact is the 
product of the proportional weighting of total decreases (1s), increases (0s), neutral (0) in 
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addition to the adoption requirements of early & non-universal adoption). Adoption 
requirements could not be scored with the competitive advantage factors in the same 
table due to their absence of a null value which distorts the degree of policy impact 
because of imbalanced proportions. They are scored separately and placed in the truth 
table along with the degree and impact result.  The proportional totals plus adoption 
requirements are converted into binary values for decreases (1) and increases (0) on 
competitive advantage imposed by each policy.335  The conversion thresholds are tabled 
in Figure A2.12. 
Figure A2.12: Competitive Advantage-Conversion Thresholds  
Competitive Advantage: Conversion Thresholds
N&S Conditions Degree Impact Value
Very High (Negative)
All combos above 1=5 +
1=5, 0=3, n=0
Very High Impact-Sufficient 1=5, 0=2, n=1 Decrease
1=5, 0=1, n=2
1=5, 0=0, n=3
High (Negative) 
1=4, 0=4, n=0
High Impact-Necessary 1=4, 0=3, n=1 1
 +NonUniversal Adoption-Sufficient 1=4, 0=2, n=3 Decrease
and/or 1=4, 0=1, n=3
 +Early Adoption-Sufficient 1=4, 0=0, n= 4
Moderate (Negative)
1=3, 0=3, n=2
Moderate Impact-Sufficient 1=3, 0=2, n=3 Decrease
 +NonUniversal Adoption-Necessary 1=3, 0=1, n=4
 +Early Adoption-Necessary 1=3, 0=0, n=5
Low (Negative)
1=2, 0=4, n=2
1=2, 0=3, n=3
Manageable Decrease 1=2, 0=2, n=4 Null 0
based on the configuration of factors 1=2, 0=1, n=5
All combinations 1=1
Increase (Positive)/Nill
Increase/Nill All combos 0=1 + Increase  
A2.4 Stage 1 QCA Result 
The QCA results are derived deductively, starting with fixed necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the five overregulation responses, then moving backwards to 
identify which policy responses parallel those of overregulation. Consistency thresholds 
and coverage scores are therefore not set ahead of the analysis. Likewise, the process of 
                                                 
335 In calculating the conversion thresholds, neutral impact is totaled independently as “n” separately from 
total decreases (1s) and increases (0s) based on a proportional calculation of impact. 
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condition minimization and consolidation for the elimination of redundancies and 
contradictions are not the first steps of the analytical process. With established 
conditions, the process begins with an examination of the patterns and trends in the truth 
table.  
The relationships between combinations of conditions and the outcome of interest 
(overregulation response) are summarized in a truth table (Figure A.13). The truth table is 
built from the collection of tables of set memberships for each overregulation response. 
The table summarizes crisp conditions, grouping together the combinations of set 
membership scores leading to the particular overregulation responses in response to the 
10 prescribed policies. All values in the table are binary listed as 1 for the presence of the 
condition or factor, or 0 for the absence of a given condition or factor. The table identifies 
which policies prompted a combinations of activities and characteristics identified 
specifically with each of the five overregulation responses. The truth table displays where 
variation in response occurred leading to a common outcome. The response outcome is 
listed in the third end column displaying whether the response met the necessary and 
sufficient conditions required for that particular overregulation response. The final 
column lists the reform outcome indicating if the policy associated with the response was 
adopted as part of the reform or rejected. The consolidated truth table is displayed in 
Figure A2.13.  
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Figure A2.13: Overregulation Truth Table 
QCA: Overregulation Truth Table 
Policy No. Policy:                                   Conditions Response Ratio/Prop OutCome
Adoption Evaluated Reported Compliant Reported Partial Compl Reported NonCompliant No Current Infractions Current Infractions Result
Nec & Suff Conditions Compl Necessary Necessary Necessary NA NA Necessary NA
P1 US-US/UKOT FATCA IGA Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P2 UK-CDOT Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P3 UK-CenRegBenOwn Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl 2.3|1  / 7|10 Adopt (1)
P4 OECD - "CRS & AEOI" Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P5 FATF - Trans Benf Own Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) NA Yes (1) NA Compl Adopt (1)
P6 G20 - Ben Own Trans Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
P7 G20 - MCMAATM Yes (1) FATF/OECD FATF/OECD NA NA FATF/OECD NA Compl Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions Creat Compl Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Necessary NA Sufficient NA
P8 EU - AMLD4 No (0) Yes (1) No Yes (+) NA Yes (1) NA CreatCompl 1|9 / 1/10 Adopt (1)
Nec & Suff Conditions NonCompl Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Sufficient
P9 US-FATCA Yes (1) Yes (1) NA NA Yes  (1) NA No (0) NonCompl 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)
Nec & Suff Conditions BlkMk/LwTr Sufficient Necessary NA NA Necessary NA Necessary 
                            -          -            -                     -                       -                       -                      -                     - BlackMarket/LwTr  -  - 
                                  Conditions
Active Membership Legislation Removal of Harmful Granted Specific 
Lobbying Group Change Policy or Legislation Advantages
Nec & Suff Conditions Capture Necessary Sufficient Necessary Sufficient Sufficient
P10 UK-Public Central Reg Beneficial Own Yes (1) No (0) Yes (1) Yes (1) No (0) Capture 1|9  / 1|10 Reject (0)  
An examination of the consolidated truth table reveals the trends present in the 
data set, in particular the relationship between conditions and their characteristics. The 
details of the set relations are summarized and tabled in figure A2.14. Compliance, 
having four necessary and no sufficient conditions, consequently displayed only a single 
configuration among 7 out of 10 policies (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7) with a marked 
consistency score of 0.70. The raw and unique coverage of the compliance response 
paralleled this 0.70 score of the 10 policies. The fitness scores indicate that the necessary 
conditions for compliance are the mutually dependent and the most prevalent action 
prompted by the reform policies.  
Figure A2.14: Overregulation Truth Table 
QCA Result:  Overregulation Responses
Result Summary
Necessary Sufficient Possible Displayed Consistency of Raw/Unique
Responses Conditions Conditions Configurations  Configuration Configuration Coverage Total Policies: 10
Compliance 4 0 32 1 .7 (70%) 0.70 (70%)  P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7(7 total) 
Creative Compliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10)%  P8 (1)
Noncompliance 2 2 32 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P9
Capture 2 3 64 1 0.10 (10%) 0.10 (10 %) (1) P10
Black Market Low Transparency Activities 3 1 32 1 0 0 0
 
 The creative compliance response, subject to 2 necessary and 3 sufficient 
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conditions, displayed only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 in relation to policy 8 
(P8). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency 
score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. Likewise 
the noncompliance response subject to 2 necessary and 2 sufficient conditions, displayed 
only 1 configuration out of a possible 32 in relation to policy 9 (P9). The configuration 
was only present in 1 out of 10 policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with 
identical paralleling raw and unique coverage scores. The capture response, subject to 2 
necessary and 3 sufficient conditions, displayed  only 1 configuration out of a possible 64 
in relation to policy 10 (P10). The configuration was only present only in 1 out of 10 
policies with a consistency score of 0.10 (10%) with identical paralleling raw and unique 
coverage scores. Last, the black market/low transparency response, subject to 3 necessary 
and 1 sufficient condition, was markedly absent in response to any of the 10 policies and 
as a result has no accompanying fit scores. 
In practical terms, the second stage QCA results indicate that full compliance and 
adoption of US-FATCA, the UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership, and 
the EU-AMLD4 would each significantly decrease the UKOTs comparative advantage in 
financial services. The impact of the reporting based polices OECD-CRS & AEOI, US-
UKOT FATCA IGA, and UK-CDOT on competitive advantage factors are moderate with 
non-universal adoption and no early adoption.  As a result they have a null effect on 
competitive advantage. The UK-Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership has low 
impact on competitive advantage factors and an overall null effect on competitive 
advantage. The three recommended standards, the FATF-Transparency in Beneficial 
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Ownership, G20-Benenficial Ownership Transparency, and G20-MCMAATM have 
positive impact with the effect of increasing competitive advantage. Each policy’s QCA 
result on its competitive advantage result is briefly explained individually. 
-US FATCA:  1=5, 0=0, n=3 /  Negative High Impact / Decrease: 
Has one of the two the greatest impacts on the International Competitive 
Advantage of the UKOTs in the financial services industry of all the prescribed reforms. 
Of the eight (8)  factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive 
advantages relative to their competitors, full compliance would negatively impact five 
(5), resulting in an increase in operational costs, contraction in differentiation 
characteristics, and reduced ability to compete in niche markets.  US FATCA decreases 
comparative advantage generally (universal application) among all jurisdictions globally, 
increasing costs in two of the four competitive advantage factors: regulatory due 
diligence and facilities/technology/specialist. The legislation imposes these costs across 
the entire financial services industry among all competing jurisdictions save the US. 
FATCA decreases advantages in two of the four differentiation factors by generally 
decreasing privacy across the entire financial services industry as well as causing 
regulatory inefficiency universally due to its legal incompatibility with localized privacy 
laws in most jurisdictions. FATCA decreases focus advantages in the territory’s niche 
markets by making the US a larger competitor in all markets as they are not subject to 
FATCA costs and requirements (no reciprocation requirements). FATCA defacto makes 
companies in the territories answerable to US financial regulatory authorities rather than 
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local authorities.336 Noncompliance is punished by an immediate large fine or tax.337  
FATCA’s negative impacts on Competitive Advantage factors are general to the 
jurisdictional competitors along with the UKOT7 with the exception of the US, to whom 
the territories would lose their competitive advantage in preferred niche markets. Threats 
to privacy and regulatory inefficiency would degrade the quality of the product offering 
of the territories driving business to jurisdictions not subject to FATCA imposed 
problems, but willing to absorb its fines. Therefore full compliance would decrease both 
the absolute and relative international competitive advantages of the UKOTs in financial 
services. 
-UK Pub. Cen. Reg. of Ben. Own.1=5, 0=0, n=3 / Very High Negative Impact/Decrease: 
Has one of the two the greatest impacts on the International Competitive 
Advantage of the UKOTs in the financial services industry of all the prescribed reforms. 
Of the eight (8)  factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive 
advantages relative to their competitors, full compliance would negatively impact five 
(5), resulting in an increase in operational costs, contraction in differentiation 
characteristics, and reduced ability to compete in niche markets.   
The Public Beneficial Ownership Register decreases comparative advantage in 
two of the four competitive advantage factors: regulatory due diligence and 
facilities/technology/specialist. The policy increases due diligence costs by adding the 
                                                 
336 Laurie Hatten Boyd, “Are Problems Looming for FATCA and the Reciprocal IGA?” The Tax Adviser, 
June 1, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016,  http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2016/jun/problems-looming-
for-fatca-and-reciprocal-iga.html.  
337 “Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),” US Department of the Treasury, Modified March 
29, 2017, accessed June 4, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx.  
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responsibility of maintaining a register, populating it, guaranteeing specialized access, 
while maintaining privacy and security. It increases technology and facilities costs in the 
expense to purchase and maintain the digital data storage system. The Public Beneficial 
Ownership Register decreases differential advantage in two of the four differentiation 
factors: privacy and regulatory efficiency. It eliminates privacy by making beneficial 
ownership information held by the territories publicly accessible. The elimination of 
privacy in turn decreases regulatory efficiency due to the “public” component’s legal 
incompatibility with localized privacy laws in the territories and the existing contractual 
arrangements with clients based on those laws.  The policy eliminates any focus 
advantages in any niche markets by eliminating privacy which is a staple of the financial 
services industry. The UK Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership policy 
significantly decreases the international competitive advantage of the territories in 
financial services negatively impacting multiple comparative and differentiation factors 
and eliminating any focus advantage in niche markets by eliminating privacy in financial 
services. 
-EU AMLD4   1=4, 0=1, n=2 / Negative High Impact / Non-Universal / Decrease: 
Has the second largest impact on the International Competitive Advantage of the 
UKOTs in the financial services industry of all the prescribed reforms. Of the eight (8) 
factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive advantages relative to 
their competitors, full compliance would negatively impact four (4).  The policy holds the 
potential for a possibly negative impact on tax rates in the future but is presently under 
discussion. Even so, the negative impacts on differentiation capacity are offset by its 
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positive impact on regulatory efficiency.   
At the behest of the UK, the UKOTs have undertaken only partial compliance 
(Registers of Beneficial Ownership) of the AMLD4. Full adoption of the EU AMLD4 is 
not required by the UKOT7 as they are not EU member states (except Gibraltar). As EU 
Overseas Territories they are however expected to comply sufficiently with its 
requirements or risk being placed on a listing of non-cooperative third country 
jurisdictions in the future.  Through UK demands on the territories, they have together 
with the UK met the AMLD4’s requirements for registers of beneficial ownership. The 
territories have not taken steps to comply with any other aspects of the AMLD4 other 
than that imposed by the UK. Compliance with the register requirement decreases 
comparative advantage in two of the four comparative advantage factors: regulatory due 
diligence and facilities/technology/specialist. It increases due diligence costs by adding 
the responsibility of maintaining a register, populating it, guaranteeing specialized access, 
and maintaining privacy and security. It increases technology and facilities costs in the 
expense to purchase and maintain the digital data system.  Establishing central registers 
has no impact on three of the four differential advantage factors, but enhances 
differentiation capacity by increasing regulatory efficiency through compliance with EU 
regional standards.  
However, any further compliance with AMLD4 requirements hold the unknown 
possibility of decreasing comparative advantage by further increasing due diligence costs 
via its requirements for Expanded Due Diligence (EDD) regarding suspicious individuals 
in relation to money laundering, financial crime, and tax evasion. Further compliance 
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also holds the possibility of reducing differentiation capacity due to the possibility of the 
EU penalizing a future list of ”High Risk Countries” identified under the AMLD4 in the 
future.   
Therefore complying with Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership component 
of the AMLD4 moderately impacts the international competitive advantage of the 
territories in financial services. It increases costs in multiple comparative advantage 
factors, while at the same time enhancing differentiation via enhanced regulatory 
efficiency which positively adds to product safety, quality, and reputation.   
-OECD CRS & AEOI     1=3, 0=1, n=4 / Nil: 
Of the eight (8)  factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive 
advantages relative to their competitors, full compliance would negatively impact three 
(3), resulting in an increase in operational costs, contraction in differentiation 
characteristics, and no impact on specialization or niche markets.  Even so, the negative 
impacts on differentiation capacity are offset by its positive impact on regulatory 
efficiency.   However, the negative impact is universal given that it is the international 
standard.   
The CRS & AEOI decrease comparative advantage generally (universal 
application) among all jurisdictions globally, increasing costs in two of the four 
competitive advantage factors: regulatory due diligence and 
facilities/technology/specialist. The legislation imposes these costs across the entire 
financial services industry among all competing jurisdictions save the US who has opted 
not to participate based on conflicts national privacy laws. The policy decreases 
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advantages in two of the four differentiation factors by generally decreasing privacy 
across the entire financial services industry as well as causing regulatory inefficiency 
universally due to its legal incompatibility with localized privacy laws in most 
jurisdictions. However, all jurisdictions are subject to the compatibility problems which 
early adopters seek to correct before noncompliance becomes punishable by sanctions in 
the period of general adoption. There is no impact on focus advantages in the territory’s 
niche markets are areas of specialization. Given the global adoption of the CRS & AEOI 
as the global standard in financial services, subjecting all jurisdictions to the same costs 
for full compliance, the territories face no relative loss in international competitive 
advantage within the financial services industry. 
-US/UKOT7 FATCA IGA       1=3, 0=1, n=4 / Nil: 
The IGA, signed four years after the introduction of FATCA, corrects the 
decrease in regulatory efficiency of the initial FATCA legislation caused by 
incompatibility with local privacy laws. The correction is achieved by requiring the 
governments of the UKOTs (rather than FFIs) to report to the US information about 
financial accounts held by US taxpayers, or by foreign entities in which US taxpayers 
hold a substantial ownership interest. The local governments are responsible for 
collecting the information by their own means according to their local laws and 
legislation. Failure of local companies to report or comply is subject to sanctions by the 
local government who can then in turn further a report of noncompliance to the US, 
thereby keeping the companies under the authority of the local governments. Regulatory 
efficiency is increased by minimizing the losses imposed by FATCA and achieving full 
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compliance which positively adds to product safety, quality, and reputation. As a result, 
with the exception of the US, there is no relative loss of competitive advantage as the 
territories can now comply with FATCA as all of their competition are required to so. 
-UK CDOT: CDOT:     1=3, 0=1, n=4 / Nil: 
Of the eight (8)  factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive 
advantages relative to their competitors, full compliance with either  policy would 
negatively impact three (3), resulting in an increase in operational costs, contraction in 
differentiation characteristics, and no impact on specialization or niche markets.  Even so, 
the negative impacts on differentiation capacity are offset by their positive impact on 
regulatory efficiency. 
CDOT decreases Comparative Advantage by increasing costs in two of the four 
competitive advantage factors: regulatory due diligence and 
facilities/technology/specialist. The territories must enforce reporting and adoption of 
technological solutions by which to do so. CDOT decreases advantages in one of the four 
differentiation factors by decreasing privacy relative to the UK market. However, it 
simultaneously enhances a single factor in regulatory efficiency through compliance with 
UK regulatory requirements. The policy has no impact on the focus advantages in the 
territory’s niche markets as the scope of CDOT is extremely limited. The policy is 
directed only at UK individuals and entities, who represent only a fraction of the global 
markets of the territories. Therefore, while posing no threat to losses in the territories’ 
international competitive advantage in financial services, CDOT’s impact is relatively 
small whether negative or positive.   
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-The UK Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership       1=2, 0=1, n=5 / Nil: 
Of the eight (8) factor endowments from which the territories derive competitive 
advantages relative to their competitors, full compliance would negatively impact two 
(2), resulting in an increase in operational costs, and no contraction in differential or 
focus advantages. Rather, implementation of the registers positively impacts 
differentiation capacity by increasing regulatory efficiency. The null effects of the policy 
(no impact on 5 of the 8 factors) outnumber the total negative and positive impacts on 
competitive advantage. It has the second smallest degree of impact of the prescribed 
policies. 
The UK Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership eliminates the privacy 
decrease caused by the “public” component demanded in the initial legislation. This in 
turn eliminates the regulatory inefficiency caused by the “public” component due to legal 
incompatibility with localized privacy laws in the territories and existing contractual 
arrangements with clients based on those laws. It still decreases comparative advantage in 
two of the four comparative advantage factors: regulatory due diligence and 
facilities/technology/specialist. It increases due diligence costs by adding the 
responsibility of maintaining a register, populating it, guaranteeing specialized access, 
and maintaining privacy and security. It increases technology and facilities costs in the 
expense to purchase and maintain the digital data system. It however has no impact on 
three of the four differential advantage factors, but positively impacts regulatory 
efficiency, increasing it through fulfilling Beneficial Ownership recommendations and 
requirements of the EU AMLD4, FATF & G20.   
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There is no impact on focus advantages relative to niche markets. The UK Central 
Registers of Beneficial Ownership moderately impacts the international competitive 
advantage of the territories in financial services. It increases costs in multiple 
comparative advantage factors, while at the same time enhancing differentiation via 
enhanced regulatory efficiency which positively adds to product safety, quality, and 
reputation.   
-The FATF Transparency in Beneficial Ownership     1=0, 0=1, n=7 / Nil: 
-G20 Beneficial Ownership Transparency      1=0, 0=1, n=7 / Nil: 
-G20 MCMAATM     1=0, 0=1, n=7 / Nil: 
Full compliance with the policies have no negative impact on the territories’ 
competitive advantage in financial services. They each have mostly null effects on 
competitive advantage factors (7 of 8), with the exception of positively impacting 
differential advantages by increasing regulatory efficiency. 
A2.5 Stage 3QCA: Composite Mechanism  
In the stage 3 QCA, with both theories combined, the composite mechanism 
dually dictates that the impact of each policy on competitive advantage determined the 
choice of response to that policy, and that the variety of available responses were framed 
by the elements of overregulation present in the policy.  The central elements of the 
composite causal mechanism include a competitive advantage impact assessment and 
overregulation framed choices of response.  
Under the assumption of the combined theories as the active causal mechanism in 
the process, the chronology of the reform proceeds from conditions of overregulation in 
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the regulatory environment brought about by multiple prescribed policy adoptions by 
regulatory authorities. These conditions prompt the UKOTs to first conduct a competitive 
advantage impact assessment to determine whether each policy stands to decrease or 
increase their competitive advantages in financial services. If the policy did not stand to 
decrease competitive advantage or enhanced it, the policy was met with a compliance 
response and adopted as part of the reform. If the policy stood to decrease competitive 
advantage, compliance was forgone and it was rejected then met with either 
noncompliance or one of the other three overregulation responses. Those responses 
included capture, black market/low transparency, or noncompliance while awaiting 
reregulation-deregulation-regulatory reform.  
If changes occurred in the policy via capture or reregulation, it was reassessed, 
and if found to no longer decrease competitive advantage, was then met with a 
compliance and adoption response. If the policy had both sanctionable and non-
sanctionable elements, of which some parts negatively impacted competitive advantage 
while others does not, a creative compliance response was followed by adoption as part 
of the reform.  The end result was the reform outcome comprised of eight policy 
adoptions of which seven are compliance responses, and one a creative compliance 
response. Two of the policies were rejected (FATCA, Public Central Registers of 
Beneficial Ownership), one with a noncompliance response, the other with a capture 
response.  The two rejected policies were later adopted in a different form from their 
initial introduction by regulatory authorities (UKOTs FATCA IGA, Central Registers of 
Beneficial Ownership). 
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Composite Mechanism Explanation by Policy:  
-US FATCA(2010):  The policy was initially rejected with a noncompliance response due 
to its very high negative impact (decrease) on competitive advantage factors, awaiting 
reregulation, deregulation, or regulatory reform due to the universal nature of challenges 
posed by FATCA to jurisdictions worldwide. The territories entered into negotiations 
with the US (after initial preparations by the UK) citing their inability to comply with 
FATCA in its initial form and sought a solution that would allow for their compliance 
with US reporting requirements. After these types requests mass mounted against 
FATCA by numerous states worldwide, the US restructured the policy to accommodate 
the individual needs of select jurisdictions in the form of Intergovernmental Agreements 
(IGAs).  
The US-US/UKOT7 FATCA IGA (2014)  was agreed between the territories and 
US requiring  the governments of the UKOTs (rather than FFIs) to report to the IRS 
information about financial accounts held by US taxpayers, or by foreign entities in 
which US taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest. The local governments would 
be responsible for collecting the information by their own means according to their local 
laws and legislation. Failure to report the information to the local authorities is subject to 
sanction by the local government, who thereafter can report the entity to US authorities 
for a further round of sanctions.  The IGA had a null effect on competitive advantage. It 
actually increased regulatory efficiency by minimizing the legally problems imposed by 
FATCA, resulting in relatively no loss of competitive advantage (with the exception of 
the US), allowing the territories to comply and adopt the FACTA IGA. 
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-UK Public Central Registers of Ben. Ownership:  The policy was initially rejected due to 
its very high negative impact (decrease) on competitive advantage factors, as the 
territories pursued a capture strategy (capture response) employing localized diplomatic 
resources in the UK to influence the structure of the policy in their by removal of its  
“public” requirement. The attempt was successful as the “public” element was withdrawn 
and the policy presented as the UK Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership (2016).  
The revision had a null effect on competitive advantage. The elimination of the decrease 
in privacy by the removal of the “public” component in turn also eliminated the 
regulatory inefficiency caused by its legal incompatibility with localized privacy laws in 
the territories. The policy allowed for an increase in regulatory efficiency by allowing the 
territories to fulfilling Beneficial Ownership recommendations and requirements of the 
EU AMLD4, FATF & G20.  With an overall null impact on the territories’ competitive 
advantage in financial services, they able to comply and adopt the central registers as part 
of the reforms.   
-EU AMLD4: Full adoption of the EU AMLD4 is not required by the UKOT7 as they are 
not EU member states (except Gibraltar). As EU Overseas Territories they are however 
expected to comply sufficiently with its requirements or risk being placed on a listing of 
non-cooperative third country jurisdictions in the future.  At the behest of the UK, the 
UKOTs (along with the UK) have undertaken partial compliance with the AMLD4 
meeting only the requirements for registers of beneficial ownership which have only a 
null effect on competitive advantage. The total policy has a high negative impact 
(decrease) on competitive advantage and as a result the territories have taken no steps 
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towards further compliance. They had a noncompliance response to all non-sanctionable 
components of the AMLD4.  
Any further compliance with AMLD4 requirements hold the unknown possibility 
of decreasing comparative advantage by further increasing due diligence costs via its 
requirements for Expanded Due Diligence (EDD) regarding suspicious individuals in 
relation to money laundering, financial crime, and tax evasion. Further compliance also 
holds the possibility of reducing differentiation capacity due to the possibility of the EU 
penalizing a future list of ”High Risk Countries” identified under the AMLD4 in the 
future.   
Therefore in addition to the modest negative impact on competitive advantage 
imposed by costs of establishing and maintaining the register, the UKOTs had to 
calculate the potential high negative impact the Enhanced Due Diligence component and 
risk of being listed as “High Risk Country on their competitive advantages. As a result 
the AMLD4 was met with a creative compliance response and adoption as part of the 
reform; complying with the sanctionable requirements, but not complying with non-
sanctionable requirements. 
-UK CDOT: CDOT / OECD CRS & AEOI:  
The two reporting regimes having a null effect on the territories’ competitive 
advantage in financial services. The universal scope of adoption of the CRS & AOEI as 
the global reporting standard mitigates its relative negative impact on competitive 
advantage given that it imposes the same costs on all competitors. Likewise the limited 
scope of CDOT to the UK market greatly limits its impact on competitive advantage 
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because the niche markets of the territories are global in scale. Therefore they were both 
met with a compliance response and adopted as part of the reform. 
-The FATF Transparency in Beneficial Ownership / G20 Beneficial Ownership 
Transparency / G20 MCMAATM:   
The policies have no negative impact on the territories’ competitive advantage in 
financial services and were met with a compliance response and adoption. They each 
have mostly null effects on competitive advantage but serve to increase regulatory 
efficiency. 
175 
 
 
APPENIX 3 
LOBBY REPORT 
 
Organization: The Government of the British Virgin Islands London Office 
 
Date: May 1, 2017 
 
Duration: 1 Hour 
 
Location: London, UK 
 
The London Offices of the BVI refused to provide any formal paperwork for consent or 
any acknowledgement of discussion of their lobbying practices for research purpose. The 
office would not consent to an interview written or verbal. The office stated that it was in 
protecting their interests and image not to formally endorse any lobby claims other than 
official diplomatic meetings.  
 
The London Office was only willing to provide an informal basic lined responses in 
regard to their lobbying activities on Financial Services Matters. 
 
1. The UKOTs lobby vigorously UK legislators and financial institutions to 
influence policy in their favor, particularly in regard to financial services.  
 
2. These activities involve numerous formal and informal individual meetings 
annually by each territory to both friendly and unfriendly legislators.  
 
3. These relationships are cultivated through social groups with formal and informal 
memberships linked directly to the UKOTs’ diplomatic offices. 
 
4. Previous legislators and former UK Representatives in the territories are used as 
consultants in the lobbying process.   
 
5. The UKOTs Lobby was instrumental in deflating initial and later efforts to 
impose Public Central Registers of Beneficial Ownership on the territories. 
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